NWFP GOVERNOR ON KHYBER OPERATION, FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000390 E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/8/2018 TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF SUBJECT: NWFP GOVERNOR ON KHYBER OPERATION, FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE TALKS REF: A) PESHAWAR 389, B) PESHAWAR 382, C) PESHAWAR 370, D) PESHAWAR 360 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Consulate Peshawar, State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Owais Ghani briefed NSC Senior Director for South and Central Asia Mark Webber on the status of current operations in Khyber Agency during a July 3 meeting. While the Governor would like to expand operations to other parts of Khyber agency, he is limited by security forces which are "stretched." Uzbeks and Arabs are still present in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but Ghani assured Senior Director Webber that his forces would go after militant commanders. Cooperation with political leadership at the provincial level is good, but the Governor is not receiving all of the support he has requested from Islamabad. Repatriating Afghan refugees is still a challenge due to ongoing turmoil in Afghanistan. While over 100 "militants" have been arrested and dozens of militant hideouts demolished in the current Khyber operation thus far, it is unclear whether the GOP speaks from a position of authority yet in a tribal agency wracked by growing lawlessness and criminal activity. End Summary. Khyber Operation -------------- ¶2. (C) The Governor stated that he had planned to carry out the operation in Khyber agency's Bara area in April/May after a skirmish with Mangal Bagh in Khyber's Jamrud area but had "been too busy on other fronts to do so." Responding to a question about potentially expanding operations into the Tirah Valley, the Governor said that his forces were "stretched." According to Ghani, he had initially requested four wings of Frontier Corps, but was only given two. The Governor said he had needed at least two wings to keep in reserve because the troops are "getting tired." He also received only 27 of the 32 Frontier Constabulary platoons that he had requested. (Note: A wing consists of 400-650 soldiers. A platoon is approximately 30 troops. End note.) ¶3. (C) Ghani said that the operation in Bara had met with no resistance due to four months of "political spadework." He claimed that the operation had the support of the people and that common individuals had assisted security forces in identifying over 100 suspected militants who had since been arrested. The Governor predicted that the operation would continue for another seven to ten days and claimed that the operation's objective of reducing the immediate threat to Peshawar had been met. Ghani said that he is currently unable to venture out of Bara because he does not have the manpower to do so. He claimed, however, that Bara is now "weapons-free" and that troops are confiscating militant arms. Foreign Fighters -------------- ¶4. (C) Responding to Senior Director Webber's question about the presence of foreign fighters in the FATA, Ghani said that both Uzbeks and Arabs "are still there." Despite the killing of "hundreds" of Uzbeks during military operations in 2007, the Governor did not see their numbers diminishing, but rather noted a steady "trickle" of incoming Uzbek fighters. The Governor also claimed that Arabs, who first "stage" in Afghanistan's Helmand province, are coming into the tribal areas. The Governor asked for the United States to "keep them busy in Iraq, while we sort out our problems here." Ghani acknowledged that cross-border movement has increased over recent months but noted that recent peace talks in South Waziristan included provisions specifically prohibiting this movement. ¶5. (C) Moving to the topic of confronting militant leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud, the Haqqani network and Hekmatyar, the Governor described these militants as the "center of gravity" and urged that "we need to get them." He said that "we have no reservations about going after them" and cited a shortage of night fighting capability as a reason why Frontier Corps and Army soldiers have been unable to follow through on capturing or killing these commanders. The Governor said that he had approached Chief of Army Staff General Kayani for this support but has not yet received any material assistance. Webber affirmed that the United States is prepared to help and emphasized that staffing border coordination centers and training sites would be a good step toward increased U.S./Pakistan cooperation. Cooperation with Political Leadership -------------- ¶6. (C) Governor Ghani described his "FATA Policy Committee" as evidence that he is consulting the political leadership in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The Committee consists of himself, NWFP Chief Minister Haider Hoti, Awami National Party provincial president Afrasiab Khattak (in his new capacity as "Peace Envoy"),the 11th Corps and Frontier Corps Commanders, the NWFP Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and the FATA Additional Chief Secretary (ref. C). He claimed that ANP leader Asfundyar Wali Khan is "very much involved" in formulating FATA policy and said that he had discussed the Bara operation with ANP's leadership over a month ago. According to the Governor, ANP had pressured Prime Minister Gilani to extract Frontier Constabulary troopers from Balochistan to be used in the NWFP and FATA. Ghani claimed that Pakistan's newly elected government is "still having problems settling down" and commented that he was somewhat concerned that Nawaz Sharif had not been consulted about carrying out operations in Bara. Refugees -------------- ¶7. (C) Responding to Senior Director Webber's concern that refugee camps can serve as centers of gravity for militancy in Pakistan's northwest, Ghani replied that two major camps had recently been "cleaned out." The Governor said that Peshawar's Kachagari and Nowshera's Jalozai camps had been emptied, but he was concerned about "destabilizing what little government is left in Afghanistan." He said that he would like to push the refugees back across the border because they are an "economic and social drain" on his province, but they "need to have something to go back to." Fence the Border? -------------- ¶8. (C) The Governor described his strategy of fencing and mining the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and building approximately 25 biometric crossing points. He attributed his failure to successfully carry out this initiative to Afghan "interference." Ghani claimed that during his tenure as Governor of Balochistan, a Governor from an adjacent province in Afghanistan (NFI) led a procession and stoned a prototype border crossing point that Ghani had established in the Chama Nagh area of Balochistan. Ghani claimed that the Afghans were against fencing the border because it would "inhibit the flow of narcotics." He acknowledged the possibility of international concern with mines, but requested that the United States find out why the Afghans are against fencing and mining the border and encouraged Webber to convince Afghanistan to participate. (Note: In Ref A, Frontier Corps Commander Khattak did not consider fencing, and particularly mining, to be a productive use of resources in stopping cross-border attacks. End note.) Militant Funding -------------- ¶9. (C) Governor Ghani repeated his suspicion that Russia is involved in funding militants in Afghanistan. (Note: Ghani conveyed this theory to NIO Peter Lavoy on June 26 - ref C. End note.) He claimed that successful attacks such as the July 2 downing of a helicopter in Afghanistan's Logar province are evidence that Russian operatives are injecting high quality arms, such as Stinger missiles, in "small, unnoticeable quantities" into Afghanistan. According to the Governor, "the Russians' greatest success lies in the fact that we have not yet been able to discern their involvement." While Ghani conceded that he did not have proof of this interference, he claimed that an investigation would be necessary. The Governor's FATA Policy -------------- ¶10. (C) NWFP Governor Owais Ghani described his policy in the FATA in similar terms to those relayed to Counselor Eliot Cohen, National Intelligence Officer Peter Lavoy and Ambassador on June 12, 18, and 26 (refs. B, C, and D). He described his strategy of conducting peace talks with tribal elders as a means to carry out development work in the FATA as quickly as possible. He acknowledged that the accords - or "undertakings" - were not long-term agreements and would not hold indefinitely. When Senior Director Webber raised concerns that a lack of adequate enforcement would enable the already increasing threat to grow stronger, he acknowledged the need for continued security operations to deal with violations of the agreements. However, effective enforcement to the Governor means having military and paramilitary troops ready to move in within a few hours and noted that soldiers are present in North Waziristan's Miramshah, Razmak, Dattakhel and Shawal areas. Ghani stated that he did not wish to make the text of the South Waziristan agreement public until it was finalized in order to prevent any negative reaction in the press. VIA