MAURITANIA/FRANCE: "ISOLATE AZIZ, MAKE HIM LEAVE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001946 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINS ETTC MR FR SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/FRANCE: "ISOLATE AZIZ, MAKE HIM LEAVE" Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The French are attempting to isolate Mauritania coup leader General Aziz, in order to force his resignation, which would lead to the return of constitutional government, Presidential AF Counselor Romain Serman said on October 22. Serman said that the GOF had had some success in promoting anti-coup sentiments among Mauritanian parliamentarians. He said that the October 20 EU-Mauritania consultations were designed to fail, so as to bring the specter of sanctions to the fore. The French want the EU, AU, U.S., and France to announce soon (e.g., October 25) that they would send a joint delegation to Nouakchott roughly a week later to present Aziz with "an offer he can't refuse -- to resign." Serman indicated that France would be coordinating closely with the U.S. and other partners in the days ahead. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Romain Serman, an AF Counselor at the French presidency, on October 22 explained France's strategy for putting an end to the junta's rule in Mauritania. He said that when the coup first took place, President Sarkozy ordered GOF elements to "get them out of there" in no uncertain terms. Serman had been tasked with this project and he set forth France's plan. Squeezing Aziz -------------- ¶3. (C) First, he hailed the very good cooperation the U.S. was providing. He noted the announcement of U.S. sanctions the previous week, just before the October 20 EU-Mauritania talks within the Article 96 context. He said bluntly that the EU talks were "designed to fail," so that the EU could then threaten sanctions. In fact, the Mauritanian delegation at the talks offered nothing in the way of meeting EU demands about the return to constitutional rule, the freeing of President Abdallahi, and so forth. Commissioner Louis Michel, Serman said, was furious at the Mauritanians for not demonstrating any willingness to offer reasonable steps to resolve the crisis. ¶4. (C) With the talks having failed, the EU was in a position eventually to cut about 160 million Euros in funding to Mauritania (about USD 205 million). Serman said that this amounted to about 1/3 of the GOM's annual budget and would therefore have a significant effect on Mauritania's economy. Individual states had already imposed their own sanctions and �A;this would be an additional layer. Serman repeated that the U.S. sanctions announced just before were an excellent foundation for the EU sanctions. "We are also telling them that UNSC sanctions could be next," Serman said. ¶5. (C) Serman said that France's strategy was to isolate Aziz to the extent possible and to strip away his support, both politically and the support from his clan. Aziz was showing all the signs of a classic megalomaniac dictator -- paranoia, an obsession with his own power, and a disregard for his country's fate. "He is not clever enough to pretend that he has a 'program' for his country," Serman remarked. ¶6. (C) Serman said that France had had some success in weakening Aziz's parliamentary support. Ten Mauritanian deputies came to France a short time ago to discuss the situation. Meeting with them, Serman said that the group had originally been 12 but that he (Serman) canceled the visas of two members because they were unequivocal coup supporters. Serman said that "we are being extremely blunt with them. I told the other ten 'all of you risk losing your visas to France, too, if you continue to support the junta.' This got their attention. We have to make sure that coup supporters understand that supporting the coup will cost them personally. The next thing we will do, even if it's only a bluff, is to wave the prospect of individual UNSC sanctions against them, to include travel bans and asset freezes." Serman said that Aziz's support among Mauritanian deputies was weakening and that about half of Mauritania's senate now opposed the junta. ¶7. (C) Serman thought that Aziz's weakened position could cause his clan to pressure him to change course or even step down, if doing so would promote his clan's vested interests. "What we want to do is to eliminate as much of his support as we can, so that he ends up isolated and alone." End-Game Scenario -------------- ¶8. (C) Serman said that France would work toward the following end-game: On or about October 25, the U.S., EU, France (as EU President but also in its own right),and the AU would announce that they would send a joint delegation to PARIS 00001946 002 OF 002 Nouakchott approximately one week later. (NOTE: We pointed out that U.S. elections would take place on November 4, and Serman said that the delegation would go to Mauritania before November 4. END NOTE.) This joint delegation would announce publicly that Aziz had to step down, which would effect a return to constitutional government. Serman acknowledged that he would have to give further thought to the issue of whether Abdallahi would then automatically return to power. Serman thought that it might be better to have Abdallahi resign the presidency at the same time Aziz leaves. The constitution provides that the president of the senate becomes president of the country in the absence of a president. The new president would then form a government, the sole purpose of which would be to organize free and fair elections within a reasonable period. ¶9. (C) Serman said that the joint delegation would not go to Nouakchott to negotiate -- "it would go there to deliver 'an offer he can't refuse' -- to leave power and allow for the return of constitutional government." The joint delegation would make its goals publicly known before going to Nouakchott, thus increasing the pressure on Aziz. ¶10. (C) Serman said that the GOF would be in close touch with the USG in the days ahead, via its Washington Embassy, to coordinate details should the U.S. agree with this as a way forward. He again expressed appreciation for the excellent cooperation and similar assessment the U.S. had already demonstrated. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: Serman was very firm in expressing the GOF intention to force Aziz's hand in this way. He had nothing at all redeeming to say about the junta or about Aziz personally, which seemed to make it easier to support the blunt approach he was advocating. Serman was at all times quite sincere in expressing appreciation for what the U.S. had already done and in expressing his hope that the U.S. would join France in taking the steps he had outlined. END COMMENT. STAPLETON