PAKISTAN'S PROSPECTS FOR CURBING MILITANCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000391 E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/8/2018 TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV EAID PINR PK SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S PROSPECTS FOR CURBING MILITANCY REF: ISLAMABAD 2135 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Consulate Peshawar, State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) Summary/Introduction -------------- ¶1. (C) Despite the presence of over 100,000 combined military/security forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and over 50,000 in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP),the government has been losing space to militants since ¶2002. The pace of loss has accelerated over the past year. Distraction at the national level with political survival, policy dissonance between the federal and provincial governments, competition over bureaucratic turf, and fractious civil-military relations have translated into local governance that is adrift and unable to check swiftly and effectively opportunities for militant expansion. Militants, meanwhile, have been moving toward greater coordination, particularly through Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan. ¶2. (C) Pakistan faces significant challenges in its efforts to curb and roll back militancy emanating from the tribal areas. The threat taking shape goes deeper and well beyond a historically sometimes romanticized "wild West." The deterioration of security in the Peshawar district that culminated in the launch of operations in Khyber Agency is part of a broader set of trends with the potential to reach beyond the Northwest Frontier area. Loss of traditional community leaders, weak administration, ineffective law enforcement, slow justice, crumbling social services, a distressed economy, and poverty all have enhanced the militancy's strength in the FATA and the NWFP. ¶3. (C) We are implementing long-term development programs and beginning to provide security training. Given growing short-term challenges, however, we need a more robust, fast-track response to help woefully under-funded and equipped security and government forces extend security, governance, and development. Other donors are needed through mechanisms such as a World Bank-led consortium (reftel). Pakistan must also commit resources to this endeavor, particularly salary and benefits support for law enforcement. Absent measures to contain the trends that are in motion in the FATA and NWFP, the insurgency on the border has the potential to reach elsewhere into Pakistan -- and it is unclear how Pakistan would cope with that development. End Summary/Introduction Accelerating Loss of Space -------------- ¶4. (C) The government has steadily been losing control of space to militants since 2002 and that pace has accelerated over the past year. In 2005, except for the Waziristans, Consulate's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) staff building roads in the FATA were able to operate fairly widely with some manageable, primarily historical (criminal) risk in the other five agencies. In 2008, the Waziristans remain nearly inaccessible, and NAS is no longer able to operate in most of the other five agencies. In Bajaur and Mohmand where we once operated freely, only small areas adjacent to the NWFP are now accessible. Friendly pockets remain in upper Kurram, but can only be reached by air because of threats on the land route through Kohat and Hangu. Orakzai once deemed entirely safe is now viewed as risky. Khyber, once the most accessible agency, has only pockets of space where risk is manageable, primarily in its northern area and in communities not far off the Peshawar-Kabul highway. ¶5. (C) USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) with embedded partner staff in Political Agents' compounds has seen similar trends since it started field operations in January 2008, primarily in Khyber, Orakzai, and Mohmand. In the NWFP, southern districts and some northern districts (Swat, Dir, and Malakand) are now largely off limits to us. In 2002, we were able to visit all of these areas. OTI, however, is operating in five of the seven FATA agencies. ¶6. (C) More militant and/or criminal hot spots are popping up than security forces, including the Pakistan army, can control. The collapse of the North Waziristan Agreement and the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007 appears to have been the take off point for the acceleration of violence targeted at government institutions and the loss of space. The declaration of a new Lal Masjid in Mohmand, the capture of 250 security forces in South Waziristan, the open uprising of Tehrik-i Nafaz-i Shariat-i Mohammadi (TNSM) militants in Swat, the ambush of army forces in North Waziristan, the outbreak of sectarian violence in Kurram, the encroachment of militants into the Kohat/Darra Adam Khel/Orakzai area, the destabilization of Khyber because of criminal activity, and growing incidents of targeted violence in NWFP districts near Peshawar have all taken place within the past year. Many of these developments occurred simultaneously or close in time. At best, security forces, including the military, appear to have the ability to address no more than two major hot spots at any given moment. The impact is that smaller law and order problems go unattended. ¶7. (C) Militant coordination and cooperation with criminals appears to be growing. The most visible example of this over the past year was the emergence of the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007 that announced an alliance among militants, including Baitullah Mehsud and Bajaur's TNSM leader Faqir Mohammad. The degree of cooperation and control is difficult to assess, but we are seeing more references to TTP from militants in the FATA and the NWFP. ¶8. (C) The criminal element poses a different dilemma. Criminals, according to local contacts, are operating in relationships of mutual convenience with militants. Khyber's warlord Mangal Bagh who was the target of recent operations has predominantly been a criminal figure, running smuggling routes. Much of his criminal activity in the Peshawar environs -- kidnappings, control of the alcohol and drug trade -- was aimed at generating revenue for himself rather than attacking government institutions. Figures such as Mangal Bagh, however, pose a longer-term danger. In some cases, they are reportedly facilitating cross-border attacks and other militant activities. The unchecked criminal activities also soften up the ground for militants by helping to establish an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. Perhaps the most dangerous impact of all is that militants and criminals alike appear to have lost their fear of security forces, including the military -- a fear that was once critical to maintaining law and order in the FATA and the NWFP. Tribal Fabric in Distress -------------- ¶9. (C) The FATA is hemorrhaging leaders. According to local estimates, 250 to 300 tribal elders have been killed, most of them since 2004. The majority of the assassinations have been in the Waziristans, but other parts of the FATA and NWFP have been hit as well. The attacks have primarily picked off tribal leaders in twos and threes. More recently, a suicide attacker killed 50 elders in Darra Adam Khel in March, and Baitullah Mehsud loyalists executed 23 in Jandola in June. ¶10. (C) Many of the educated and professionals -- natural sources of local leadership and bulwarks against extremism -- are leaving their communities and are unable to return even for brief visits. From Bajaur to South Waziristan or places such as Swat, we are seeing or hearing of those who have decamped to adjacent NWFP districts, Peshawar, Islamabad, or Karachi -- mainly because of security. The newer heros, particularly to young boys, are reportedly the Baitullah Mehsuds who do not come from particularly important local families, but who have acquired status through their reputations as "jihadi commanders." ¶11. (C) In this environment, peace agreements signed and enforced by tribal community leaders will be difficult to maintain. The deterioration of security, and particularly the targeting of pro-government elders, has shaken many traditional community leaders who do not have confidence that the government is able to protect them if they agree to stand up to militants. The government has been encouraging Political Agents to return to living in their agencies to counter this trend. Weakening Administration -------------- ¶12. (C) Turnover among key civilian field and working-level officers is increasing. Historically, Political Agents served at least two years in a posting. More recently, Political Agents have been rotating out short of twelve months in an assignment and in some cases after less than six months in the more difficult areas such as the Waziristans. One FATA Secretariat official attributed the relatively rapid turnover to "burnout" because of the increasing danger and pressures of the position. ¶13. (C) The training ground for Political Agents is gone. The system of positions, known as the District Management Group (DMG),that once groomed young civil service officers to administer tribal agencies and provincial districts throughout Pakistan was largely dismantled under President Musharraf's "devolution" reform in 2002. The DMG positions once wielded broad authorities at the district level -- administration of resources, authority over the police, and magistrate powers. "Devolution" substantially diluted these authorities in the provinces, leaving a much weaker district administrator position, the usual starting position for most Political Agents. More broadly, with the loss of prestige, the DMG is no longer seen as the premier civil service path. Pakistan's best and brightest in the civil service are no longer choosing district administration at a moment when top talent in this field is desperately needed. USAID's capacity building projects in the FATA Secretariat can help the situation but alone will not counteract this trend. Ineffective Law Enforcement -------------- ¶14. (C) FATA's paramilitary forces including Frontier Corps, and NWFP police are increasingly de-moralized. They are facing adversaries who are reportedly better paid and equipped with better weaponry. Law enforcement recruits generally make 4,000-7,000 rupees ($50-$100) per month while militants are reportedly paying twice that amount. In some cases, paramilitary personnel must supply their own weapons, ammunition, and uniform. Training is often inconsistent. There are few, if any, retirement or death benefits. In the tribal areas and along the NWFP/FATA border, these forces are frequently deployed in remote 10-20 man posts that become the target of militants who are able to intimidate or overwhelm. ODRP reports that 11th Corps often deploys Frontier Corps as an infantry battalion -- a role for which they are not trained and consequently do not perform well. ¶15. (C) There is insufficient authority in the field to direct law enforcement. "Post-devolution," in practice, means that provincial law enforcement has no administrative or elected oversight at the district level, often leaving the police adrift. The "devolution" reforms also destroyed the cross-cutting jurisdiction that gave senior administration officials in the field combined oversight of a tribal agency, frontier region, and provincial district. That combined oversight and other broad authorities gave these officials the power to order the movement of law enforcement assets to tackle quickly law and order problems that straddled the NWFP/FATA border. Such coordination must now be referred back to Peshawar. Justice Deferred -------------- ¶16. (C) Militant identification with Sharia law is one of its most potent tools for generating local support. The most frequent example of militant parallel government in the FATA and NWFP is administration of justice. The call for Sharia law, however, is for many simply a demand for "quick justice." Local dissatisfaction with the access to the courts and the pace of judicial decision is high. Civil cases, particularly for property disputes, regularly drag on for decades. According to a number of Peshawar observers, the heart of the discontent in Swat has been long unresolved land disputes which gave TNSM (and now Tehrik-I Taliban - Swat) a popular local cause. When Sharia's full meaning is explained, enthusiasm for Sharia drops quickly. No Teachers, No Jobs, No Money -------------- ¶17. (C) While the FATA has been identified as a long neglected area for development, mainstream Pakistan, as ostensibly represented by many parts of the NWFP appears only marginally better off - and may not be well enough to ward off the pressures of militancy and extremism. On travels to outlying NWFP districts that have been possible, lack of social services, particularly health and education, surface quickly in conversations with local residents. The closing of schools for lack of teachers and the falling standards of qualifications for teachers are a source of frustration. The lack of local employment opportunities and rising prices of energy and commodities is a source of anger. Local militants have not yet shown a serious interest or capability in parallel government function that would deliver basic services a la the Hezbollah model. However, signs of such a development would spell even greater danger for the FATA, NWFP, and potentially the rest of Pakistan. VIA