PREAH VIHEAR: TENSION UNLIKELY TO DISSIPATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000581 SIPDIS PARIS PLEASE PASS US MISSION TO UNESCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2010 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNESCO SCUL MOPS PBTS TH CB SUBJECT: PREAH VIHEAR: TENSION UNLIKELY TO DISSIPATE WITHOUT CHANGE IN BILATERAL DYNAMIC REF: A. BANGKOK 2207 ¶B. PHNOM PENH 578 ¶C. BANGKOK 2167 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph A. Mussomeli, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) See para two for action request. ¶1. (C) Summary: Reftel A provides a solid update on the evolving situation along the Thai-Cambodian border near Preah Vihear temple. Embassies Phnom Penh and Bangkok had a number of good exchanges during the course of the day to double-track information coming from Thai and Cambodian sources. Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An called Ambassador late this afternoon to convey continued Cambodian concerns that tensions in the area are high, with what the Cambodians describe as a significant number of Thai troops having moved into Cambodian-built structures in an area awarded to Cambodia by a 1962 International Court of Justice decision. During Sok An's conversation with the Ambassador, the DPM took a call conveying information apparently passed to Prime Minister Hun Sen from Prime Minister Samak. Sok An said that Samak had been counseled by Thai military described as being closer to the government that other Thai military would follow orders if instructed to withdraw from the newly occupied areas -- but would then use this as a pretext to topple the government. Sok An said that the Cambodian government (RGC) would continue its policy of patience and peaceful, bilateral efforts to resolve the situation. However, he expressed two concerns: (1) that the number of Thai and Cambodian soldiers crowded into a small area presented a volatile situation which could not continue indefinitely without sparking, and (2) that the Thai government's hands may be tied in dealing with its strong and relatively independent military. Sok An was dubious that the planned extraordinary meeting of the General Border Committee July 21 would yield results. He noted that if these quiet, bilateral efforts did not work, Cambodia contemplated taking the issue to ASEAN, UNESCO and the UN Security Council -- to pressure Thailand to withdraw its troops from Cambodian territory and arrange some sort of international observation in the border area. End Summary ¶2. (C) Comment and Action Request: Embassy Phnom Penh agrees with Embassy Bangkok's assessment of the extraordinary �A;politicization of issues surrounding Cambodia's decision to inscribe Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site and the linked question of what the Thai describe as a nearby overlapping claim. This assertion of an overlapping claim, however, is irrelevant legally or morally. Cambodia has had control of the territory in question for 46 years. Historically, most border disputes that result in armed conflict begin with an assertion of overlapping claims. We believe that the U.S.'s overarching interest in maintaining regional stability does not allow us the luxury of indefinitely standing on the sidelines of this dispute. We see the options as follows: (a) pursue balanced, quiet diplomacy now to encourage both parties to defuse tensions and work in a spirit of goodwill using solid existing mechanisms including the upcoming GBC, (b) react when, almost inevitably, tensions spark a incident, (c) accept that both the Cambodians, who see international law as solidly on their side, and the Thai military will perceive U.S. silence as tacit approval, or (d) develop a position when the Cambodians bring this into regional and multilateral fora. We believe the two sides are paralyzed at the moment and need help. We should continue to frame this as a mil-mil issue and believe that a call from a senior U.S. military official to his Thai and Cambodian counterparts would help to get both sides to prepare seriously for the July 21 Border Committee meeting. We would advocate the following points, building on Embassy Bangkok's suggestions but shifting from "if asked" to a more proactive approach: -- URGING THAT ALL PARTIES WORK IN A SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL AND COOPERATION TO RESOLVE THEIR CONCERNS PEACEFULLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY, -- ENCOURAGING THEM TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH EXISTING MECHANISMS (SUCH AS THE UPCOMING MEETING OF THE GENERAL PHNOM PENH 00000581 002 OF 003 BORDER COMMITTEE) TO RESOLVE BORDER ISSUES CAN FUNCTION, -- REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS DEPLOYED INTO THE AREA AND PULLING BACK TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE JULY 14 End comment and action request. ¶3. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Sok An met the Ambassador late in the day July 18 to provide an update on Cambodian-Thai discussions about Preah Vihear. Sok An reviewed developments since July 15, shared with the Ambassador photographs of Thai military in and around the Cambodian-built Keo Sikha Kiri Svara pagoda and a Cambodian police outpost, reviewed the maps and import of the 1962 ICJ decision which awarded the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia and instructed Thai troops to withdraw from the area (which they did),and shared Cambodian thoughts on next steps to defuse this issue. During the course of the conversation, Sok An stressed the RGC's sympathy for the difficult position of the Samak government and recognition that Preah Vihear had become excessively politicized in Thailand. He said PM Hun Sen had counseled patience repeatedly when approached by senior Cambodian military and police insulted by what he described as Thai rangers' occupation of a Cambodian-built pagoda approximately 1/2 kilometer within Cambodian territory. ¶4. (SBU) Earlier in the day, Foreign Minister Hor Namhong convened Phnom Penh-based Ambassadors for a briefing on Preah Vihear. He opened by noting the July 7 inscription of the sacred site of Preah Vihear temple by the World Heritage Committee; the Thai government (RTG) had first supported and then later, because of domestic opposition, withdrawn their support for inscription. There had then been "a political storm" in Thailand, stirred up by known figures. Cambodia had never thought, however, that Thai soldiers would decide to take possession of a pagoda within 300 meters of the temple. Hor Namhong displayed copies of the French-Siam map from the early 1900s, noting this map had been used in the 1962 International Court of Justice decision awarding Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia. He asserted the pagoda in question is clearly in Cambodian territory as per that map. Hor Namhong also referred to Thailand's "unilateral" development of a competing map and assertion that there is a 4.6 km square overlapping claim area. ¶5. (SBU) Hor Namhong said Cambodia did not know who was behind the military decision to move troops into this area. He did not/not think the Thai government was behind the decision. However, the situation was tense with more than 1,000 Thai and Cambodian troops in the area. Cambodia further understood that some 40-60 trucks had brought in Thai protesters who were gathered in Thai territory with the intent of protesting at the temple. In the face of this provocative situation, Cambodia had maintained its self restrain. PM Hun Sen,s phone call and letter to PM Samak were efforts to solve the problem peacefully. Cambodia wanted to solve the problem peacefully and bilaterally, without foreign or international intervention. If they cannot solve the problem peacefully and the Thai choose to use force, Cambodia reserved the right to use force. First, however, Cambodia envisions solving this politically and diplomatically possibly be referring the matter to the UN Security Council. ¶6. (SBU) On July 21, there will be a meeting of the General Border Commission (GBC). Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Banh will attend. Answering a question, Hor Namhong noted that PM Samak is dual-hatted as Defense Minister, but was unlikely to attend, probably instead sending Supreme Commander Boonsrang Niumpradit. Responding to a German question about whether ASEAN could play a mediating role, the FM noted that he would be unable to attend the ASEAN FM's meeting, because of the upcoming elections, and is sending MFA Secretary of State Kao Kim Horn. Kao Kim Horn is instructed to inform ASEAN Foreign Ministers about the situation. the FM concluded the meeting saying that if the situation worsens, Cambodia may ask the assembled Ambassadors if their countries could contribute to helping solve the problem. ¶7. (SBU) Comment: Although well-spoken, intelligent and known in ASEAN circles, we do not see Kao Kim Horn as somebody who PHNOM PENH 00000581 003 OF 003 will be able to engage with ASEAN Foreign Ministers or use the Singapore meeting to problem-solve. While the FM did not/not seem eager to seek ASEAN mediation, it was clear there were Ambassadors (in addition to Germany, Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia were talking about this question) who believe this issue is bound to come up during the ARF. We learned earlier that the Cambodians have been in contact with Vietnam, seeking what was described as "Vietnamese support" -- we now suspect that may have been in the context of the Vietnamese' position on the Security Council. Local papers -- which are portraying tensions as having abated somewhat -- also describe Thai and Cambodian military units as "face-to-face and side-by-side" in the small area. One English language report describes one narrow alleyway of the 100 meter stretch leading up to the pagoda as "young and old Thai and Cambodian troops standing and sitting cheek by jowl and with a horrifying range of weaponry." From this Embassy's perspective, this face-off generates a level of tension which is likely to lead to an incident or accident and should not be left to fester. ¶8. (SBU) Although tourists could in theory access Preah Vihear temple in Cambodian territoy without passing through the area of tension or nearing the Thai border checkpoint, Post's EAC decided this morning also to issue a warden message counseling American citizens to avoid the area until tensions subside. MUSSOMELI