UNESCO'S AUTUMN 2008 EXECUTIVE BOARD: Category 2

UNCLAS PARIS FR 002106 SIPDIS SENSITIVE TAGS: UNESCO PREL SCUL NI BN SF IN SUBJECT: UNESCO'S AUTUMN 2008 EXECUTIVE BOARD: Category 2 Institutes The message is sensitive but unclassified. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At UNESCO's autumn 2008 Executive Board, the U.S. clashed with a coalition of developing countries over Category 2 institutes - independent institutes that are paid for by their host countries but are under the aegis of UNESCO. Led by India and South Africa, these countries resisted a U.S. effort to amend the Secretariat's draft strategy for these institutes that would have required they have an independent evaluation before renewal of their agreement with UNESCO. Board members in the end postponed consideration of the strategy document to the Executive Board's spring 2009 session. A U.S. effort to open debate and ask questions about a proposed Category 2 institute of African culture at the Obasanjo presidential library in Nigeria was met with indignation by South Africa who stated that it was impugning the "honor of Africa." End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) North-South tensions flared on several occasions during the September 30-October 21 (180th) session of UNESCO's Executive Board (septels). The most intense clash came as UNESCO moved to consider issues regarding Category 2 institutes, independent institutes that are financed by their host governments but are under UNESCO's aegis. There were two related items on the agenda. The first asked member states to approve a Secretariat-proposed revised strategy and new model agreement that would govern UNESCO's relationships with all of these institutes. The second item asked the Board to recommend to the General Conference that it approve the establishment of three specific Category 2 institutes: an institute on human rights issues in Buenos Aires, an institute on water issues in the Dominican Republic, and an institute on African culture at the Obasanjo Presidential Library in Nigeria. Category 2 Center Strategy ¶3. (SBU) The Organization's October 2007 General Conference mandated that the Secretariat produce at this Executive Board session a strategy for better using the centers and dealing with the administrative burden that their rapidly growing number poses. (Note: There are currently 40 such institutes with plans for at least another 15-20 at various stages of development. Under existing rules, Secretariat members attend the Board meetings of each institute and are expected to coordinate regularly with them. In return, each institute is permitted to use the UNESCO name and logo. End Note.) At the 2007 General Conference and subsequently, the U.S. strongly supported the need for a new strategy and urged that it provide for a six-year sunset clause and an independent evaluation of the contribution these institutes make to UNESCO's work before their agreements with UNESCO are renewed. ¶4. (SBU) Prior to the most recent Executive Board session it was clear that some developing countries had misgivings about revising the strategy and, in particular, about including a provision for regular evaluation of institutes. India notably took the lead in stirring anxieties among the developing countries, arguing that the cost of independent evaluation would be too high and that the U.S. was trying to prevent developing countries from having institutes by making them too costly for any but rich countries to afford. (Comment: While there are more Category 2 institutes in rich countries than poor ones, as might be expected, it is absolutely untrue to say the developed countries are trying to prevent poorer countries from having them. There are currently Category 2 institutes in such countries as Malawi, Burkina Faso, and India itself. End Comment.) ¶5. (SBU) Despite this opposition, as the session began it appeared that a deal might be possible. Many delegations - from both rich and poor countries - agreed that UNESCO needed to get a better grip on these institutes. The Indian delegation told us in confidence that what concerned them most was the possibility that an evaluation might address the efficiency with which these independent institutes are run. The U.S. delegation said that it was alright to respect the independence of the institutes as long as it was balanced by appropriate accountability. The Indian Ambassador suggested privately to the U.S. Ambassador that an open-ended working group could be convened to iron out differences when the Board considered the issue. The U.S. delegation, therefore, submitted proposed amendments to the draft strategy that would have provided for sunset clauses, criteria for establishing centers, and independent evaluation, and would have placed clear limits on the amount of assistance that UNESCO provides to Category 2 institutes. ¶6. (SBU) When the proposed Category 2 center strategy came up for consideration in a joint meeting of UNESCO's Finance and Program Commissions, Program Commission Chair, Argentine Senator Daniel Filmus opened the floor to general comments. This gave India the opportunity to argue the institutes pose no burden on UNESCO, and that institutes cannot be subjected to uniform standards, since conditions in the developing world are different. Many other developing countries, notably including Brazil and South Africa, spoke up to support India. Many states also said the proposed new strategy should not be applied to existing institutes. ¶7. (SBU) The U.S. stated that we were not seeking to prevent the establishment of new institutes but rather ensure that the direct and indirect costs of these institutes to the Organization are limited as much as possible. The U.S. then recommended the establishment of a working group, which was supported by a number of other countries. However, India reversed its previous position and opposed the establishment of the working group. Following India's lead, other countries rejected the idea of a working group as well. When India announced that there was little support for a working group, the representative of the Philippines intervened and said that she had taken copious notes during the discussion and that India was wrong, and that in fact there was significant support for a working group. The Philippine representative then received a public dressing down from the Indian Ambassador for breaking solidarity with the Asia-Pacific Group in a public session. The Philippine representative responded with an abject apology to her Indian colleague. ¶8. (SBU) The Argentine Chair then directed the members to consider an Indian draft decision that would have approved the strategy while stipulating that it would not apply to existing institutes until their agreements with UNESCO were renewed. The U.S. amendments were not considered. However, having heard the tenor of the debate, the Indians decided to amend their own decision from the floor. In revised form, it merely welcomed the Secretariat's proposed strategy, invited Member States to send the Director-General comments on it, and decided to consider the matter again at the Board's next session in spring 2009. The decision was adopted in this form. Proposed Nigerian Institute ¶9. (SBU) It was late in the evening, and emotions were already strained when the Argentine, Dominican, and Nigerian institutes came up for consideration. As many other observers had left, a wave of young Nigerian men, carrying still and video cameras, filled the vacant chairs. A Nigerian minister sat behind his country's nameplate in place of Nigeria's regular ambassador. ¶10. (SBU) The chairman announced that the Bureau (conference steering committee) had recommended all three institutes be considered without debate. The U.S. asked for the floor and said that, given the importance of Category 2 institutes, we thought there should be discussion. The chair then allowed debate but said the three institutes must be considered together and not separately, and that delegations would have up to ten minutes speaking time to comment on all of them. (Note: The U.S. had learned that the Secretariat's third and most recent feasibility study completed in June 2008 on the Nigerian proposal had raised serious concerns about an unresolved court case regarding the property rights at the proposed site and had found that little thinking had been done on the proposed institute's vision, goals, objectives, and program. End Note.) ¶11. (SBU) The representative of South Africa publicly attacked the U.S. Ambassador for "disreputable conduct" because the U.S. was not abiding by the "decision" of the Bureau recommending no debate, which he said was the result of three hours of heated discussion at the previous Bureau meeting. Ambassador Oliver responded by saying that she would not tolerate those kinds of personal comments, and that any country had the right to discuss any item it wished to at the Executive Board regardless of what was "decided" in the Bureau, especially since the Bureau was only empowered to make recommendations, not decisions. (Comment: There was a major disagreement in the Bureau on the Nigerian Center as several Bureau members opposed the Center's going forward given all the unresolved issues relating to the Center. A compromise had been reached in the recommended decision which stated that the Director General could only sign the UNESCO agreement with the Government of Nigeria after the court case had been resolved. The U.S. supported the compromise decision.) ¶12. (SBU) Later on the debate, after more than a dozen states had taken the floor to say in almost exactly the same words that they supported all three of the proposed institutes, the U.S. intervened again to congratulate the governments of Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Nigeria for their proposed Cat II institutes. The U.S. then went on to ask questions about the the status of the Nigerian court case and about the center's vision, goals, objectives, and program. In response, the Nigerian minister blandly assured the Board that the court case had been settled (N.B. a claim contradicted by news reports) and that the Nigerian Government is committed to supporting the center over the long-term. The South African delegation took the floor to complain that the U.S. questions had impugned the "honor of Africa." After this, the chair announced that the decision in favor of all three centers had been adopted. There was general jubilation among the large numbers of Nigerians who had by this time filled the room. ¶13. (SBU) Comment: This discussion, especially consideration of the proposed Nigerian institute, was one of the most emotional we have experienced at UNESCO in quite some time. Although it took place against a wider backdrop of North-South tensions on other issues (septel),we suspect that many developing countries were motivated less by a strong sense of group solidarity and more by a desire to protect their particular centers. The Indians were clearly concerned about what an evaluation of their institutes might show, and, other delegations tell us, the Indians warned developing country delegations behind the scenes that institutes in their countries might be closed if the U.S. initiative was adopted. The Argentines told us they worried approval for their institute might be delayed if it became caught up in a quarrel over a new strategy. For their part, the Nigerians were determined to have their institute approved come what may, and many developing countries were happy to oblige them in hopes of having the favor returned later. ¶14. (SBU) Comment Continued: The whole affair demonstrates how hard it is for many UNESCO Member States to put the interests of the Organization ahead of their own. Prior to the session most Member States appeared to agree that Category 2 institutes should be better regulated and their costs to the Organization kept limited, but they lost their nerve when presented with a concrete and effective plan for doing so. Oliver