Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PODGORICA210
2008-08-14 12:16:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Podgorica
Cable title:  

SUMMER OF SQUABBLES FOR MONTENEGRO'S RULING COALITION

Tags:  PGOV PREL MW 
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RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHPOD #0210/01 2271216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141216Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0900
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0985
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PODGORICA 000210 

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MW
SUBJECT: SUMMER OF SQUABBLES FOR MONTENEGRO'S RULING COALITION

REF: PODGORICA 208

PODGORICA 00000210 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PODGORICA 000210 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MW SUBJECT: SUMMER OF SQUABBLES FOR MONTENEGRO'S RULING COALITION REF: PODGORICA 208 PODGORICA 00000210 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Relations between coalition partners the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) have hit a rough patch of late, fueling rumors that the DPS might consider early elections. While highly unlikely -- the partners' decade-long coalition has survived bigger bumps and is advantageous to both -- the parties may run separately in the next election (scheduled for fall 2009). Even if this occurs, however, their shared commitment to Montenegrin statehood and Euro-Atlantic integration could well reunite them after the vote. END SUMMARY. A Stormy Summer For DPS-SDP Relations... -------------- ¶2. (U) As reported reftel, coalition partners Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) failed to agree on July 31 on a new Law on Concessions. The dispute -- over the length and mechanism for approval of government concessions -- marred the coalition's otherwise assembly-line efficiency, with opposition MPs boycotting over a TV coverage dispute, in passing several dozen bills before the summer recess. (Note: the DPS and SDP have run together in every national election since 1998. Following the September 2006 election, by agreement the DPS has 33 MPs and the SDP seven.) ¶3. (U) The quarrel over concessions capped a summer of small but highly publicized disagreements between the partners: -- In June, the SDP ousted DPS operative Dragan Kujovic from the managing board of the state-owned Budvanska Rivijera company (which controls four hotels and valuable land on the Montenegrin coast). The SDP replaced him with Rasko Konjevic, Chief of Staff to SDP leader and Parliament Speaker Ranko Krivokapic. -- Also in June, Djordje Suhih, the SDP head of the Podgorica Municipal Council, attempted to block DPS Podgorica Mayor Mugosa's sale of a city-owned children's holiday resort (which the Mayor plans to turn into a parking lot). Suhih demanded the resignation of a Mugosa protigi and blasted the Mayor for making decisions without consulting the Council. -- In late July, the DPS-controlled Finance Ministry rescinded a decision by the SDP-run Real Estate Directorate to tighten regulations concerning the sale of land to foreigners. &#x
000A; -- Also in late July, the DPS rejected an SDP amendment to the Law on the Historic Capital of Cetinje which would have moved Parliament from Podgorica to Cetinje (DPS MPs publicly accused the SDP of seeking to score cheap political points). ...And Differing Economic Visions... -------------- ¶4. (SBU) DPS-SDP squabbles are nothing new. In June 2007, the partners famously fell out over a DPS plan to sell the majority stake in Montenegro's only thermo-electric plant and an accompanying coal mine, both in Pljevlja, to Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. (Note: The SDP voted with opposition parties to block the sale, and the DPS backed down at the time, although DPS leaders assure us that a new tender for the plant will be released in the next year or so.) The partners also have clashed on several occasions over privatization. ¶5. (SBU) These flaps reflect a larger ideological rift between the parties over the state's role in the economy. In a nutshell, the SDP does not oppose privatization but would like the government to retain a controlling stake in strategic industries and assets, and has been critical of what it sees as the DPS's "neo-liberal" rush to sell state properties (the SDP also has sought to restrict the ability of foreigners to buy land). SDP deputy head Ivan Brajovic recently told us that the parties still were at loggerheads over energy privatization and property relations. PODGORICA 00000210 002.2 OF 003 ...Fuel Divorce Rumors -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The latest disagreements have fueled rumors that the coalition is in jeopardy; these have gained additional traction because some believe the DPS would benefit from early parliamentary elections (which would be called should the coalition split). The latest polls give the DPS close to 50 percent support at a time when opposition forces are divided and weak (SDP had four percent in a June poll, uncomfortably close to the three percent hurdle to enter Parliament). Early elections therefore could give the DPS a shot at forming the parliamentary majority -- and consequently the government -- on its own. (Note: We also have heard rumors that some DPS members -- most notably DPS Vice President Svetozar Marovic, who has been criticized by Krivokapic for pursuing personal business interests in his hometown of Budva -- are pushing for an alliance with the moderate opposition Socialist People's Party (SNP),which is headed by Budva-resident Srdjan Milic.) ¶7. (SBU) As for the SDP, independent analyst Svetozar Jovicevic recently opined to us that it was increasingly difficult for that party to justify its coalition with the DPS. Montenegrin statehood was the glue that held the partners together, he said, and with this issue settled, the SDP needed to take a principled stand on what the new state should like or risk losing what small electorate it had. Ranko's New Car, Or The Ties That Bind -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Officials of both parties quickly denied the divorce speculation. Following the concession law spat, President Vujanovic told the press that the partners had their disagreements, but were willing to overcome them. PM Djukanovic also declared that the coalition was encountering "normal differences" and was not in crisis; the SDP's Brajovic seconded this assessment. ¶9. (SBU) Indeed, few interlocutors see a split as likely at this point. The parties agree on most big issues (adherence to statehood, Euro-Atlantic priorities) and have usually compromised on legislative and privatization disagreements. SDP MPs frequently tell us they recognize that their small party is better able to influence policy within the coalition than from without. As Brajovic told us recently, "for all our problems, we are still one of the most stable coalitions in the Balkans." ¶10. (SBU) Many also note the considerable benefits the SDP accrues in terms of positions and perks. The party has the Speaker and a deputy speaker position and three ministers in the government, including one of the two Deputy Prime Ministers. According to the parties' post-September 2006 election agreement, the SDP also gets 20 percent of positions in state managing boards and structures. DPS MP Miodrag Vukovic claimed to us that SDP-run agencies control 40 percent of all budget assets (including pension and health funds, forestries, and other state companies). And more than one interlocutor has pointed to Krivokapic's expensive new Audi as an example of what the SDP would lose should it bolt the coalition. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The odds are heavily stacked against a split -- the coalition has survived bigger bumps in the past and is highly convenient for both sides -- but the DPS does not appear to have conclusively ruled out early elections (PM Djukanovic said in TV interview that "everything is possible, but let's hope it is not necessary.") The implied threat gives the DPS considerable PODGORICA 00000210 003.2 OF 003 leverage over the SDP at a time when several big privatization decisions are pending (for example, the privatization of Montenegro's airports, the Plantaze winery, the port of Bar, and several coastal tourist sites were put off until at least 2009, and the DPS wants to push again for the privatization of the thermo-electric plant and coal mine, although the parties have an apparent agreement that the state will retain a 55 percent stake). The rumors, likely encouraged by the DPS, of the DPS's flirtation with the SNP also can be seen in this light, although the DPS also likely wants to keep its options open. ¶12. (SBU) What does appear possible is that the DPS and SDP will run separately in the next election. They ran alone in April local elections in Herceg Novi and Tivat and may do so again in October elections in Kotor. SDP sources tell us it is too early to make a decision about the parliamentary election, but that their party "approaches every election with the intent to run on our own." In the DPS, there clearly is strong sentiment for separate slates. A senior DPS official predicted as much during a recent conversation. After describing the recent disagreements (the official was particularly bitter about the SDP's activities in the Budvanska Rivijera company),and confiding that the DPS was considering introducing a law that would prohibit parties from forming coalitions for elections, he told us, "after ten years together, we simply have grown tired of each other." ¶13. (SBU) The implications of a split ticket are unclear at this point, but are unlikely to affect Montenegro's foreign policy orientation. The DPS would hope to win an outright majority, which would allow it to form the government on its own (in this scenario, the SDP -- if it makes it into Parliament -- would still vote with the DPS on issues supporting Euro-Atlantic integration). If the DPS falls short of a majority, given DPS's and SDP's strong adherence to statehood and Euro-Atlantic goals, a revival of the present coalition is a distinct possibility. The wildcard would be a third scenario -- in which the DPS would opt for another coalition partner, such as the SNP. This should not slow Montenegro's drive toward EU integration, but -- depending on how strong the SNP's representation was in the Parliament and GoM -- could slow its NATO integration pace (in that the SNP, while not opposed, is less enthusiastic about membership than the SDP.) MOORE

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