COMOROS: FRANCE SUPPORTS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ASEC CN FR
SUBJECT: COMOROS: FRANCE SUPPORTS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST
ANJOUAN SHOULD NEED ARISE

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 138


B. ANTANANARIVO 137

C. ANTANANARIVO 129

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French MFA officials told us on February
20 that France would support military action by the Union of
the Comoros to take control of Anjouan from Colonel Mohamed
Bacar, should Bacar not heed the counsel of the multinational
mission preparing to meet with and deliver to him an
ultimatum urging cooperation. The French believe that this
mission will take place on February 23 or shortly thereafter,
and will include French participation. Our MFA contacts also
confirmed that France would provide transportation assistance
to Senegalese and Tanzanian units that may be involved in an
offensive, as well as other logistical support, but that such
support would not include assistance with troop landings at
Anjouan or French participation in combat. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MFA Comoros deskoff Jacques Biau and Madagascar
deskoff Beatrice Lederle discussed the crisis in Comoros on
February 20. They said that the GOF was highly engaged in
the issue and shared what they understood to be the USG
position concerning Anjouan and the possibility of
AU-supported military action by the government of the Union
of the Comoros. Biau noted that the multinational delegation
headed by South African FM Dlamini-Zuma, in which France and
the U.S. would participate, could travel to Anjouan on
February 23 or soon after; he noted that the precise date had
not yet been set (which Lederle said continued to be the case
in a February 21 follow-up conversation).


3. (C) Ideally, Dlamini-Zuma's delegation would convince
renegade Colonel Bacar to stand down, return to his senses,
and agree to cooperate with the electoral process that he had
previously helped sabotage, Biau said. He commented,
however, that it was difficult to understand Bacar's motives
and ultimate goals, given what Biau believed to be the
long-term futility of his wanting to "control" Anjouan. Biau
noted that Dlamini-Zuma's mission would not be to open some
sort of negotiation with Bacar. Instead, he would be told
that he had to cooperate, with no strings or pre-conditions
attached.


4. (C) Should Dlamini-Zuma fail to convince Bacar, which
seemed likely, Biau said that the Union government, with the
international community's support, would have done everything
possible to avoid a military confrontation, which the Union
government was nonetheless prepared to undertake. Biau said
that France, although not desiring such a result, could
accept a decision on the Union government's part to seize
Anjouan militarily. Biau also took careful note that France
believed a legal framework supporting the attack would be in
place, first at the AU-level and then at the UN Security
Council, where he believed that work was already in train to
craft a resolution that would provide a mandate and legal
basis for the attack and for those actively supporting it.


5. (C) Biau and Lederle confirmed press reports that France
had been asked to provide assistance to the operation and
that it had agreed to do so. This assistance would consist
of transportation support for the Senegalese and Tanzanian
units that would reportedly participate in the operation, and
other logistical services. They said that France would try
to play a "behind-the-scenes" role in moving troops among the
islands but that in no case would France help land troops on
Anjouan or participate in combat operations.


6. (C) Biau said that Anjouan's geography, which made beach
landings difficult, favored a defender but that the two
helicopters the Union government had acquired would
significantly help the attack force. He said that the Union
government forces numbered roughly 400 and he indicated that
this did not include whatever Senegal and Tanzania would
provide. Biau seemed confident that, with the two
helicopters, the Union side would prevail.


7. (C) All that said, Biau regretted that it had all come
to this. The Comoros was the last place that needed or
deserved this kind of internecine conflict. He observed that
various forms of EU and bilateral assistance had been
arranged but were now blocked because of the Anjouan

PARIS 00000308 002 OF 002


situation. France and the Comoros had signed, in 2006, a
Partnership Framework Agreement for the 2006-2011 period,
through which France was prepared to provide roughly 88
million euro. (NOTE: The Partnership Framework Agreement is
the instrument France has used for the past several years to
set forth and channel its foreign aid programs with recipient
countries; each such agreement covers a five-year span and
can be adjusted and fine-tuned to reflect changing
circumstances over the life of the agreement. END NOTE.)


8. (C) Biau and Lederle said that France welcomed U.S.
engagement in the Anjouan issue and that communications
between the U.S. and French Embassies in Madagascar were
excellent. They said that French officials involved in the
Dlamini-Zuma mission looked forward to close cooperation with
USG counterparts.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA