HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE RESPONSE TO RECENT CIVIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 000644

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
S/CRS
INL FOR KEVIN BROWN AND ANGELIC YOUNG
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018
TAGS: KCRM PHUM PREL PGOV SNAR SOCI HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE RESPONSE TO RECENT CIVIL
DISTURBANCES: WHAT WORKED, WHAT DIDN'T

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Classified By: Charge Thomas C. Tighe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of civil unrest that led to
looting and vandalism, the Haitian National Police (HNP) is
looking at lessons learned and planning for future such
events. The HNP response to the crisis in April revealed
progress made in developing a professional police force but
also highlighted unmet needs, particularly in terms of
staffing, equipment and fuel, that significantly impacted the
HNP's ability to effectively and quickly respond to emerging
events. End summary.


2. (C) On April 3-9 Haiti suffered civil disturbances that
began in Les Cayes in the south and spread to Port au Prince
and cities in the central part of the country. The north
remained relatively quiet throughout the period and an uneasy
calm returned to the country starting April 10. In the
aftermath of those events, which included violent
demonstrations, vandalism and looting, the HNP has begun
analyzing what worked and what didn't during that period.
MINUSTAH is participating in that process as well as
conducting internal deliberations related to their own
response to events. The final statistical tally for the
period in the capital area is:
- four deaths and a number of injuries, some from rubber
bullets;
- 428 public and commercial buildings vandalized and looted
- 303 arrests
- 1 HNP officer and 15 MINUSTAH officers wounded
- an unspecified number of arms seizures, and
- one death of a MINUSTAH Nigerian police officer after the
major disturbances ended which may ot may not be connected to
the riots, circumstances still under investigation.

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The Good...
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3. (C) Several positive observations emerged from the HNP
experience: the police continued to show up for work
throughout the period in spite of the risks and the
difficulty in getting to the police stations; police showed
great restraint, with HNP Director General Andresol
specifically instructing the police to use non-lethal force
and respect the rights of the demonstrators; and the DG
publicly supported the right of the people to demonstrate
peacefully, while warning them that violence would not be
tolerated, a position that was publicly reiterated by
MINUSTAH SRSG Annabi as well. Both President Preval and SRSG
Annabi praised the HNP and MINUSTAH forces for their good
work and cooperation.

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The Bad...
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4. (C) The demonstrations began in Les Cayes where they
quickly turned violent, with four deaths occurring in that
area as well. Neither the response of the HNP nor MINUSTAH
was sufficient to quell the violence quickly, which in turn
may have encouraged demonstrators in other parts of the
country to take to the streets later and to attack government
and private facilities. Embassy sources in MINUSTAH during
the Les Cayes events reported that some local HNP officers
behaved in ways that made MINUSTAH suspect they were
cooperating with drug trafficking and other criminal elements
thought to be behind the violence there. In Port au Prince,
the HNP appears to have been caught off guard when violence
broke out April 7. They did not respond effectively to
barricades and burning tires until at least April 8. Neither
did they present much effective initial resistance to the
vandalism, looting, and window-breaking rampage in the
commercial district of Petionville. Among the facilities
subsequently attacked on April 9 was the Killick Haitian
Coast Guard base, which also houses the Sri Lankan Formed
Police Unit in Port au Prince. That attack was repelled by

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the Sri Lankans firing over the heads of the crowd. More
worrisome and now subject of intense scrutiny by the HNP and
MINUSTAH alike is the attack on the National Palace on April
8, in which the crowd nearly breached a gate left unlocked
before being forced back by Brazilian MINUSTAH troops. In
response to the heightened violence, the HNP DG wanted to
impose a curfew but was not authorized to do so. (Note:
MINUSTAH source told poloff it rejected HNP,s curfew
proposal for two reasons: UNPOL needed to remain focused
solely on restoring security and not/not monitoring and
supervising an overnight curfew; and UNPOL,s officers needed
to rest at night after spending hours on the streets during
the day, for the same reason. End note) Analysis of that
incident is being held behind closed doors at the HNP by a
select group that includes Bob Manuel, the President's law
enforcement/drug advisor; the HNP DG; Secretary of State for
Public Security Luc Eucher Joseph; and the Central Director
of Police Administration (DCPA),Germain Destorel.


5. (C) It was also evident that the HNP, in spite of strides
made in hiring and training new officers, is still
understaffed nationwide. The HNP currently has fewer than
9000 officers based primarily in Port au Prince, with a
projected need for at least 14,000 to police the entire
country. Coverage in the provinces is even worse than in
Port au Prince. Exacerbating that problem is a lack of
equipment and resources for those officers on duty. The HNP
reports that during the crisis they lacked sufficient body
armor, shields and helmets, rubber bullets, and tear gas.
During the events, NAS assisted the HNP, with the cooperation
of MINUSTAH, in retrieving nearly 1000 canisters of tear gas
from the USG-controlled bunker at the Police Academy to
facilitate dispersing the disorderly crowds by non-lethal
means. Other resources were in severely low supply,
including fuel for HNP vehicles due to internal GOH planning
deficiencies. When the HNP had just 200 gallons remaining,
MINUSTAH stepped in and provided 2800 gallons of diesel fuel
to allow the HNP to refuel vehicles during the nighttime
lulls, in priority order based on predicted need for the next
day. The HNP was unable to obtain sufficient fuel as fuel
vendors demanded payment at the time of delivery and the
Ministry of Finance was unable to disburse funds. This is a
chronic problem that the police face as fund distribution
remains a difficult and time-consuming process. It also
reflects tighter controls on HNP fuel purchase and
distribution following evidence of corruption uncovered last
year.

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and The Ugly...
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6. (C) Rumors ran rampant during the demonstrations,
including one that the HNP and MINUSTAH were not cooperating
to the point that several HNP officers were fired upon by
MINUSTAH. The rumor may have sprung from an incident in
which some HNP officers were in the area of a crowd when
MINUSTAH fired rubber bullets, causing some minor injuries.
The rumor however was so persistent that SRSG Annabi publicly
denied it at his press conference on April 17, praising the
level of cooperation between the HNP and MINUSTAH.


7. (C) The business community is in general unhappy with the
HNP response, saying that the HNP stood by and allowed their
businesses be attacked and ransacked. Rumors abound that the
HNP, many of whom are recruited from the lower and middle
classes, stood by and let the people take out their
frustrations on affluent Haitians. The business community's
stance is in sharp contrast to their praise for DG Andersol's
stepped-up efforts to address crime in the business district
less than two months ago. The HNP response to violence in
the Petionville commercial area is subject of internal HNP
scrutiny. The DG has pledged that anyone found to have not
fulfilled his/her duties will be held accountable. The HNP
are also actively investigating the looting of several rice
depots at the border at Malpasse. (Note: Given the limited

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numbers of police and equipment available, the HNP's response
was predictable and some UNPOL advisors believe a more
aggressive approach would have led to more casualties and
greater damage if the crowds had reacted to perceived police
excessive force. End note.)


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Next Steps
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8. (C) As a result of lessons learned from these events, the
HNP DG plans to restructure the role of the DCPA to
streamline his duties in time of national crisis. Current
DCPA Destorel is the oldest member of the HNP, a former FADH
military officer and has overarching responsibilities in all
security issues. He is so well-regarded by the DG that his
request several times to retire has been denied. Once
Destorel is gone, the new DCPA will need clearer guidance on
how to manage such events. Issues of staffing and equipment
are also being analyzed as the HNP determines how best to
prepare for future events and reaches out to the
international community for additional support. The HNP is
carrying out this review as it keeps a wary eye on rumors of
more demonstrations this week. (Note: Small violent
demonstrations occurred in Les Cayes on April 28 but were
quickly quelled. End note.) Overall, the HNP would like
clearer, quicker guidance from the President or the Minister
on how to proceed in such events. HNP ability and authority
to respond quickly to public disorders are of the essence,
and they were unable to do so in both Les Cayes and Port au
Prince. In general, the HNP responded at first tepidly and
cautiously, lacking explicit support and authorization from
the President. Their caution has historical roots. Past
actions to control rioting that produced casualties had led
to the arrest and incarceration of the commanding officers
while the circumstances were investigated.


9. (C) The USG will continue to assist the HNP in meeting
identified and emerging needs. The USG supports cadet
classes of 650-750 officers annually and, working with the
Canadians, is expanding the capacity of the Police Academy to
allow for 1300 cadets to be trained annually beginning in
summer 2008. NAS will also work with the HNP to determine
the best use and storage for the non-lethal equipment the USG
controls at the Police Academy. NAS is required to control
and monitor that equipment and weapons purchased by the
Interim Government of Haiti in 2005 under specific conditions
imposed by Congress. By accelerating training and vetting of
CIMO and UDMO riot units, it may be possible to make those
items more readily available in time of crisis. However,
supplying the greater operational needs and correcting the
deficits of the HNP will require a GOH coordinated response
acros ministries.

TIGHE