S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO

S E C R E T PARIS 002016

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PTER PHUM KAWK KISL KPAO FR
SUBJECT: S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO
BAY DETAINEES, SUDAN AND GEORGIA WITH FRANCE

Classified By: POL Deputy Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 (B & D)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Williamson met with
French MFA officials on October 27 to discuss possible
resettlement of Guantanamo Bay detainees in France.
Williamson noted there are approximately 25 detainees
considered low-threat whom the U.S. wants to release but
cannot return to their countries of origin because of U.S.
concerns for the detainees, well-being. French advisors to
the foreign minister, Eric Chevallier and Sylvie Pantz, said
that while the GOF could not confirm it would accept any of
the detainees, the GOF would be willing to consider the
request as well as participate in talks on the issue led by
European Union partner, Germany. Chevallier and Pantz
expressed concern over assimilation of detainees who did not
have Francophone ties, but Williamson referenced the
successful recent assimilation of five Uiger detainees in
Albania who did not have ties to that country. Regarding
Sudanese efforts to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN
Security Council on the possible indictment of President
Bashir in the International Criminal Court, Chevallier said
the GOF position was "clear and firm": There would have to be
a marked and demonstrable change in Sudan for the French to
even consider the issue. On Georgia, Chevallier emphasized
that the EU observer mission there was strong and competent,
contrary to what Russian President Medvedev had publicly
claimed. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with French MFA
advisors to the foreign minister Eric Chevallier and Sylvie
Pantz, as well as with MFA officers Christian Bernier and
Gurvan Le Bras in Paris on October 27.


GITMO DETAINEES: FRENCH OPEN TO DETAINEE ISSUE
-------------- -


3. (S/NF) S/WCI Ambassador Williamson began by stating that
as the legal process in U.S. courts for detainees held in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba progressed, flexibility on options about
what to do with them decreased. Thus, there was some urgency
to resolving some of the more problematic cases. He said the
USG is particularly concerned about the status of around 25
detainees who could not be sent back to their countries of
origin. This group includes 17 Uighurs, as well as Uzbek,
Palestinian and Egyptian detainees, who cannot be repatriated
because of concerns about humane treatment. Williamson said
that the 25 detainees in question had not been prosecuted,
were low threat, and would require little in the way of
security measures. In response to a question from Pantz, he
emphasized that the USG was not seeking any sort of judicial
process against them nor their detention. Williamson noted
there were currently around 250 detainees left in GITMO, but
efforts were ongoing to reduce this number. He stated that
approximately 100 are from Yemen alone, and while we have
been working to see many of them repatriated, the government
there simply doesn,t have the capacity to absorb them.
Williamson said that anywhere from 50 to 100 detainees posed
a high threat and the U.S. would almost certainly have to
deal with these detainees for years into the future. He
explained that the USG was asking allies to help by accepting
other detainees who posed less of a risk. This relatively
small, low-threat group for whom the U.S. was seeking
relocation could be accepted for re-settlement as a
humanitarian gesture. He pointed out that Human Rights Watch
(HRW),the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
the Special Rapporteur for Torture all were supportive of
these efforts to see detainees re-settled in Europe and would
be willing to publicly commend countries that accepted them.


4. (S/NF) Williamson said he has spoken to a number of
European governments about this issue over the past two years
and had heard that while certain countries were willing to
accept some of these low-threat detainees, they have
consistently sought an arrangement where several governments
would act simultaneously to admit them. Williamson noted
that the effort to pull such a group together had been
hampered by the fact that the decision making process in
different governments was progressing at different paces and
that governments had placed constraints on the USG as to what
could be said about their willingness to be part of a group.
Williamson said that recently, German National Security
Adviser Christophe Heusgen had stated that he would be
willing to act as a facilitator for this process and wanted
to reach out to his counterparts in other European
governments to discuss the issue. Williamson encouraged
France to consider accepting some detainees, noting that
France,s stature within Europe, and its position as EU
President, would automatically add credence to the effort.
He urged Chevallier to accept a call from Heusgen on this
matter.


5. (S/NF) Pantz said the GOF would need certain guarantees
that the detainees would "not return to fight." France is
concerned that accepting a detainee who did not speak French,
for example, might make assimilation complicated, marking
them as potential recruiting targets for Islamic extremist
elements, she said. Chevallier asked if there were any
Francophone detainees among the 25 low-threat group, as it
would be easier to sell the idea within the GOF. Williamson
said he was not sure if there were any French-speaking
detainees, but noted that of the five Uighur detainees and
three others that were already relocated to Albania, none of
them spoke the language but that their assimilation had been
going well. Representatives from the Uighur Diaspora, he
noted, had expressed a willingness to help with the
assimilation of the any Uighur detainees re-settled in
Europe.


6. (S/NF) Chevallier said he would have Pantz and her team
review documentation provided by the USG regarding the 25
low-threat detainees and assess whether there were any
security or other concerns. He noted that the MFA legal
advisors would "hate" the idea, but that the decision, if a
positive one were made, would be via political means.
Williamson said that if the GOF could identify specific
potential detainees for relocation, the USG could arrange for
personal interviews with the detainees, if required, and
provide any additional information that might be needed.
Chevallier asked how many detainees the U.S. was asking
France, or other countries, to take. Williamson said that
obviously we would like to see all of them transferred so the
more any one country would take, the closer it moved us to
that objective. He recognized, though, that one of the
reasons governments were looking for a group to act together
was that this then reduced the burden on each country. He
suggested that Chevallier discuss this further with Heusgen.
Williamson confirmed to Chevallier that the USG had already
spoken to Switzerland, Portugal, Germany, Ireland, and
Lithuania about the issue. When Chevallier asked whether the
UK would be accepting detainees, Williamson replied that the
UK had already taken three individuals who had had residency
in Britain, but who were not citizens, and that it was
unlikely that they would accept more at the present time
Chevalier said the GOF would look into the matter and get
back to Williamson soon. The GOF would also be willing to
speak with Heusgen as he attempted to put a group together,
Chevallier said.


SUDAN: FRENCH POSITION FIRM AND CLEAR
--------------


7. (C) Williamson asked about the GOF position regarding
Darfur and Sudan, noting that he had discussed this matter
with MFA officials at a P-3 meeting in London in August and
in Paris last month with Presidential Adviser Bruno Joubert.
Chevallier said the French were "clear and firm": The GOF
publicly and officially said there would have to be an
"immediate and radical" change in Sudanese policy for the
French to consider an Article 16 deferral in the UN Security
Council
(UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir by the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Such a change in policy
would have to include a ceasefire agreement per UNAMID,
political change, acknowledgement of regional issues (such as
Chad),and implementation of judicial arrangements acceptable
to the ICC. Chevallier said 10 days earlier he and other
French officials, including Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner, told visiting Sudanese officials that, contrary to
GOS requests, the GOF would not act as a mediator between
Sudan and the ICC. In the meantime, the Sudanese had made
some effort at reforms, but they were "far from sufficient,"
Chevallier said.


8. (C) Williamson noted that the Sudanese had seemed
confident earlier that because of backing from African Union
(AU) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) states,
they would be able to garner enough support within the UN
General Assembly (UNGA) to halt the ICC process. Williamson
asked if the GOS officials still appeared as confident when
he and Kouchner met with them recently. Chevallier said he
believed the GOS was disappointed by events at this year,s
UNGA, especially after clear demonstrations of P-3 unity and
lack of cohesive support from AU colleagues. Williamson
stated that the GOS had previously sought to have the UNSC
vote on an Article 16 deferral quickly, but he wanted
Chevallier,s thoughts on how the Sudanese might want to
approach the matter now, in light of their experience at
UNGA. Chevallier replied that he believed the GOS did not
believe there would be any change for the better in U.S.
policy with the incoming administration, so he thought they
still wanted to see some resolution in the near future In
fact, he added, the Sudanese seemed more pessimistic about

their chances after January, especially with the election of
new non-permanent members to the UN Security Council who do
not appear sympathetic to Sudan,s position on Darfur.
Williamson concluded by stressing again the USG,s concern
that any discussions with the Sudanese not lead them into
believing that a deal can be worked out and that it is only a
matter of agreeing to the terms. Chevallier assured him that
France also felt strongly that the Sudanese not interpret
discussions in that light.


GEORGIA: FRENCH PLEASED WITH EU OBSERVER MISSION
-------------- ---


9. (C) Williamson indicated that during his September visit
to Paris, he had had detailed discussions with MFA officials
about the deployment of the EU Observer Mission in Georgia,
and of the importance of a human rights component. While
there had been skepticism then that human rights and civilian
protection capabilities could be incorporated, Williamson
noted that some progress seemed to have been made in this
regard when he subsequently spoke to EU officials in
Brussels. Chevallier said that there had been progress and
that he had been very involved in the process to enhance this
component of the mission. He acknowledged that it still was
not nearly as robust as they would like, but the GOF believed
the current group of EU observers was "strong and good,"
contrary to Russian President Medvedev,s statements claiming
the observer mission was incompetent. Chevallier noted the
EU needed to have the right kind of observers in Georgia in
order to track events on the ground and to adequately address
these concerns. Although getting approval for the observer
mission was difficult, he believed that over time it would
become incrementally more effective and play more of a
protection role. Ultimately, though, the EU would need to
have a presence in Akhalgori, the Kodori Gorge, and other
contentious locations, Chevallier said.


10. (U) SWCI Williamson has cleared this message.


STAPLETON