RUSSIA/GEORGIA: FRENCH PRESIDENCY OFFICIAL SEEKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002284

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MCAP MARR FR GG RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIA/GEORGIA: FRENCH PRESIDENCY OFFICIAL SEEKS
U.S. HELP TO GUIDE GEORGIA TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POL/MC KATHLEEN ALLEGRONE FOR
REASONS 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) During a December 16 meeting with Pol MC, French
Presidency (Elysee) advisor for Russia and the Americas
Damien Loras asked for our assistance dealing with Georgia.
Per Loras, President Sarkozy used the coming end of the
French EU presidency to write to Russian President Medvedev
in early December to summarize the current situation
regarding the Russia-Georgia crisis and to outline what still
needs to be done. The letter focused on three areas:
conflict prevention, the status of Perevi, and the Geneva
process. On conflict prevention, Sarkozy urged developing a
mechanism that could be used to prevent new incidents from
occurring and to defuse them before they can occur.
Regarding the standoff in Perevi, Sarkozy proposed a Russian
withdrawal, the return of Georgian police, and the insertion
of EU observers. On the Geneva process, Sarkozy said that
there had been some initial positive steps but asserted it
was necessary to continue the discussions in the Geneva
format to secure a more lasting solution. Sarkozy was
motivated, according to Loras, to cement progress to date but
also to reinforce the need for Russia to comply with its
existing commitments and to keep Russia engaged in the Geneva
talks. French FM Kouchner followed up Sarkozy,s letter with
a more detailed letter to FM Lavrov that also strongly
reminded the Russians that it is not acceptable to leave an
increased number of Russian troops in the enclaves.


2. (C) The French were pleased that three days after the
letters were sent, Russian troops appeared to be withdrawing
from Perevi. As the Russian withdrawal was nearing its end,
however, and the EU 27 ambassadors were visiting the area to
witness these developments and to mark the introduction of EU
monitors, the Georgian government surprised everyone by
arriving on site with sixty military troops. Both the
Georgian troops and the Russians adopted a very tense
posture. Almost immediately, the Russians responded by
installing not regular troops but Special Forces troops, or
"spetsnaz. " Loras clarified that the Georgians are well
aware of the deal Sarkozy had proposed to the Russians and
that the intervention of their troops ) rather than the
arrival of civilian police -- had been intentional and
counterproductive. France believes that the Russian military
had been reluctant to leave the Perevi area and had started
to do so only because the political side of the house had
required it. Now, with the failure of the initiative, the
military hardliners appear again to be in the ascendancy.
(Note: According to Embassy Tbilisi,s "Tbilisi Update" from
December 15, the OSCE reported that Georgian and Russian
forces agreed before the December 11-12 withdrawal of Russian
troops that a small number of Georgian Interior Ministry
criminal police would re-enter Perevi after the Russians
left. The first Georgian forces to arrive in Perevi on
December 12 were criminal police, but early on December 13,
an additional 50-60 Interior Ministry specialforces troops
arrived in unmarked vehicles, for an estimated total of
90-100 Georgian personnel. Russian forces claimed to the
OSCE that the Georgian side had sent in 500 troops, including
military forces, and consequently sent their own forces back
into Perevi. For several hours during the day on December
13, Georgian and Russian forces each had a presence in Perevi
within a few hundred yards of each other. Georgian forces
originally withdrew, so that by the evening of December 13,
the location of the two sides was essentially the same as it
had been before the Russian withdrawal. We assume this was
the incident to which Loras referred. End Note)


3. (C) Loras said Medvedev has not yet responded to
Sarkozy,s initial letter. The French are concerned that the
answer might come in advance of this week,s meeting of the
Geneva group, laden with unacceptable conditions and demands.
If that occurs, the Elysee has instructed EU Special Envoy
Morel to reject the conditions, and Sarkozy is poised to send
Medvedev a letter reinforcing the terms of the earlier
agreements and outlining the need for Russia to participate
constructively in the Geneva process. Failure to do so,
Loras said, would have to call into question Russia,s
commitment to the agreement and the continuing role of the EU
monitors, an observation Sarkozy would mentioned in any
letter he might send to Medvedev.


4. (C) Loras said the French believe Saakashvili is playing
an unhelpful and provocative role because of his weakened
domestic posture. They would like our help in guiding him
toward a more constructive role. Discussing Russian
leadership views, Loras said it appears that Putin is once
again playing a strong and unhelpful role. Loras judged
Medvedev,s role to be uncertain -- it is not clear whether
he is taking a harder line because he has been perceived as
too prone to settle issues or whether that is his normal
style. In any case, Sarkozy remains committed to preserving
the gains made through the August and September agreements,
continuing and advancing the Geneva process and enhancing the
role of the EU monitoring mission.


5. (C) Comment: Loras used a pre-arranged meeting to raise
this issue and to make a plea for assistance in working with
Saakashvili. Sarkozy obviously wants a positive legacy from
his intervention in Georgia and believes that is only
possible if a dialogue on the future of the enclaves remains
on the table in Geneva. From what Loras said, it also seems
that Sarkozy is unwilling to allow EU monitors to be
sidelined and marginalized. Sarkozy has proven himself in
other situations willing to cut deals with leaders he does
not fully trust, but has also been tough minded in holding
them to bargains they have struck, as he did with Syrian
President Asad last year. We look forward to any reporting
from Geneva or elsewhere that can shed light on developments
as well as guidance on a reply to the Elysee. We will also
check with the MFA for further details on Sarkozy's letter to
Medvedev, e.g., whether it included reminders of Russia's
obligation to withdraw from Akhalgori and Upper Kodori.

STAPLETON