S/I SATTERFIELD DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH FRENCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000083 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM FR IZ IR SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS DECEMBER 28, 2007 Classified By: DCM Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Visiting S/I David Satterfield on December 28 provided an overview to French Presidency diplomatic adviser Levitte and French MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Felix-Paganon of U.S. efforts to promote Iraqi national reconciliation. He also provided a paper outlining U.S. ideas on how France might become more involved in efforts to help Iraq. Although his French interlocutors did not have enough time to review and provide substantive responses, Satterfield said we were prepared to discuss Iraq with France in Paris, DC, or Baghdad. (Note: Embassy is expecting a formal response to the paper after President Sarkozy's current trip to the Gulf but has received an informal response it will report septel.) Felix-Paganon was more skeptical about the overall security situation in Iraq than Levitte and focused attention on Iran's manipulation of the Shi'a part of the insurgency to, as he saw it, further Tehran's regional and even international aims. He also worried that the policy of supporting "people's committees" would open a Pandora's Box and undermine central government authority. Satterfield emphasized that we have a realistic appreciation of the challenges facing us and would analyze where we are in the months ahead in "real world" terms. Felix-Paganon, picking up on FM Kouchner's offer to host an Iraqi national dialogue at Istanbul, said that France remains ready to help in a manner that complements U.S. efforts. End summary ¶2. (C) In a December 28 meeting mostly devoted to Lebanon (septel notal),S/I David Satterfield raised Iraq with Jean-David Levitte, French diplomatic adviser to President Sarkozy. DCM and poloff accompanied Satterfield; French Presidency adviser on NEA matters Boris Boillon joined Levitte. Satterfield began by welcoming France's more active role in Iraq and its desire to work with us more closely to help Iraq overcome its many problems. Satterfield proposed to hold ongoing discussions in Paris, Washington, or in Baghdad. ¶3. (C) Levitte thanked Satterfield for raising Iraq and said that France was "impressed" by the reported improvement in Iraq's security situation. Satterfield asserted that the USG is realistic and believes that, despite recent gains, the security situation in Iraq will remain fragile in the absence of real national reconciliation. He stressed that this will be a long-term process and pointed out that there currently exists no structure to consolidate and implement national reconciliation. Satterfield stated that the fault did not lie exclusively with PM Maliki but was broadly shared among all Iraqi leaders. He recounted the Secretary's recent message to members of the Iraqi leadership other than Maliki that the government must function collectively and that they should not make Maliki the issue. They grudgingly accepted the Secretary's position but doubted there was the political will in Iraq currently to succeed. Satterfield told Levitte the Secretary also was blunt in her one-on-one with Maliki. Our recent painful experience in renegotiating the terms for the MNF/I renewal, according to Satterfield, confirmed that we need to move to a point where we can negotiate a bilateral agreement on the long-term status of U.S. forces in Iraq with the entire Iraqi government and not just the prime minister's office. ¶4. (C) Levitte thanked Satterfield for the overview and for the paper outlining ideas for increasing French involvement in Iraq. He apologized for being in a rush to join President Sarkozy in Egypt. As they headed for the door, Levitte asked about the upcoming next round of discussions with the Iranians in Baghdad. Satterfield stressed that they would remain focused on the security situation in Iraq and not deal with other issues. ¶5. (C) Later that day, Satterfield (again accompanied by DCM and poloff) met with French MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Jean Felix-Paganon (accompanied by DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula Franck Gellet and Iraq desk officer Olivier Masseret). Satterfield described positive trend lines due to the surge of U.S. military personnel, the greater effectiveness of Iraqi forces, the diminution of al-Qa'ida capabilities in certain provinces, divisions within the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, and a lessening of Iranian support for Shi'a insurgents. This improvement in security was matched by economic improvement as seen in the fourfold increase in capital spending in the Iraqi government budget. The lack of progress in achieving national reconciliation, however, was placing all of this in jeopardy. As he had done with Levitte, Satterfield explained that Iraq must undergo a long-term political "revolution" via gradual progress on its component pieces and cannot achieve immediate progress on the overall whole. He ran through the Secretary's message to PM Maliki and other Iraqi leaders and reiterated our PARIS 00000083 002 OF 003 determination to deal with the government as a whole when negotiating our strategic framework. Satterfield also shared our assessment of challenges ahead in terms of building up the powers of provincial authorities and promoting national reconciliation. This should culminate, by the end of 2008, with the end of our mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and with agreement on a new bilateral structure for a continued U.S. military presence. ¶6. (C) Felix-Paganon responded with two general comments: (1) France and the U.S. share common objectives of a more stable Iraq so that it would not pose an ongoing threat to the region as a whole and (2) while France welcomes the progress that has accompanied the surge, it still has many reasons to be worried about the future. Among the questions Felix-Paganon then rattled off were: What happens after the surge? How reliable are the newly trained Iraqi forces? What will be the consequences of reinforcing the status of certain tribes as they stand up to insurgents? Nearly all of these questions, Felix-Paganon responded, required that we "wait and see." That included waiting to see what happens when U.S. forces leave. He expressed skepticism that the tribes would be a force for stability over the long term. In addition, Felix-Paganon wondered how national reconciliation was possible when consensus among Iraqi leaders was so far out of reach. Maliki seems more part of the problem than the solution. At least some of the former Ba'th party members need to be brought into the transition process. It is vital to bring a critical mass of Kurds on board even as the question surges to the forefront between Kurds and Arabs over "who gets Kirkuk." Finally, there is the issue of bringing Sunnis into this critical mass. Restoring the former system is out of the question, but somehow former Sunni political leaders have to be brought back into the system without upsetting the others. ¶7. (C) Satterfield replied that all of the questions and issues Felix-Paganon raised have been on our minds, too. We have started to reduce our troop presence with little measurable change to the security situation, which is positive. Later, however, we will need to do a real world assessment of consequences of our policies in measuring progress. In dealing with national reconciliation, Satterfield called for pressing the non-Maliki elements to seek a coalition in the center as we press Maliki to work with the others. We are trying to focus on the government's program and not its personalities. With respect to de-Ba'thification, the Sadrists are softening their position in recognition that they do not have the position of strength they once enjoyed. As for the status of Kirkuk, Satterfield agreed it was a subject that we could not ignore. The UN, however, is now engaged in seeking a resolution. The current process may not result in a settlement by mid-2008, but a more mature understanding may emerge among Kurdish and local Arab leaders of the need to balance various equities. Turkish military action against the PKK is arguably prompting this evolution of thinking. Felix-Paganon nodded, saying that if this buys time for a solution to be worked out it would not be a bad thing. With respect to the question of who speaks for the Sunnis, Satterfield said this will take time and probably a round of local elections. ¶8. (C) Shifting to the regional context, Felix-Paganon asserted that Iran has two apparent considerations vis-a-vis Iraq: those that were strictly Iraqi in nature and how meddling in Iraq helped Iran project its power in the region and even serve as a lever in its relationship with the West. In this respect, Felix-Pagnon wondered whether the NIE might have had a "soothing effect" on Iran's Iraq policy. Satterfield rejoined that we have seen no link between the NIE and Iran's policy in Iraq. Felix-Paganon agreed but said he could imagine a different situation with different NIE judgments. In his view, the Iranians see Iraq as a low intensity conflict problem "for them but not for us" that they may offer to modulate by offering a more cooperative approach as they have in Lebanon. Satterfield expressed skepticism but said that upcoming U.S./Iranian discussions might give a clearer indication as to Iranian thinking. ¶9. (C) With respect to what France is ready to do in Iraq, Felix-Paganon said that it is already more forthcoming through its political statements (such as FM Kouchner's offer at Istanbul to host national reconciliation talks) and attend international meetings. He added that France wants to be more involved in terms of addressing humanitarian needs in Iraq. This will take shape in the north after the embassy office opens in Irbil in 2008 and possibly later in the south after another office opens in Basrah. Satterfield, who referred to the paper the embassy had distributed earlier in the day to the MFA, said we are ready to continue discussion anywhere and anytime of how France can help. PARIS 00000083 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Just before concluding, the discussion returned briefly to French concerns about U.S. funding to popular committees to challenge the insurgency. Satterfield appreciated French concerns about the risk of undermining central government authority. For that reason, he explained, we are telling the government it must reach out to these people to allow for true national integration. Satterfield described support for the committees as a tactical measure that must be transitional and temporary. Felix-Paganon worried about opening a Pandora's Box and how that might complicate the already difficult effort at national reconciliation. He noted FM Kouchner's desire to sponsor a dialogue among Iraqi national leaders, although making it clear that France did not want to disrupt U.S. efforts underway. Satterfield repeated that we would welcome an ongoing exchange with France over Iraq. The French voice is an important one, he concluded, in the discussion of Iraq's future. ¶11. (U) S/I Satterfield did not clear this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm PEKALA