SUDAN/QATAR: FRENCH INTERESTED BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001958 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV SU AL QA FR SUBJECT: SUDAN/QATAR: FRENCH INTERESTED BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC REF: A. KHARTOUM 1521 ¶B. DOHA 743 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1569 PARIS 00001958 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/ d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal on October 23 said that France was not optimistic that the Qatar process on Sudan/Darfur would produce results, although France was interested in and supportive of Qatar's effort. In Qatar, French envoy Issa Maraut has helped convey the French message that the talks not include Article 16 ICC relief as an agenda item; that the Qataris work with UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole; and that the talks take place under Qatar's sponsorship and not under the sponsorship of the Arab League. The Qataris have made some progress overall and with respect to these points, but the main shortcoming in the process so far seems to be their failure to reach out to the rebel factions, without whose presence in the talks there can be no meaningful result, in Le Gal's view. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In an October 23 meeting devoted to other subjects (Rwanda, Somalia piracy, DRC, reported separately),MFA DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal offered her views on the process Qatar has initiated in an effort to resolve the Darfur problem. Le Gal said that France had been drawn into this effort when President Sarkozy was in Damascus September 3-4, during which he took part in a meeting with Syria, Turkey, and Qatar. During this meeting, which covered several topics, Qatar offered to host talks on Darfur. Although the proposal seemed to come somewhat out of the blue, the French decided to be supportive, in part because Qatar had played a positive role in France's work on Lebanon. ¶3. (C) Qatar raised the matter again, at ministerial level, on the margins of the UNGA later in September. At that time, Qatar was touting Article 16 ICC relief as among the main objectives of the talks, "which did not please us," Le Gal remarked. The French sent Issa Maraut, who has served on a temporary basis in other activities relating to Sudan/Darfur, as a representative to the talks. Maraut has been there about two weeks and, Le Gal reported, is being treated well by the Qataris, who seem to welcome his counsel. ¶4. (C) On substance, Le Gal said that France had laid down three clear markers. First, Qatar should not put Article 16 ICC relief into play by making it an agenda item or goal to be achieved as part of the talks. Second, the Qataris should work closely with UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole. Third, the talks must be run independently by Qatar, and not under the aegis or control of the Arab League, given the Arab League's tendency to want Article 16 ICC relief on Sudan's behalf. Le Gal said that Qatar agreed to these principles. ¶5. (C) Le Gal said that the process seemed to going forward well, with one notable and perhaps fatal exception. The Qataris were working well with Bassole and seemed to have stood down on the Article 16 issue. The Qataris seem to have gained Khartoum's approval and they have worked with Egypt. The Qataris were reportedly working to organize a meeting between Presidents Bashir and Deby, perhaps in Tripoli. The big exception, according to Le Gal, is the Qatari failure to make any meaningful outreach to the Sudanese rebels, notably the two most important rebel leaders, Khalil Ibrahim (JEM) and Abdulwahid el-Nur. ("If these two agree to participate, the smaller rebel groups will follow," Le Gal observed). Le Gal said that France, via Issa Maraut, was pressing the Qataris to reach out to the rebels and that France was also willing to reach out to the rebels as well. Despite Qatar's claims of having done so, Le Gal said there had been apparently little or no outreach, with JEM reporting that "we never got any kind of invitation." ¶6. (C) Failure to include the rebels, in Le Gal's view, would mean that the talks would have no real meaning, except perhaps to allow Sudan to claim that it was willing and able to engage in a peace process and could not be faulted if others killed the process by not participating. Maybe that was Sudan's (and Qatar's) aim all along, Le Gal mused, which would allow Sudan to say that it was making a sincere effort to meet one of the conditions (engaging in a political process) that France and others had urged after the ICC issue arose. ¶7. (C) Le Gal observed that the Qatar process seemed to offer opportunities but she reserved judgment on whether it would produce results, and suggested that it was not wise to build expectations until the process actually showed promise. PARIS 00001958 002.3 OF 002 She reminded that the history of the Darfur problem was full of false starts, meetings, talks, signed agreements, and the like, not many of which had made much of a real difference so far. Still, the French would continue to try to play a positive role until events convinced them to do otherwise, Le Gal concluded. STAPLETON