MAURITANIA/FRANCE: POLITICAL PROCESS AT AN

S E C R E T PARIS 002253 SIPDIS ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS USMISSION USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KDEM MR FR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/FRANCE: POLITICAL PROCESS AT AN IMPASSE; AZIZ SHOULD "ACT LIKE VALL" REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 0723 ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 706 ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 582 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Romain Serman, AF advisor at the French Presidency, said on December 10 that the political process in Mauritania was blocked, with neither Aziz, President Abdallahi, nor opposition leader Amed Ould Daddah willing to compromise to reach a solution. Serman said that internal GOF policy-making was complicated by a dispute between the military/intelligence communities, which did not want to weaken Mauritania's anti-terrorism cooperation with France, and the civilian community, which did not want France to be seen as "endorsing Aziz's coup." Serman said that this policy dispute required him to tread carefully during his November mission to Mauritania, where he met with Aziz, Abdallahi, and Ould Daddah, each of whom were locked into fixed positions. Aziz told Serman that he feared a U.S. military invasion of Mauritania. Serman said that Aziz's only reasonable course was to declare that he and other coup leaders would not be candidates for the presidency and to announce a plan for new elections. Aziz should, in effect, act as previous coup leader Colonel Vall had acted. Serman said that if Aziz did not, a coup against him by other junta members or military figures would be possible. Serman said that the EU sanctions process was moving slowly, with perhaps eventual action in mid-January. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Romain Serman, AF advisor at the French Presidency, reviewed Mauritania issues with us on December 10, focusing on his visit to Mauritania during the November 22-23 weekend. He was accompanied on that mission by Philippe Etienne, the director of FM Kouchner's cabinet at the MFA; Serman made clear that he, Serman, was the leader of the mission. "Mission Impossible" -------------- ¶3. (S) Serman prefaced his remarks by saying that prior to the visit, the GOF had conducted an intense policy review on Mauritania, with two competing blocks emerging. One, representing the intelligence and military communities, did not want Serman sending strong signals about the return to the status quo ante or pushing too strongly for the return of Abdallahi to power. They argued that a strong and negative message could jeopardize the cooperation that Mauritania was providing France on anti-terrorism in the region, particularly concerning al-Qaida in Maghreb and its affiliates. Serman said that the other camp consisted of members of the diplomatic community, such as himself. They argued that France had to maintain a firm position critical of Aziz, "otherwise, we would in effect be endorsing Aziz's coup." Serman said that Claude Gueant, Chief of Staff at the Presidency, ended the debate by deciding that Serman would go to Nouakchott but would have to walk a careful line that would neither provoke Aziz into reducing anti-terrorism cooperation with France nor suggest that France was in any way ready to accept the legitimacy of the coup. Serman, shrugging his shoulders, said "they sent me on a 'Mission Impossible' but I think I succeeded in not leaning too far one way or the other." Serman said that a DGSE representative accompanied Serman and Etienne to some of the meetings; Serman indicated that the DGSE presence proved to be inhibiting, as he thought it was no doubt intended to be. (NOTE: The constraints placed on Serman may explain some of the concerns about French policy noted in, e.g., ref A (para 6) and ref B. END NOTE.) ¶4. (S) Asked about the anti-terrorism cooperation Mauritania was providing to France, Serman said that it was not, in his view, that significant. "Mostly, they seem to just agree to let our intel and military guys operate in Mauritania. They don't really do all that much themselves," he said. Political Stalemate -------------- ¶5. (C) Serman said that the political process seemed blocked, with none of the actors willing to compromise. Aziz, he said, no longer viewed Abdallahi as much of a concern, the result of Aziz's holding power for roughly six months. "Aziz views Abdallahi as something from yesterday, and doesn't feel obliged to reach out to him at all." Instead, Aziz told Serman that he hoped to stage "journees de consultation" perhaps by the end of 2008, with elections perhaps by June 2009. Serman explained that these "days of consultation" were intended to bring together Mauritania's political actors and allow them, together, to reach consensus on a way forward, including a possible roadmap for the elections. Serman indicated skepticism about the prospects of Aziz's being able to organize such a meeting and to involve others. Aziz had already said that Abdallahi was no longer a factor. ¶6. (C) Abdallahi, for his part, said that he would not negotiate with the junta. He said that he would accept being reinstated as President, after which he would be willing to resign in order to pave the way for elections. Serman said that he was very fixed in stating this position and did not offer much room to maneuver ("he has an 'all or nothing' mindset"). Serman doubted that Abdallahi would agree to participate in any "journees de consultation" that Aziz might seek to organize. ¶7. (C) Opposition leader Ould Daddah told the French that he wanted Aziz and the other coup leaders to pledge that they would not run for the Presidency before he would agree to participate in a political dialogue. Ould Daddah was no fan of Abdallahi, and would not do much to help him, Serman observed. Serman said that Aziz never committed on whether or not he or other coup members would run for high office. Aziz told Serman that "if I run, I will resign from the ruling junta committee two months before the elections, with the number 2 on the committee then taking over." Serman remarked that even if the number 2 took over, Aziz would likely retain all or a significant part of his control over the committee. Aziz also told Serman that he would create an independent electoral commission and would agree to international observers for the elections. Serman remarked dryly that the electoral commission would likely spend its time buying the support of the 20 leading tribal chiefs necessary for victory in any election. Aziz -------------- ¶8. (C) Serman did not have many positive things to say about Aziz, whom he met for the first time. He said that he had few statesman-like qualities, either intellectually or in terms of leadership. He had no charisma, was unable to look Serman in the eye, and often spoke while looking at the floor. Serman said that Aziz had spent his whole career in the military on some sort of palace duty or another, which meant he had a very narrow outlook. His one significant time outside Mauritania consisted of his spending time observing Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard in Iraq -- "which ought to tell you something," Serman remarked acidly. Aziz had come to power as part of a palace coup resulting from officers' disgruntlement with Abdallahi and Aziz had no vision on how to move forward. Aziz seemed to understand that he was in way over his head, Serman indicated. ¶9. (C) Aziz at one point told Serman that he was worried about a U.S. military invasion of Mauritania seeking to effect "regime change." Serman commented that "it was stupid of Aziz to believe such a thing and even stupider to say it to us." Serman said that, instead of denying this, the French delegation tried to exploit Aziz's fear and give him some food for thought. Serman told Aziz that Barack Obama would soon become President and that he was known to be a strong supporter of human rights and democracy, and not likely to support coups that had ousted a democratically elected president such as Abdallahi. There was no reason to believe that USG condemnation of the coup would change with the new administration, and U.S. policy might well be tougher. Serman said that Aziz's belief that the U.S. would invade stemmed from remarks U.S. officials had made, or that Aziz believed they had made, concerning "all means necessary," and from a letter Abdallahi had written to President Bush, which Mauritanian security forces intercepted, in which he called for U.S. military action. ¶10. (C) Serman said that France's bottom line message to Aziz was that he had created a deep and complicated mess that virtually the entire international community found unacceptable. Aziz and the junta were the only ones who could rectify the situation, which involved, quite simply, a return to constitutional and democratic rule. It was up to him to deal with Mauritania's plight, and he could not expect France, the EU, the U.S., or any other body to do it for him. Scenarios -------------- ¶11. (C) Serman thought that Aziz might see the light and decide to do what Colonel Vall had done after Vall's coup -- declare that he and his associates would not seek high office and devote their time to organizing elections. Serman was not sure Aziz was strong enough of character to do this, however. Another scenario involved the possibility that members of the junta, or other military officers, would finally tire of Aziz's inept leadership and realize that Aziz was taking Mauritania nowhere. They could mount a coup against Aziz and then take Colonel Vall's approach. "There's no way that anyone overthrowing Aziz in a coup would subsequently act like Aziz -- who would want to be in his position?" Serman was not certain which of the two scenarios was more probable. ¶12. (S) When asked whether France supported Abdallahi's return to power, Serman hedged a bit. He acknowledged that President Sarkozy and others had strongly insisted that Abdallahi be reinstated, "but that was a while ago. Things have changed a bit now that time has passed. As I said, the intelligence and military want us to ease up the rhetoric. Moreover, we must keep in mind that many Mauritanians, of all backgrounds, don't like Abdallahi. Public calls for his reinstatement can actually work in the junta's favor." Serman indicated that the landscape had changed enough that making Abdallahi's reinstatement a sine qua non might not be the best way to proceed. EU Sanctions -------------- ¶13. (C) Serman described the EU sanctions process as muddled. He said that Germany, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands wanted the full 120-day period to run before the EU's Article 96 process went forward. January 20, or thereabouts, would mark the 120th day, Serman noted, the same day that Barack Obama would become U.S. President. Serman said that the EU would likely move towards sanctions after the 120-period, per Article 96 guidelines. Comment -------------- ¶14. (S) Serman was remarkably candid in describing the GOF interagency fight over how firmly Serman's delegation should deal with Aziz and the junta. He clearly indicated that he would have been tougher had he not been put on such a short leash. He asked that we not exaggerate France's policy debate -- "we are still deeply committed to undoing the coup, but we now have to proceed a bit more carefully because our intelligence and military believe we have important interests of theirs to protect. We may not be out in front as much as we were but we of course still share everyone's ultimate goal of restoring democracy in Mauritania." END COMMENT. PEKALA