THE POLITICS OF NYET: RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE COE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001960 EUR ALSO FOR EUR/ERA L KONICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM COE FR GG RU SUBJECT: THE POLITICS OF NYET: RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE COE Classified By: CG VIN CARVER FOR REASONS 1.5 (b/d). SUMMARY - - - - ¶1. (C) Russian intransigence, lack of EU unity for meaningful action, general European desire for dialogue with Moscow at almost any price, and a cautious Council of Europe (COE) Secretariat combine to provide little hope that even minimal COE monitoring of Russia and Georgia will succeed. Incoming (late November) COE Chair Spain is expected to be less aggressive in challenging Russia than current Chair Sweden. End summary. RUSSIA: HOW DARE YOU EQUATE US WITH GEORGIA? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Russian Ambassador Alekseev continued the "policy of nyet" in the COE Council of Ministers (ambassadors) October ¶22. While most delegations supported the Swedish Chair's draft action plan (supported by a more detailed set of options from the secretariat) for monitoring both Georgia's and Russia's commitments to the COE, Alekseev resorted to yet another boorish intervention. He thanked those delegations that "were not in a hurry" to analyze the secretariat's draft (admittedly, the secretariat distributed the 90-page draft the evening before). Alekseev then posited most of his venom on Georgia and the Swedish chair: "This is a clear attempt to put on the same level the country that launched an aggressive military campaign with the country that had to react and defend its peacekeepers under Article 51 of the UN Charter," He continued that "any enhanced monitoring cannot be accepted by Russia." Alekseev added that "some vested interests" are attempting to put political pressure on Moscow. This "should be rejected by everybody who really cares about the Council of Europe." Alekseev then carefully noted that the draft contained "some elements that are not contradictory." He said Russia would try to find a mutually acceptable solution, but that with "documents like these," even CBMs "will be difficult to arrange because this organization is putting the country that started this whole mess and the country that was the victim on the same level." MANY SUPPORT MONITORING FOR BOTH COUNTRIES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Most delegations spoke in favor of the Swedish approach (monitoring of both countries' commitments to the COE). France (speaking before Alekseev's intervention) stressed that the Action Plan was a "realistic and balanced" proposal; it is important to monitor both countries' commitments to the COE to promote "constructive cooperation" with both countries, and to highlight the COE's values. Finland, Ukraine, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Croatia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland, and the European Commission agreed. The UK said it welcomed an ongoing dialogue between Russia and the Chair and hoped a way forward could be found. Germany made its most forceful (comment: which admittedly is still relatively mild) intervention, noting that the independence and territorial integrity of a member state were infringed upon by another member. Portugal, however, said that strengthened monitoring could actually prevent cooperation. Several delegations, generally those more "understanding" of Russia's position, including the Cypriot, Italian, Bulgarian, and Greek reps, did not intervene. GEORGIA: DO NOT SUCCUMB TO BLACKMAIL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Georgia stressed that it is ready to cooperate fully with the COE and supports the Chair's Action Plan. The Georgian Ambassador said that Georgia has tried to fulfill all its COE commitments. He acknowledged that some commitments regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes had been "unfulfilled" -- "Georgia needs assistance from the COE in this regard." The Georgian Ambassador decried the destruction of schools and churches in South Ossetia and said that the return of all people to their villages is crucial to a settlement. ¶5. (C) The Georgian Ambassador then underscored that the positions of Russia and Georgia were well known and "were confirmed again today." "We do not condition our cooperation with the COE," he stressed. Noting that Tblisi is "awaiting a message from Strasbourg" from the next scheduled debate November 5, he emphasized that there should be monitoring for both countries. He cautioned against the "policy of blackmail that Tblisi sees (Russia engaging) in the COE and other organizations." The Georgian Ambassador concluded by asking what the COE and its member states would do if a country subjected to monitoring does not cooperate. SECRETARY GENERAL: NO TIME TO WASTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) COE SecGen Terry Davis stressed that the COE must take action quickly (note: continued COE debates, including over whether to increase the modest COE Human Rights Commissioner's office in Tblisi, make EU deliberations look speedy by comparison). He stressed that enhanced monitoring of both countries had been supported by the COE informal ministerial in New York September 24. Davis added that, "It is clear we are welcome in Georgia," and, taking a cue from the Georgian Ambassador's intervention, added that if "one is engaged in ethnic cleansing, one tries not only to expel people, but also to erase traces, including churches and schools, of that people's identity." COMMENT - - - - ¶7. (C) While a consensus is finally forming at the COE around monitoring both Russia's and Georgia's COE commitments, it is a fragile one. The EU is split regarding how hard to push Moscow to accept monitoring. Sweden as COM Chair has produced, as the Secretariat's Political Director told us October 24, the "minimal acceptable" in an effort to try to keep the EU together and yet maintain some semblance of COE credibility. Russia blatantly notes that if it is pushed too hard or too quickly, and particularly if it is put on an equal footing with "the aggressor," its cooperation with the COE (spotty at best politically but some in the secretariat and even in member state delegations are also looking at Russia's 12 percent contribution to the COE budget) will suffer. The November 5 discussion will be critical in getting the COE to support monitoring of both Russia and Georgia -- a limited action coming almost three months after the conflict We have no doubt, however, that the Russians will continue bluster and to stall for more time -- looking to Spain's taking over the Chair from Sweden in late November as a positive development -- and one that could lead the COE to take even less decisive action. PERKALA