POST CONVENES EAC MEETING

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000511 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018 TAGS: ASEC PTER MOPS PK SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING REF: A) TD-314/081980-08 B) TD-314/082591-08 C) PESHAWAR 508 CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (S) Post convened an Emergency Action Committee meeting at 10:30 (local) on November 14 in light of specific, credible threat information targeting Consulate personnel and a request from local security authorities to limit Consulate movements. PO, RSO, RAO, and DEA attended the meeting. See paras 7-9 for Principal Officer's comment. Threat Report -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed threat reporting developed late November 13 that described an attempt to target Consulate vehicles on one of the two primary routes in University Town used by Consulate personnel traveling from home to office (Refs A-B). There was no timeframe associated with the threat. Based on the level of detail, the EAC assessed the threat to be very credible. ¶3. (S) RSO received a request late on November 13 from local security authorities, asking that the Consulate limit its movements in University Town. Local authorities indicated that search operations may take place over the next several days in the Hayatabad and University Town suburbs in the wake of the November 13 kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat in Hayatabad. Local authorities also expressed concern that militant elements may stage further attacks in the University Town area in reprisal for the search operations as well as military operations in Bajaur Agency. (Comment: The request by local authorities to limit Consulate movements is highly unusual if not unprecedented.) Consulate Response -------------- ¶4. (U) The EAC had limited post travel on November 12 to mission essential following the killing of a USAID contractor on a University Town street where Consulate residences are located (Ref C). Mission essential travel status was to remain in effect through November 14. ¶5. (S) The EAC determined on November 14 that the Consulate's mission essential travel status should be extended through November 17. Post is coordinating with Islamabad to release an updated warden message about the extension of mission essential travel status. The EAC agreed that all visits except those with a mission essential purpose should be deferred through November ¶17. The EAC agreed that all self-drivers must travel in pairs. Post is continuing its policy implemented in late August following the attack on the Principal Officer that vehicles operated by local drivers travel in a minimum of twos with armed bodyguards. ¶6. (S/NF) RSO is separately requesting the immediate deployment of a Security Support Team (SST) from the Office of Mobile Security Deployments (DS/T/MSD). Post is also coordinating with Embassy Islamabad on a comprehensive list of required security resources to enable the Consulate's presence and to perform its mission in Peshawar for the immediate, near, and medium term. Principal Officer Comment -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The string of violence in Peshawar over the past week -- the suicide bombing at a sports stadium, the killing of our USAID contractor, the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat, and reports of an attack on November 14 in Hayatabad on a Japanese and a Pakistani journalist -- have underscored the ability of al-Qai'da and its associates to strike successfully and repeatedly in a short space of time in areas that were once considered relatively safe. Security forces have been drained from Khyber and Peshawar to cope with Bajaur, Swat, and hot spots around Kohat/Darra Adam Khel, leaving Peshawar vulnerable to hit and run violence as it was earlier this year. In this latest round of violence plaguing Peshawar, militants appear more determined than ever to hit at western/foreign targets as well as local institutions of government. ¶8. (S/NF) While we have asked at senior local levels and been promised police support -- we cannot count on that help for our safety and security, particularly in the University Town area where all of the Consulate's residences are located. Local police contacts although genuine in their desire to assist appear overwhelmed or tell us quietly that the police are demoralized and deserting. Some local observers fear that the police will simply "lay down like they did in Swat." ¶9. (S/NF) The details of the threat contained in Refs A-B indicate that Consulate personnel and vehicles are being closely observed and that al-Qai'da and/or local associates already appear to be adapting to countermeasures that we have put in place. The resources that will be required to allow Consulate personnel to move with some reasonable measure of safety from home to work and on business in the community must come from the U.S. side. These resources must be sufficiently robust to make up for gaps in local law enforcement and capable of addressing the deteriorating security conditions around Peshawar. TRACY