S/I SATTERFIELD'S DECEMBER 28 MEETINGS PRECEDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000034 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM FR LE SY SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD'S DECEMBER 28 MEETINGS PRECEDE DRAMATIC FRENCH DECISION TO BREAK OFF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH SYRIA OVER LEBANON PARIS 00000034 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: S/I and NEA PDAS David Satterfield on December 28 urged French Presidency diplomatic adviser Levitte and MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Felix-Paganon in separate meetings to strengthen the Siniora government in Lebanon pending election of a president and to consider using the Arab League summit in Damascus as a lever vis-a-vis Syria. Levitte agreed with Satterfield's assessment of the situation and Syria's effort to dismantle Lebanese state institutions but expressed frustration with March 14's leadership, which he felt was not as coherent or decisive as it should be. He further agreed with the idea of using the summit as a point of pressure with Syria -- although with the idea that the threat would be to transfer the venue away from Damascus and not to cancel it outright ) and offered to raise with President Sarkozy before he met Egyptian President Mubarak in Cairo December 30. Levitte complained that Syria was using talks about the composition of the Lebanese cabinet -- designed to ensure an opposition blocking minority -- to ensure its allies had the upper hand. Satterfield expressed skepticism about France organizing another conference on Lebanon, especially if it involved Syria and Iran among interested outside powers. Felix-Paganon expressed familiar worry about the possibility for a rapid breakdown of the situation in Lebanon but noted that inertia was holding things in check for the moment. Like Levitte, he was skeptical that Sleiman -- the best of the bad choices on offer -- could be trusted to select neutral ministers if given the chance. Felix-Paganon had few ideas about the way forward and asked that the U.S. continue to express concerns about French dealings with Syria over Lebanon. Since Satterfield's meetings, Sarkozy has suspended high-level contacts with Syria over Lebanon (but not broken or reduced ties to Damascus) and expressed full support for the just-announced Arab League proposal. An expected January 8 lunch in Paris between Sarkozy and Saad Hariri should be another opportunity for France to indicate its public support for March 14 and democracy in Lebanon free of Syrian 
interference. End summary ¶2. (C) S/I and NEA PDAS David Satterfield met December 28 with French Presidency Diplomatic Adviser Jean-David Levitte to discuss Lebanon and Iraq (see septel for Iraq discussion). DCM and poloff accompanied Satterfield. Levitte welcomed the meeting as an opportunity to do some "brainstorming" prior to French President Sarkozy,s upcoming meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak in Cairo, during which Sarkozy wanted to discuss Lebanon. He jokingly expressed the hope that Satterfield had brought a "magic formula" for dealing with the Lebanon crisis. ¶3. (C) Satterfield regretted that he had no magic formula. He asserted, however, that Syria is progressively and in a largely passive manner, seeking to dismantle everything March 14 has set up since Rafiq Hariri's 2005 assassination. This is slowly eroding the Siniora government's legitimacy and risks the Lebanese government's independence vis-a-vis Syria. Satterfield said it is not clear to us when an election has to occur; we would prefer it happen sooner than later but not at any price. The USG's preference is an approach that would: --fortify the Siniora government (as NEA A/S Welch put it recently in Beirut so that it can "act like a government") and not wait for an election to provide it legitimacy; --seek to delegitimize what Syria is doing on its own and via its Lebanese allies vis-a-vis the Special Tribunal as well as rallying Arab (particularly Saudi and Egyptian) support for March 14; --discuss with Egypt and Saudi Arabia using the upcoming Arab League summit in Damascus as leverage with Syria to allow the election to proceed freely in Lebanon. ¶4. (C) Satterfield noted that March 14 continues to expect the U.S. and France to take the lead in resolving the Lebanese stalemate. We have argued that it must act and avoid playing into opposition hands. When Satterfield said that Welch had gotten no clear response from March 14 except a vague expression of its desire for clear international support, Levitte and Boillon observed "that is the problem." Satterfield, when asked whether the USG supported the PARIS 00000034 002.2 OF 004 Lebanese government's initiative to break the impasse over election of a president, answered that we strongly support the normal functioning of a government to avoid the appearance of a vacuum until there is agreement on the election. Levitte asked about using the UNSC as a lever. Satterfield urged keeping the UNSC in reserve and using the Special Tribunal as the first international body to take steps to counter Syria's activities in Lebanon. ¶5. (C) Levitte agreed with all the points Satterfield made, although he doubted the Arabs would agree to cancel or postpone the summit. He and Satterfield discussed having Sarkozy raise with Mubarak and Saudi King Abdallah the possibility of seeking an alternative venue for the summit as a form of pressure. Satterfield acknowledged, and Levitte agreed, that threatening to cancel the summit outright over Syrian behavior was likely out of the question. With respect to changing the venue, Levitte wondered whether Mubarak might be willing to host, to which Boillon retorted "he wouldn't dare." Levitte then suggested Saudi King Abdallah, who "hates Asad." After pointing out that Presidents Bush and Sarkozy would be in Riyadh the same day on separate programs, Levitte called for them to coordinate their messages to the Saudis. Satterfield agreed to pass that suggestion on to Washington. Levitte said he would suggest that Sarkozy propose to Mubarak, in the absence of progress on Lebanon, moving the Arab summit venue elsewhere, perhaps Riyadh. ¶6. (C) Satterfield reiterated the Secretary's hope that there would be no further EU missions to Syria. This prompted Levitte to discuss French efforts at dialogue with the Syrians. He acknowledged having gotten nothing or limited gains (e.g., Lahud's peaceful departure from the presidency, probably on Syrian instructions). Levitte agreed that Asad's strategy is to destroy Lebanese state institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The "good news" is that, in the face of this crisis, relations between the GOL and LAF have never been stronger. ¶7. (C) In terms of possible next steps, Levitte said the French were thinking about calling for a "well-prepared conference," to be held in Cairo, or Paris, that could include March 14 (i.e., Hariri, Gemayel, Ja'ja', and Junblatt) and March 8 (Berri, Hizballah, Aoun) leaders as well as key external players (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Italy, Spain, the Arab League, and the U.S). Levitte wondered whether Syria's and Iran's inclusion would cause the USG problems. Satterfield responded that the French should first of all discuss the viability of such a conference with March 14. He added that we would be very concerned with any concept that appeared to establish equality between March 8 and March 14 and could lead to more pressure to form a compromise government with a blocking minority. If our concern now was to shift the focus from Syria's continued ability to exert leverage over Lebanon to how the GOL could function effectively and independently of such influence, Syria's inclusion would be a non-starter. Satterfield said we would probably not support any gathering that included Syria and Iran. ¶8. (C) Levitte affirmed the importance of maintaining U.S./French cooperation on Lebanon. France, like the U.S., cannot accept a blocking minority. It would accept a 15 (March 14)-10 (March 8)-5 (ministers appointed by Sleiman) formula but shares U.S. reservations about the five ministers Sleiman would appoint. He and Satterfield discussed apparent convergence on the outlines of a reform of the electoral law as a possible basis on which to build a broader accord, with Satterfield stressing the need to ensure that whatever may have looked possible a few weeks ago was still something that March 14 accepted and would strengthen its position. Satterfield repeated that we need to ensure that anything the U.S. and France does now strengthens the Siniora-led GOL as Syria seeks to weaken it. We need to be clear whether our objective is to strengthen the GOL or simply get a president elected. Levitte agreed but contended that Syria, if it believes time is working against it, will work to weaken the GOL through new demonstrations, provocations, and even assassinations. ¶9. (C) Levitte continued by voicing familiar French concerns about the risk of a breakdown of order and security the longer the current situation runs. He said Sarkozy would PARIS 00000034 003.2 OF 004 speak to Mubarak December 30 about the Arab League summit. Levitte also said that "we" will speak to Hariri about the five ministers Sleiman would appoint under a 15-10-5 formula. He agreed with Satterfield's qualification that the end result would not be a cabinet with a blocking minority. Levitte also agreed that March 14 should not be pressed to compromise or to concede anything for an agreement on the election, although he asserted that "eventually there must be an agreement." ¶10. (C) Satterfield's subsequent meeting at the MFA the same day was initially with the French NEA PDAS-equivalent Gilles Bonnaud and later NEA A/S-equivalent Jean Felix-Paganon, who arrived late from a working lunch. Felix-Paganon's Lebanon team accompanied him. DCM and poloff accompanied Satterfield. In addition to the core points above, Satterfield recounted how David Welch, during his recent trip to Beirut, told Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri that he had a personal responsibility for what is happening. This triggered some discussion, with general agreement all around, of Berri's limited room for maneuver, his determination to hold onto his position (and stay alive), and the need to keep pressure on him to help resolve the situation. ¶11. (C) Felix-Paganon observed that the U.S. and France agree completely on the strategic objectives but differ on tactics. He noted we have all accepted Sleiman as the least worst of the candidates and opined that if he fails to go through, the names likely to come up next will be progressively worse. Felix-Paganon expressed no confidence in Sleiman's likely choices for his five ministers in a new cabinet. Overall, Felix-Paganon argued, we are in a situation of having to accept the least worst of the bad alternatives before us. If we ever had a real alternative of an election based on a 50 percent plus one outcome, we certainly do not have it now. Satterfield acknowledged the challenges we face but countered that we should still strive for the best outcome. France and the U.S. will be blamed if there is no peaceful end to the current crisis. Satterfield several times hammered home the argument that we should not agree to pay a price for an election that would weaken March 14 even if the passage of time works to everyone's disadvantage. We must be cautious, he argued, about any formulation that might get a president elected but lead to the death of March 14 as an independent political entity. ¶12. (C) There was some discussion of the status of the Special Tribunal (Felix-Paganon believed the money was mostly in hand to set it up and the judges appointed),the lack of movement on implementation of UNSCR 1701, and questions about Saad Hariri's real position. On the latter, Felix-Paganon said that he is in a classic suq-style bargaining situation with Damascus. Felix-Paganon also asserted that France believes the assassination of LAF number 2 al-Hajj was undertaken to get him out of the way as Sleiman's successor. He agreed with Satterfield's assertion that composition of the next government was what was really at stake, which raised questions about Hariri as the next prime minister. ¶13. (C) Similar to Levitte, Felix-Paganon doubted anything violent would happen immediately in Lebanon. Over time, however, he expected tensions to rise. He said the only ones currently with people being mobilized for possible trouble belonged to Aoun and Hizballah. Felix-Paganon called for three things: (1) a public statement of firm support for March 14, (2) a frank private dialogue, preferably undertaken jointly by our two governments, with March 14, and (3) extreme caution with respect to maintaining any dialogue with Syria. On this latter point, Felix-Paganon referred to "the debate in Paris on this" and said that the U.S. position would be extremely important in influencing what France decides to do next. On EU dealings with Syria, Felix-Paganon and his DAS-equivalent for the Levant noted that Mu'allim is due to visit Berlin shortly. Felix-Paganon said that others in the EU are likely to argue that anything they do now with Syria is only "matching" what France has been doing. ¶14. (C) Update and comment: As reported in Paris Points and international media, President Sarkozy announced during a joint press conference December 30 with Egyptian President Mubarak that he had suspended his own contacts with the Syrian leadership over Lebanon and had ordered his "team" to PARIS 00000034 004.2 OF 004 do the same. This step occurred even as Elysee Secretary General Claude Gueant continued to pursue a political compromise with Syria that would lead to a presidential election until at least December 28. It appears to us that Sarkozy finally tired of Syrian double-dealing and agreed that he should not further pressure March 14 after Hariri rejected the Gueant formula that would likely have given the opposition a blocking minority in a new cabinet. (As an ironic denouement to this episode, Gueant reportedly phoned Mu'allim December 31 to "officially" inform him that contacts were being broken off.) Sarkozy's decision, however, does not constitute a total rupture with Damascus but a decision not to engage with the Syrian leadership at a senior level. Our understanding is that the French ambassador remains in Damascus and that French/Syrian relations remain "normal." The MFA press spokesperson underscored this point January 4, when she said that "political level" contacts would be suspended until Syria "demonstrates its good faith and a consensus president is elected in Lebanon. Our diplomatic relations with Syria are not called into question by this decision." ¶15. (C) Update and comment continued: The French government has welcomed the three-part Arab League plan. FM Kouchner issued a statement January 7 calling the plan a "very positive step, giving grounds for hope" and asserting that it was "based principally on ideas that France has been helping to develop over the past few months." The statement called on all parties to implement the plan quickly so that presidential elections may be held immediately. It reaffirmed France's commitment to remain in contact with all concerned parties and stated that France was pursuing a "close dialogue on the subject" with the Arab League. Although the spokesperson refused to discuss the status of France's efforts vis-a-vis the Arab League decision, the Arab League's intervention ended days of difficult questions and answers by reporters eager for details about the proposal France had been working on with Syria. Sarkozy, when asked at his January 8 press conference about his dealings with Syrian President Asad, did not express any regret for having gone to such lengths to head off a potentially violent denouement of the Lebanese crisis. President Sarkozy's expected lunch in Paris with March 14 leader Saad Hariri on January 8 should be an occasion for France publicly to affirm its support for democracy in Lebanon and privately to clear away any bad feeling over Sarkozy's Damascus gambit. ¶16. (U) S/I Satterfield agreed to post sending this cable without his clearance. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm PEKALA