S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO

S E C R E T PARIS 002016 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PTER PHUM KAWK KISL KPAO FR SUBJECT: S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES, SUDAN AND GEORGIA WITH FRANCE Classified By: POL Deputy Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Williamson met with French MFA officials on October 27 to discuss possible resettlement of Guantanamo Bay detainees in France. Williamson noted there are approximately 25 detainees considered low-threat whom the U.S. wants to release but cannot return to their countries of origin because of U.S. concerns for the detainees, well-being. French advisors to the foreign minister, Eric Chevallier and Sylvie Pantz, said that while the GOF could not confirm it would accept any of the detainees, the GOF would be willing to consider the request as well as participate in talks on the issue led by European Union partner, Germany. Chevallier and Pantz expressed concern over assimilation of detainees who did not have Francophone ties, but Williamson referenced the successful recent assimilation of five Uiger detainees in Albania who did not have ties to that country. Regarding Sudanese efforts to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN Security Council on the possible indictment of President Bashir in the International Criminal Court, Chevallier said the GOF position was "clear and firm": There would have to be a marked and demonstrable change in Sudan for the French to even consider the issue. On Georgia, Chevallier emphasized that the EU observer mission there was strong and competent, contrary to what Russian President Medvedev had publicly claimed. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with French MFA advisors to the foreign minister Eric Chevallier and Sylvie Pantz, as well as with MFA officers Christian Bernier and Gurvan Le Bras in Paris on October 27. GITMO DETAINEES: FRENCH OPEN TO DETAINEE ISSUE -------------- - ¶3. (S/NF) S/WCI Ambassador Williamson began by stating that as the legal process in U.S. courts for detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba progressed, flexibility on options about what to do with them decreased. Thus, there was some urgency to resolving some of the more problematic cases. He said the USG is particularly concerned about the status of around 25 detainees who could not be sent back to their countries of origin. This group includes 17 Uighurs, as well as Uzbek, Palestinian and Egyptian detainees, who cannot be repatriated because of concerns about humane treatment. Williamson said that the 25 detainees in question had not been prosecuted, were low threat, and would require little in the way of security measures. In response to a question from Pantz, he emphasized that the USG was not seeking any sort of judicial process against them nor their detention. Williamson noted there were currently around 250 detainees left in GITMO, but efforts were ongoing to reduce this number. He stated that approximately 100 are from Yemen alone, and while we have been working to see many of them repatriated, the government there simply doesn,t have the capacity to absorb them. Williamson said that anywhere from 50 to 100 detainees posed a high threat and the U.S. would almost certainly have to deal with these detainees for years into the future. He explained that the USG was asking allies to help by accepting other detainees who posed less of a risk. This relatively small, low-threat group for whom the U.S. was seeking relocation could be accepted for re-settlement as a humanitarian gesture. He pointed out that Human Rights Watch (HRW),the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Special Rapporteur for Torture all were supportive of these efforts to see detainees re-settled in Europe and would be willing to publicly commend countries that accepted them. ¶4. (S/NF) Williamson said he has spoken to a number of European governments about this issue over the past two years and had heard that while certain countries were willing to accept some of these low-threat detainees, they have consistently sought an arrangement where several governments would act simultaneously to admit them. Williamson noted that the effort to pull such a group together had been hampered by the fact that the decision making process in different governments was progressing at different paces and that governments had placed constraints on the USG as to what could be said about their willingness to be part of a group. Williamson said that recently, German National Security Adviser Christophe Heusgen had stated that he would be willing to act as a facilitator for this process and wanted to reach out to his counterparts in other European governments to discuss the issue. Williamson encouraged France to consider accepting some detainees, noting that France,s stature within Europe, and its position as EU President, would automatically add credence to the effort. He urged Chevallier to accept a call from Heusgen on this matter. ¶5. (S/NF) Pantz said the GOF would need certain guarantees that the detainees would "not return to fight." France is concerned that accepting a detainee who did not speak French, for example, might make assimilation complicated, marking them as potential recruiting targets for Islamic extremist elements, she said. Chevallier asked if there were any Francophone detainees among the 25 low-threat group, as it would be easier to sell the idea within the GOF. Williamson said he was not sure if there were any French-speaking detainees, but noted that of the five Uighur detainees and three others that were already relocated to Albania, none of them spoke the language but that their assimilation had been going well. Representatives from the Uighur Diaspora, he noted, had expressed a willingness to help with the assimilation of the any Uighur detainees re-settled in Europe. ¶6. (S/NF) Chevallier said he would have Pantz and her team review documentation provided by the USG regarding the 25 low-threat detainees and assess whether there were any security or other concerns. He noted that the MFA legal advisors would "hate" the idea, but that the decision, if a positive one were made, would be via political means. Williamson said that if the GOF could identify specific potential detainees for relocation, the USG could arrange for personal interviews with the detainees, if required, and provide any additional information that might be needed. Chevallier asked how many detainees the U.S. was asking France, or other countries, to take. Williamson said that obviously we would like to see all of them transferred so the more any one country would take, the closer it moved us to that objective. He recognized, though, that one of the reasons governments were looking for a group to act together was that this then reduced the burden on each country. He suggested that Chevallier discuss this further with Heusgen. Williamson confirmed to Chevallier that the USG had already spoken to Switzerland, Portugal, Germany, Ireland, and Lithuania about the issue. When Chevallier asked whether the UK would be accepting detainees, Williamson replied that the UK had already taken three individuals who had had residency in Britain, but who were not citizens, and that it was unlikely that they would accept more at the present time Chevalier said the GOF would look into the matter and get back to Williamson soon. The GOF would also be willing to speak with Heusgen as he attempted to put a group together, Chevallier said. SUDAN: FRENCH POSITION FIRM AND CLEAR -------------- ¶7. (C) Williamson asked about the GOF position regarding Darfur and Sudan, noting that he had discussed this matter with MFA officials at a P-3 meeting in London in August and in Paris last month with Presidential Adviser Bruno Joubert. Chevallier said the French were "clear and firm": The GOF publicly and officially said there would have to be an "immediate and radical" change in Sudanese policy for the French to consider an Article 16 deferral in the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Such a change in policy would have to include a ceasefire agreement per UNAMID, political change, acknowledgement of regional issues (such as Chad),and implementation of judicial arrangements acceptable to the ICC. Chevallier said 10 days earlier he and other French officials, including Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, told visiting Sudanese officials that, contrary to GOS requests, the GOF would not act as a mediator between Sudan and the ICC. In the meantime, the Sudanese had made some effort at reforms, but they were "far from sufficient," Chevallier said. ¶8. (C) Williamson noted that the Sudanese had seemed confident earlier that because of backing from African Union (AU) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) states, they would be able to garner enough support within the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to halt the ICC process. Williamson asked if the GOS officials still appeared as confident when he and Kouchner met with them recently. Chevallier said he believed the GOS was disappointed by events at this year,s UNGA, especially after clear demonstrations of P-3 unity and lack of cohesive support from AU colleagues. Williamson stated that the GOS had previously sought to have the UNSC vote on an Article 16 deferral quickly, but he wanted Chevallier,s thoughts on how the Sudanese might want to approach the matter now, in light of their experience at UNGA. Chevallier replied that he believed the GOS did not believe there would be any change for the better in U.S. policy with the incoming administration, so he thought they still wanted to see some resolution in the near future In fact, he added, the Sudanese seemed more pessimistic about their chances after January, especially with the election of new non-permanent members to the UN Security Council who do not appear sympathetic to Sudan,s position on Darfur. Williamson concluded by stressing again the USG,s concern that any discussions with the Sudanese not lead them into believing that a deal can be worked out and that it is only a matter of agreeing to the terms. Chevallier assured him that France also felt strongly that the Sudanese not interpret discussions in that light. GEORGIA: FRENCH PLEASED WITH EU OBSERVER MISSION -------------- --- ¶9. (C) Williamson indicated that during his September visit to Paris, he had had detailed discussions with MFA officials about the deployment of the EU Observer Mission in Georgia, and of the importance of a human rights component. While there had been skepticism then that human rights and civilian protection capabilities could be incorporated, Williamson noted that some progress seemed to have been made in this regard when he subsequently spoke to EU officials in Brussels. Chevallier said that there had been progress and that he had been very involved in the process to enhance this component of the mission. He acknowledged that it still was not nearly as robust as they would like, but the GOF believed the current group of EU observers was "strong and good," contrary to Russian President Medvedev,s statements claiming the observer mission was incompetent. Chevallier noted the EU needed to have the right kind of observers in Georgia in order to track events on the ground and to adequately address these concerns. Although getting approval for the observer mission was difficult, he believed that over time it would become incrementally more effective and play more of a protection role. Ultimately, though, the EU would need to have a presence in Akhalgori, the Kodori Gorge, and other contentious locations, Chevallier said. ¶10. (U) SWCI Williamson has cleared this message. STAPLETON