Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS2079
2008-11-10 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH OFFICIALS: NATO UNITY REQUIRES NO DECISION

Tags:  PREL NATO FR RU 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #2079/01 3151510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101510Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4819
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6231
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002079 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO FR RU
SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS: NATO UNITY REQUIRES NO DECISION
ON MAP UNTIL AFTER 2009 SUMMIT

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas
ons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002079 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO FR RU SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS: NATO UNITY REQUIRES NO DECISION ON MAP UNTIL AFTER 2009 SUMMIT Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas ons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. During PDAS Marcie Ries' meetings on Friday, November 7 with French officials Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs Advisor to FM Kouchner; Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs Advisor to President Sarkozy; and Jacques Audibert, Director of Strategic Affairs at the MFA; all of her interlocutors made it abundantly clear that France does not support giving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine, either at the December ministerial or at next year's 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg/Kehl. Citing adamant German opposition led by Chancellor Merkel, the French see "no hope" of reaching a consensus decision to move forward on MAP, so they are instead focusing on "creative solutions" which could reinforce NATO cooperation with the two countries, and which could be done, if not before the Ministerial, then early in the new year. Paris wants the 60th anniversary summit to showcase Alliance unity and transformation and fears that an internal disagreement over MAP will mar what should be a glorious celebration of NATO (and at the same time possibly weaken public support for French reintegration into military structures). End summary. -------------- FEAR OF INTERNAL DIVISIONS -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Audibert made clear that the French consider the December NATO Ministerial to be a planning meeting directly linked to the follow-on 2009 April NATO summit. Therefore, what cannot be achieved in December should also not feature on the agenda of the NATO summit. Audibert and Richier both cited the need for increased NATO engagement in Afghanistan as already presenting a significant challenge for the summit, which they do not want to be likewise complicated by a thorny discussion over MAP. Their fear is that the 60th anniversary summit, which should highlight Alliance unity and concentrate on the positive results of NATO enlargement and transformation, will be a repeat of the public division seen in Bucharest. Such a visible division between European allies and the new U.S. Administration would undercut themes of the summit; the French prefer to focus world attention on the participation of two new members and the possible announcement of French reintegration into the full NATO structures after m
ore than 40 years. -------------- FRANCO-GERMAN OPPOSITION -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) All of our interlocutors emphasized that the question of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia is a very sensitive political issue for Germany, particularly for Chancellor Angela Merkel who is facing domestic political elections in September 2009. Richier likewise stressed the Franco-German unity on this issue, noting that France will not depart from the German position. Given the staunch German opposition, therefore, France and the United Kingdom are already in discussions to find "creative solutions" to manage this issue. Paris is considering ways to enhance substantive cooperation (similar to what would take place under MAP) which would enable the Alliance to send positive signals of reassurance to Ukraine and Georgia, while also making it clear to Russia that it cannot control the foreign policy decisions of its neighbors. In effect, this would grant a MAP in all but name. Ries noted that any delay in granting MAP will only make it more of an issue, not less, and it would be best to reach agreement on MAP at the December Ministerial. Ries also cautioned French officials about sending the wrong signal to Russia and thereby reinforcing intransigent Russian behavior. -------------- STEPS ON FRENCH REINTEGRATION -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) French officials laid out the careful planning and deadlines underpinning the French decision to reintegrate into the full command structure of NATO. Both Audibert and Richier cited modest progress on ESDP as likely meeting French pre-conditions for reintegration by the end of the year (although the final decision will be made by President Sarkozy on his own timing). According to French discussions with the NATO SYG, legally NATO does not have to vote or take other substantive action on the French reintegration; at the summit the SYG would merely take note of the French decision to proceed. Richier said that in February, the French would also like to gather ideas on European security initiatives that would be introduced at both the NATO summit in April, as well as at the possible OSCE summit at the end of the year. He noted that his German counterparts had pointed out that the end of 2009 is also the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, an interesting trigger-event for the OSCE summit. -------------- SUMMIT CONCEPT AND FORMAT -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) In addition to the question of MAP, Richier also laid out some preliminary French and German thinking about the summit format and substance. Paris prefers the NATO summit to be a "family" format with just the alliance members participating. In addition to the obvious logistical challenges of supporting an expanded summit in the small towns of Strasbourg and Baden-Baden, Richier observed that the Bucharest summit featured all the partner countries and councils, and that such a large format did not need to take place annually. However, he added that in early conversations with NATO in Brussels, the SYG had expressed a preference for the more expanded-type of summit, as it would be his last in his position as SYG. France also favors the launch of a new strategic concept for NATO, as the last one was completed 10 years ago, prior to the attacks of September 11 and other threats of the 21st century. Richer stated that Paris was open to merely revising and updating the current strategy, rather than changing it completely, as again, the French prefer to avoid protracted arguments that could mar the summit celebration. ¶6. (U) This cable was cleared by EUR PDAS Marcie Ries. STAPLETON

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