FRENCH REACTION TO NOVEMBER 9 QUARTET MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002089 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2023 TAGS: PREL PGOV FR SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO NOVEMBER 9 QUARTET MEETING Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas ons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The November 9 Quartet meeting reaffirmed the international consensus on the need to continue the Annapolis process "exactly as we expected," said French NEA A/S-equivalent Patrice Paoli on November 12. Paoli said he was struck by an informal consensus among Arab attendees that Hamas was responsible for the failure of Palestinian reconciliation talks, but said he doubted that Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia would publicly blame Hamas for their failure. FM Kouchner's proposal for a follow-on Quartet meeting before the end of January 2009 reflected France's conviction that the international community must maintain a sense of dynamism and optimism in the coming months. In that context, Paoli hoped that Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Salam Fayyad would use his November 13 meeting with PM Fillon to specify exactly how the EU could be most helpful to the parties. Turning to French relations with Syria, Paoli noted that FM Muallim assured the French on the margins of the Mediterranean Union ministerial in Marseille that Syria was still on track to open an embassy in Lebanon by year's end. Paoli indicated that once relations between Lebanon and Syria were normalized, France would look to ensure that Lebanese parliamentary elections take place "as well as possible" and to induce the Syrians to make a gesture on controlling the Lebanon-Syria border. On Iran, Paoli said France did not expect a change in Iranian thinking on the nuclear program regardless of the outcome of Iran's June 2009 presidential election; he noted that any effort to engage Iran prior to that date would likely become a political football in Iranian domestic politics and therefore come to naught. Paoli said the leak of a French cable on Iran policy to a French newspaper was odd since there were no policy divisions on the subject. End summary. Quartet Meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) PolMin/C and NEA Watcher met November 12 with Patrice Paoli, the MFA's A/S-equivalent for the Middle East. Paoli shared a French perspective on the November 9 Quartet meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, saying that the meeting had gone "exactly as we expected . . . it did not produce much (in terms of new breakthroughs) but at the same time it produced quite a bit (in terms of reaffirming the international consensus on the need to continue the Annapolis process). Paoli noted that Israeli FM Livni said "little of substance," while PA President Mahmoud Abbas indicated (to France's relief) that he would continue in office beyond January 9. Arab League SYG Amr Musa struck the French as "more realistic" than he was just two months ago on the margins of the UNGA, although he still fretted about the logic of discussing "a viable Palestinian state" when Israeli settlement of the West Bank went unchecked. Paoli also noted an informal consensus among Arab attendees that Hamas was responsible for the failure of Palestinian reconciliation talks, but he doubted whether Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia would be willing to publicly blame Hamas for the talks' failure. FM Kouchner's proposal for a follow-on Quartet meeting before the end of January 2009 reflected France's conviction that the international community must maintain a sense of dynamism and optimism in the coming months (Paoli observed that the Quartet agreed to "look for a date" that might work). In that regard, Paoli hoped that PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad would use his November 13 meeting with French PM Fillon to spell out in some detail the areas -- including specific economic projects -- where France and the EU could be of most assistance to the PA, both in addressing the needs of Palestinians and in supporting the PA's dialogue with Israel. Stressing that Israel needs to do more to help Fayyad and Abbas to succeed, Paoli criticized Defense Minister Ehud Barak for failing to reduce checkpoints or take action against illegal settlements. Paoli noted that Barak and the Labor Party "will not win more seats by acting tough," an approach which he said had backfired against the Labor Party repeatedly in the past. Lebanon/Syria -------------- ¶3. (C) Turning to French policy towards Lebanon and Syria, Paoli described Lebanon as being in the midst of a political upheaval similar to that which resulted in the Taif Accord. Although he did not invoke the formula "Taif II," Paoli noted that "the situation is just like Taif . . . the question is whether you want to continue on the brink of civil war, or whether you can reach at least a minimal consensus (on power redistribution)." With a chuckle, Paoli declined to speculate on the outcome of Lebanon's spring 2009 parliamentary election, saying simply that France "favored PARIS 00002089 002 OF 002 all the days in March" (in reference to the March 14th and March 8th movements). ¶4. (C) As for Syria, Paoli noted that on the margins of the Mediterranean Union foreign ministerial in Marseille, Syrian FM Muallim assured the French that Syria was on track to open an embassy in Beirut by the end of 2008, as previously announced. Paoli noted that normalization of relations with Lebanon was the most important measure of Syrian behavior as seen from Paris; he said other French benchmarks for Syria were merely "context" in comparison. He gave the Syrians some points for reactivating the Syrian-Lebanese commission on border demarcation and for cracking down on foreign fighter flows into Iraq (prior to the October 26 raid), although he conceded that Syria had done nothing to prevent the flow of weapons into Lebanon. Paoli indicated that once Syria finished normalizing relations with Lebanon, France's priorities would be to prevent the Syrians from mucking about with Lebanon's parliamentary elections and to induce the Syrians to make at least a gesture on closing the Lebanese-Syrian border to weapons shipments. Iran -------------- ¶5. (C) Paoli struck a somewhat pessimistic note on Iran, saying that French policy was clear and that both President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner were committed to strengthening sanctions in order to increase pressure on the regime. However, given the broad consensus in Iran on pushing forward with the nuclear program, Paoli said the French did not anticipate a change in Iranian behavior whatever the outcome of Iran's June 2009 presidential elections. The Iranians, he continued, were unlikely to budge unless convinced that the regime's survival is at stake. He added his personal view that while a "positive gesture" such as talks without pre-conditions might be the only way to break the deadlock, any overture to Iran in advance of the June 2009 elections would quickly become a domestic political football and would therefore come to naught. On a slightly different subject, Paoli was unaware of a November 12 article in the French newspaper Le Canard Enchaine based upon a leaked reporting cable from the French Embassy in Washington regarding Iran policy. Paoli did not appear unduly troubled (noting that efforts in the past to identify leakers had been fruitless) and confidently said there were no policy divisions on the issue, making the leak somewhat inexplicable. STAPLETON