NEW PARLIAMENTARY GROUPING CHALLENGES PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 000934 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HA SUBJECT: NEW PARLIAMENTARY GROUPING CHALLENGES PRESIDENT PREVAL REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 115 ¶B. PORT AU PRINCE 344 ¶C. PORT AU PRINCE 559 ¶D. PORT AU PRINCE 701 ¶E. PORT AU PRINCE 737 ¶F. PORT AU PRINCE 865 ¶G. PORT AU PRINCE 876 PORT AU PR 00000934 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: An ad hoc grouping of deputies from diverse political parties calling itself the ''Cooperative of Progressive Parliamentarians'' (CPP) is emerging as the majority bloc in the Chamber of Deputies and a foil to President Preval. Born of opposition to stale, corrupt leadership in the lower chamber, the CPP then became the prime mover behind the rejection of President Preval's first two candidates to succeed Prime Minister Alexis. Basking in their new-found clout, CPP members now see themselves as a force for better governance, national development, and social justice -- and as a check on anti-democratic designs they impute to the President. Behind such lofty principles lies a great deal of petty special interests and pork-barrel politicking which is negatively impacting the Prime Minister selection process. A grouping such as the CPP could arise only in a political system such as Haiti's where political parties are weak and have little control over officials elected under their banner. The CPP remains a loose conglomeration, and its future stability and effectiveness are far from assured. End summary. Origins of the CPP -------------- ¶2. (C) The ''Cooperative of Progressive Parliamentarians'' includes 52 deputies from most of the larger political parties in the Chamber of Deputies. Since the April 12 ouster of Prime Minister Alexis and his government (ref C), the grouping has emerged as the dominant force in the lower house of the legislature. Poloffs spoke with CPP members F. Lucas Sainvil (Lespwa, Port-de-Paix/Northwest),Jean Marcel Lumerant (Alyans, Grand-Goave/West),Ronald Lareche (Fusion, Capotille/North),Patrick Domond (Lespwa, Jacmel/Southeast), Gazner Douze (Fusion, Cornillon/West) and Stephen Benoit (Independent, Petionville/West) to explore the group's origins and aspirations. By their accounts, the CPP grew out of the Chamber's Anti-Corruption Commission in mid-2007, which sought to reduce corruption and waste in the administration of the Chamber. The CPP blamed the Chamber's financial and managerial problems on Chamber President P. Eric Jean-Jacques (Lespwa, Tabarre/West) and the former Chamber treasurer, Maxeau Balthazar (Fusion, Belle-Anse/Southeast). The CPP also arose to oppose the then-largest bloc in the Chamber, the ''Group of 60,'' another mixed-party grouping led by Chamber President Jean-Jacques. (Note: The Group of 60 no longer exists, and some of its former members have joined the CPP. End note.) ¶3. (SBU) The CPP gained little traction until the campaign for a new leadership bureau in the Chamber, in which the group organized to wrest leadership positions from Jean-Jacques and Balthazar. In the January 2008 elections, CPP members won three of the five bureau positions, but lost their bid to unseat Chamber President Jean-Jacques (ref A). The CPP gained further authority and legitimacy by securing the chairmanships of 14 of 17 committees in committee elections last January. These victories inspired more deputies to join the CPP. CPP Composition, Alleged Platform -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Deputy F. Lucas Sainvil (Lespwa, Port-de-Paix/Northwest) heads the bloc's seven member ''coordinating committee.'' The CPP, now boasting 52 members, is composed of members elected under the banner of many different parties. The largest group is Lespwa, with 17 members. Fanmi Lavalas, Fusion, Alyans, Union, Artibonite in PORT AU PR 00000934 002.2 OF 004 Action, and some of the smaller political parties also have members in the CPP. OPL (Struggling People's Organization) is the only major political party with no representation in the bloc. Deputy Lumerant claimed that the CPP members still defer to their political parties on all matters and simply represent their parties' points of view within the CPP. (Comment: This was not borne out in the votes to confirm Prime Minister nominees Ericq Pierre and Bob Manuel, when all CPP deputies present voted according to the CPP line, in some cases opposing the official positions of their own political parties. End Comment.) CPP members say their platform contains three fundamental elements: good governance, ''national production,'' and social equality. They argue their group seeks to strengthen the fundamental role of the parliament, and to act as a check and control on the actions of the executive branch. Privately, however, CPP members say the bloc also seeks to secure reelection of its members, and that appears to be the dominant motivation. Gaining PM Alexis' Favor, Gaining Momentum -------------- ¶5. (C) The first cohesive CPP vote took place in February, when a small group of non-CPP deputies convoked PM Jacques-Edouard Alexis for a vote of no-confidence. Alexis survived the February 28 vote, with all CPP members voting in his favor (ref B). Deputy Lumerant reported that the CPP disagreed with Alexis' politics but voted to keep him in office in the interest of political stability. Deputies Douze and Lareche told Poloffs that the CPP voted against this no-confidence motion because they believed the small group of deputies who called for the interpellation were corrupt and were using the vote to divert attention from internal Chamber reforms. Regardless of the motive, the vote helped the CPP gain Alexis' confidence and support, and also subjected them to his influence. Following the vote in his favor, Alexis began working with the CPP to help them establish a true majority in Parliament aligned with the Alexis government. The CPP is developing some structural strength, with members now required to pay a monthly fee of 1000 Haitian Gourdes (approximately USD 26) to help finance the group's operations. The CPP and the Hunt for a New Prime Minister -------------- ¶6. (C) Before Alexis had time to benefit from this new alliance, riots erupted in Haiti in early April and the Senate voted him out of office (ref C). The CPP voted as a bloc against Preval's first candidate to replace Alexis, Ericq Pierre, citing discrepancies in his official documents (ref D). Non-CPP deputies, including Chamber President Jean-Jacques, at the time accused the CPP of accepting payoffs from Alexis. Poloffs were shown copies of checks signed by Alexis allegedly to bribe deputies. Deputy Benoit alleged to Poloff that these checks were actually legitimate GOH support for schools and other projects in Deputies' districts, and denied there was anything underhanded about them. Deputy Lumerant claimed that the CPP also opposed Pierre because he failed to convince them of his leadership qualities, going so far as to inform them that he knew nothing about Haitian public administration. The CPP was further put off by Pierre when he informed them that President Preval, not the PM, would most likely nominate members of the Cabinet. ¶7. (C) All CPP members present also voted against Preval's second PM candidate, Robert Manuel (ref F). Deputy Lumerant portrayed this as a more difficult choice, since Manuel was a skilled political player with personal ties to many CPP Deputies. CPP members say their decision to oppose Manuel arose primarily from his failure to provide documentation proving he satisfied eligibility requirements set down in the Constitution. The CPP also feared that voting for Manuel because of his personal ties, despite patent gaps in his documentation, would have destroyed the CPP's credibility and possibly caused the demise of the group. Deputy Lareche added that some Deputies suspected that Manuel had politicized the police, maintained ties with gangs, and aided PORT AU PR 00000934 003.2 OF 004 drug traffickers when he was a senior security official in the late 1990s under the first Presidency of Rene Preval. It's about the Constitution - But Also Re-election -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Further conversations with CPP representatives indicate that the fight over the PM nominees was about more than respecting the Constitution. The public CPP line has been that a PM candidate need but satisfy the constitutional eligibility requirements to garner CPP support. CPP members said publicly that in a meeting of their representatives with President Preval June 18, they did not discuss specific candidates, but insisted only that Preval follow the constitutionally-mandated process and consult with the Presidents of both Chambers before announcing his nominee, and that the candidate meet the constitutional requirements for eligibility. However, several CPP members admitted privately to Poloffs that they have demanded from the President and the PM candidate funding commitments for projects in their districts so that as many CPP deputies as possible are re-elected in 2009. Deputy Douze maintains that securing projects in members' districts is the best way to secure members' reelection. He argues this will strengthen Parliament as an institution by carrying over experienced deputies into the next legislature. Deputies Sainvil and Douze denied to Poloffs that the CPP acts in the interest or at the behest of caretaker PM Alexis. ¶9. (C) Deputy Douze was not swayed by PolCouns' argument that projects in districts were more properly the subject for negotiations with individual ministers once a government is in office, but that making such demands a condition for approving a Prime Minister came close to corruption. Polcouns stressed that the USG strongly believes that Haiti needs a new government now to move the country out of the current impasse, address the challenges the country faces, and give the international community a partner to implement assistance projects. Political leaders on both the executive and legislative branches must step up to their responsibilities and show the leadership that the current difficult situation demands. ¶10. (C) Both President Preval and Bob Manuel privately, and Eric Pierre publicly, have confirmed the legislators' horse-trading approach to the PM confirmation, and the executive branch's rejection of it. The President told the Ambassador that he had refused to countenance demands for cabinet posts, pet projects, and jobs for relatives in exchange for approval of his PM candidates (ref G). Bob Manual told the Ambassador that CPP members had demanded that he personally campaign for them and ensure their re-election in the 2009 legislative elections. After Ericq Pierre's rejection by the Chamber of Deputies, he declared in a press conference that legislators and their agents had made myriad demands for government positions, special favors, and pet projects in exchange for supporting him (ref E). CPP Suspects Darker Presidential Motives -------------- ¶11. (C) Deputies Sainvil and Douze confided to Poloffs that they fear that Preval's end goal is to rule without a functioning legislature, a common fear among parliamentarians. The CPP is concerned that Preval, like he did in 1998 with then-PM Alexis, intends first to obtain confirmation of the PM-nominee, and then appoint a government and allow it to rule without constitutionally-prescribed parliamentary confirmation. Because they are unsure they will have an opportunity to influence the Cabinet selection and development of a government platform, they feel justified in making their political and pork-barrel demands up front, as a condition for voting positively on the PM candidate's constitutional qualifications. (Note: Several deputies extrapolate the Preval plot even further, suspecting he may delay parliamentary elections indefinitely, allow senators' and deputies' terms to expire, and then rule by decree. End note.) PORT AU PR 00000934 004.2 OF 004 Comment: Does the CPP have staying power? -------------- ¶12. (C) Thus far, the CPP has stuck together to block three major initiatives: the censure of Alexis, and the candidacies of Pierre and Manuel. The bloc is a product of the weakness of Haiti's political parties, which exert little to no discipline over officials elected under their banners, and who are unable to organize a majority in either house of parliament. The CPP sees its primary role as a check against the executive and especially the President, to whom they attribute sinister schemes to eventually govern without interference from the legislature. In reality, it is a collection of interests tied together by one goal: re-election (and the perks serving in Parliament brings). We frankly see little indication it will push a reformist agenda in the fledgling Haitian parliament, nor that it has a broader political agenda beyond the immediate crisis. The CPP's cohesiveness will be tested after a new Prime Minister and government are installed, when we will see whether it can bring its influence to bear on shaping legislation. SANDERSON