Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PORTAUPRINCE1585
2008-11-14 20:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROBINSON VISIT TO HAITI

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1591
OO RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #1585/01 3192020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 142020Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9129
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2113
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0263
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1874
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2442
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001585 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROBINSON VISIT TO HAITI

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4
(b),(d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001585 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROBINSON VISIT TO HAITI Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Your visit comes when the Government of Haiti is digging out from the wreckage of four hurricanes that affected 10 percent of the population and from the collapse of a school that killed nearly 100 children. The newly-installed government of Prime Minister Michele Pierre-Louis is battling to implement disaster relief and begin rebuilding, while fending off growing criticism that government assistance is not reaching all who need it. Relations between the government and parliament remain tense, and the Prime Minister is not getting the support from the President she feels she needs. Your meetings will be an opportunity to showcase support for the government and the Prime Minister, whose priorities for Haiti coincide with our own. End summary. Progress Until Riots, Floods -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Mid-way through the third year of President Preval's five-year term, Haiti has hunkered down into crisis-management mentality. Haiti made slow but measurable progress in political consolidation and economic growth in the two years following Presidential and legislative elections in 2006. The food riots in April 2008 brought political progress to a halt, and the hurricanes and floods of August-September dealt the economy a hard blow. Food and fuel inflation that built up beginning in late 2007 brought out the worst instincts in Haiti's political actors. Although there was genuine social grievance over food price inflation, there is evidence that the violent elements in April were organized and paid by political forces seeking to oust then-PM Jacques Edouard Alexis, increase their own representation in a new government, and generally take advantage of increased instability. ¶3. (SBU) During the five-month hiatus that followed the Senate's April 12 vote that brought down the Alexis government, Haiti indulged in sterile executive-legislative branch confrontation and made no progress in addressing inflation or in preparing for overdue Senate elections. Parliament rejected two Prime Ministerial candidates on flimsy grounds, in no small part because Preside
nt Preval refused to bargain with parties and parliamentarians seeking money-generating positions in government. Preval finally lobbied hard for his third nominee, Michele Pierre-Louis, and made promises of party representation in the cabinet and in ministries. Feeling public pressure to give Haiti a government after five months without one, parliament finally confirmed Pierre-Louis, and she took office September 5. Challenges the Prime Minister Faces -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Although Pierre-Louis lacks the political instincts and skills of her predecessor, she seems sincere in her determination to reform Haiti's institutions, bring investment to create jobs, fight corruption, have elections according to the constitution's calendar, organize post-hurricane assistance and reconstruction, and establish overall development priorities. Her policy goals align closely with our own for Haiti. However, she took office just as the staggering dimensions of damage caused by four tropical storms and hurricanes became clear. While previous natural disasters have affected a limited area of the country, these storms caused serious damage in eight of ten departments of the country. The flooding killed almost 800 people and affected nearly 800,000, crippled land transportation arteries, devastated livestock and crops, and reduced economic growth for 2008 to a projected 1-1.5 percent. ¶5. (SBU) The unprecedented storm damaged created a temporary climate of political good will in the public and the Parliament toward the Prime Minister and her government. She PORT AU PR 00001585 002 OF 004 acted decisively in her first weeks in office. The President and she jointly declared a state of emergency, under which authority she allocated nearly USD 200 million, the entire proceeds of Haiti's Petrocaraibe oil transactions with Venezuela, for emergency relief and reconstruction. Growing Tensions with Parliament, President -------------- ¶6. (SBU) That good will, however, is already beginning to fray, as the Prime Minister is beginning to encounter the traps lurking in Haiti's dysfunctional political institutions and in the leadership style of President Preval. With disaster relief being the number one political game in town, Parliament rushed to exercise oversight and influence. Both houses have called the Prime Minister and other ministers to testify over a dozen times. The government had to beat back parliamentary demands to co-manage disaster relief projects in members' constituencies. The Prime Minister is beginning to feel that these repeated summons are hampering her ability to govern. There are also mounting accusations that aid is not reaching intended recipients. Mayors and other local officials are accused of directing GOH-funded disaster aid for political purposes or diverting it into their own pockets. (Note: foreign disaster relief is channeled through independent NGO implementers. End note) Sensing a political opportunity, several parliamentarians the week of November 10 criticized the government for ineffectiveness in disaster relief, and said they would give it two months ''grace period'' before parliament would interpellate the government and perhaps call a vote of confidence. ¶7. (SBU) The collapse of a school in Port au Prince November 7 that killed almost 100 pupils and teachers has sharpened the parliament's instinct to call the government to account. This disaster put the government on the defensive by seeming to corroborate the deep-set perception among Haitians that the state is failing to live up to its elementary responsibility to protect its citizens. The President and Prime Minister on November 13 announced plans to enforce building codes on public buildings throughout the country -- a promise that Haiti lacks the institutional capacity to carry out. Prime Minister Increasingly Beleaguered -------------- ¶8. (C) The Prime Minister tells us that she is appalled by the mismanagement and corruption that she continues to encounter throughout government, in parliament, and even among the Prime Minister's office staff that she inherited from her predecessor. She reserves her harshest criticism for parliament, most of whose member she has concluded privately are corrupt and/or linked to criminal activity, and are interested primarily in the travel perks and immunity from prosecution their office gives them. Just as troubling is Pierre-Louis' deteriorating relationship with President Preval. This President has always tended to micromanage his government and not allow his Prime Minister autonomy to govern. Preval continues to treat foreign affairs as his private domain. Pierre Louis beat back the President's initiative to replace her Foreign and Planning Ministers. For now, she appears determined to soldier on. A Few Bright Spots -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The government has a small number of talented people. Minister of Economy and Finance Daniel Dorsainvil is a solid economic policy-maker, although he does not always coordinate with the Prime Minister. Newly appointed Minister of Justice and Public Security Jean Joseph Exhume, whom the Ambassador first met November 13, appears determined to pursue judicial reform, prosecute corruption cases, and enforce work discipline on malingering judges. Minister of Planning Jean Max Bellerive is an able administrator. Yet even the best ministers lack the staff and the financing to implement good policies. Elections PORT AU PR 00001585 003 OF 004 -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Another positive note is that the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) recently set April 19, 2009 as the date for the long-overdue partial Senate elections, which should have been held in late 2007. Since May, the Senate has had only 18 of 30 members, making the institution vulnerable because it is often difficult to achieve the 16-member quorum. The Prime Minister strongly supports those elections, although she and many others are aware of the CEP's capability gap and its need for strong technical assistance. Financing pledged by donors and in the GOH amended budget is available in the amount of USD 16.5 million. President Preval has yet to issue a decree announcing the elections, as the law requires. There are still no plans to organize or finance the late 2009 legislative elections, which will renew the entire Chamber of Deputies and another one-third of the Senate. ¶11. (SBU) We and our major allies in Haiti have a strong interest in supporting this reform-minded but beleaguered Prime Minister. Your visit will be an opportunity to show our support. So would a Pierre-Louis visit to Washington, which we continue to encourage her to undertake at the earliest opportunity. The Assistance Picture: Rule of Law/Governance -------------- -- ¶12. (U) Your visit will also allow you to review our assistance priorities in Haiti. Our assistance efforts in Haiti -- financed by USAID, CDC, INL/NAS, and the US Coast Guard -- seek to implement reforms, build public institutions, improve law enforcement and corrections capability, and help deliver basic services. Rule of Law programs target Haiti's justice system by helping increasing judicial authorities' administrative, management and technical capacity. Good Governance Programs provide technical assistance and training to Haiti's Parliament in the areas of legislative drafting, legal and judicial reform, and rules of procedure. Programs aimed at conflict mitigation address poverty and gang-related violence through creation of short- and long-term employment and transfer of job skills trough labor-intensive reconstruction of social and productive infrastructure. Another program targets the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to help it solidify its organization and modernize the voter registration process. Civil society programs assist a variety of local media, regional journalist associations, and public service associations, including those that monitor corruption. Humanitarian Assistance -------------- ¶13. (U) The steep rise in food prices in 2008 followed by the four hurricanes sharply exacerbated Haiti's chronic food insecurity, to which approximately 3 million Haitians are now exposed. USAID contributed USD 45 million in emergency food aid and another USD 14 million for post-hurricane recovery. USAID is continuing its programs to build disaster early warning, response and mitigation capacity. The Ambassador will officiate at the ground-breaking ceremony November 21 for an Emergency Operations Center for Haiti's disaster response agencies. Following the hurricanes, Congress appropriated an additional USD 96 million over three years for the restoration of public services, repairs to public use infrastructure, provision of income-generating activities, asset restoration, and support to affected families. Health and Education/Economic Growth -------------- ¶14. (U) Basic health programs help increase access to essential health services in 72 public sector clinics and 80 NGO clinics. Nearly 50 percent of Haiti's population receives at least some health services financed by the USG. USAID-financed education programs include a new basic education project to strengthen the Ministry of Education's management and supervisory system, help it extend supervision PORT AU PR 00001585 004 OF 004 over the vast private-sector education system, and provide scholarships. Social assistance programs support Haiti's most vulnerable citizens. Economic growth programs target trade and invstment, financial sector programs for small and medium enterprises, and programs for agricultural productivity and marketing. Reducing environmental degradation is the goalof USD 7 million in programs that focus on restoing watersheds that are the source of periodic fooding. PEPFAR -------------- ¶15. (U) PEPFAR will provide just short of USD 100 million in FY 2009 to prevent infections and put HIV positive persons into treatment. Implemented by USAID and CDC, PEPFAR programs target HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, but also benefit large parts of Haiti's health care system. Haiti has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS in the Western Hemisphere. Police Reform/Corrections -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The U.S. is the lead donor in implementing the MINUSTAH police reform plan, which foresees building up the Haitian National Police (HNP) from its current strength of 9,000 to 14,000 officers by 2011. In concert with MINUSTAH's mandate to enhance Haiti's border security, the U.S. Coast Guard provides training for the Haitian Coast Guard, financed by INL/NAS. The U.S. made a commitment in2007 to assist in improving the conditions and human rights in Haiti's prison system, and remains the lead dono SANDERSON

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -