CHAD: CONTINUED HIGH FRENCH ENGAGEMENT IS KEY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001936

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR MARR CD FR
SUBJECT: CHAD: CONTINUED HIGH FRENCH ENGAGEMENT IS KEY TO
CHAD'S STABILITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S GOALS IN
CHAD AND FOR THE DARFUR EXODUS

REF: KHARTOUM 1538

PARIS 00001936 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT


1. (C) Deputy Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert
told U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro on October 20 that
2009 could be a "pivotal year" in Chad's history. Joubert
said that French priorities in Chad centered on (a) electoral
reform to achieve credible elections in Chad in 2009 and 2011
for the first time in its history; (b) a reinforced MINURCAT
PKO to succeed EUFOR/MINURCAT in 2009; and (c) effective
management of Chad's oil revenues, which could provide some
boost to the economy and finance institutional and
administrative reform. The overarching French goal was to
help the Chadians build a functioning state that controlled
and governed all its territory, something that had been
missing in Chad since independence. Joubert agreed with
Ambassador Nigro's overall assessment that certain positive
factors were in place, notably the August 13 accord, the
Dakar process, and the new, serious-minded Chadian
government, but that the many problems Chad faced, including
especially Darfur, caused Chad to have to "restart from zero"
repeatedly. Nonetheless, France remained highly engaged, in
part to avoid the resulting vacuum in the region should Chad
slide into dysfunction or succumb to the Sudan-backed rebels.
Joubert noted Libya's ambiguous role, at times favoring
Sudan but now seeming to support Chad, at least since the
February 2008 near-fall of the Deby regime. On the ICC and
Sudan, Joubert said that recent indications that Sudan was
taking steps to prosecute janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb did
not represent the "radical change" in policy France had been
seeking in order for France even to consider changing its
position on the ICC issue.


2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT'D: We would agree with
Joubert that the political and financial capital France has
invested in Chad far outweigh actual French interests in Chad
itself. In our view, they are making this investment to help
form a stable Chad better able to resist destabilyzing forces
from the north and east that could threaten other French
regional interests and draw France into even more onerous
commitments in Chad and elsewhere. EUFOR and MINURCAT I are
success stories for France in Chad and the region. Absent a
continued French willingness to invest politically and
diplomatically in Chad, the future of MINURCAT II, of the
international community's ability to assist refuges and IDPs
in Chad, and of Chad's stability -- indeed of its viability
as a state -- would be in serious jeopardy. END SUMMARY AND
COMMENT.

CHAD: "RESTARTING FROM ZERO"


3. (C) Ambassador to Chad Nigro met on October 20 with
Bruno Joubert, President Sarkozy's Deputy Diplomatic Advisor
and chief advisor on Africa. Ambassador Nigro gave a brief
overview, noting the threat the rebels continued to pose and
the way that circumstances forced Chad to "restart from zero"
on a periodic basis. Still, there were some positive signs
-- the August 13 accord was still operative, the new Chadian
government seemed serious and was working purposefully, and
the Dakar process, thought imperfect, offered opportunities.
Joubert agreed with this assessment, noting that Chad was in
"perpetual reconstruction." The current national government
never seemed to reach escape velocity, leading to an "every
man for himself" approach. Social services, such as
education, were eroding, along with the administration of
Chad's territory. Joubert recalled that an older Jesuit
cousin of his had spent much of his life working and teaching
in Chad. There were fewer and fewer people like that working
in Chad now, he regretted. It was
necessary to get Chad out of this kind of rut. The discovery
of oil a few years ago created some optimism and for a while
Deby seemed poised to move the country forward. The many
problems emanating from Darfur had put an end to those hopes
more recently, and Chad and Sudan were constantly blaming
each other for supporting each other's rebels.

2009 "PIVOTAL"


4. (C) Joubert said that 2009 could be a "pivotal year" in
Chad's history. Joubert, again with a tone of regret, said
that "we the French are prisoners of Chad" -- with few real
interests on the ground there but many responsibilities.
Because, "if we left tomorrow, we know there would be all
kinds of difficult problems" that would rush to fill the

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vacuum. The international community had to remain engaged
and present, in part to prevent the region's many problems
from mushrooming out of control in the absence of a stable
Chadian state. Joubert said that France's priorities for
Chad were: (a) electoral reform to achieve credible
elections in Chad in 2009 and 2011 for the first time in its
history; (b) a reinforced MINURCAT PKO to succeed
EUFOR/MINURCAT in 2009; and (c) effective management of
Chad's oil revenues, which could provide some boost to the
economy and finance institutional and administrative reform.
The overarching French goal was to help the Chadians build a
functioning state that controlled and governed all its
territory, something that had been missing in Chad since
independence.


5. (C) Concerning the 2009 elections, which were rapidly
approaching, Joubert noted that Chad was entering into a
crucial period. He said the GOF was continuing to push all
parties, including the rebels, to engage in the elections
process, consistent with the August 13 agreement. The goal
would be successful elections that produced a "credible
political life" in Chad. Joubert expressed resentment at
Sudan's repeated request that France "get Deby to stop the
backing the JEM" rebel group. Joubert said the French had
told the Sudanese that France could pass messages but did not
rule in Chad and was neither willing nor able to guarantee
that N'Djamena would rein in the JEM, as Sudan seemed to be
suggesting. Joubert doubted that the Deby regime had as much
influence over the JEM as Sudan assumed.

EUFOR, MINURCAT, MINURCAT II


6. (C) Joubert noted EUFOR/MINURCAT's success (a point with
which Ambassador Nigro firmly agreed) and their
stabilizing influence. In Joubert's view, there should be no
question about the need for another mission to succeed
EUFOR/MINURCAT. However, he said that such a mission should
feature more UN PKO police and gendarmes, especially Formed
Police/Gendarme Units, and fewer military troops. The
presence of troops bothered Sudan and what the region needed
could better be provided by organized gendarmes rather than
soldiers. Ambassador Nigro noted MINURCAT's broad
mandate, with its emphasis on human rights, prison reform,
territorial administration, and not simply its training of
Chadian police and gendarmes to protect refugees and
humanitarians. Joubert said that Deby had visibly warmed to
the presence of international forces in Chad. Earlier, he
seemed to prefer that France ensure his regime's security.
He had, however, come to accept and even welcome EUFOR and
even more warmly, MINURCAT. Joubert thought that Deby would
be ready for the next step, i.e., a reinforced MINURCAT to
replace the EU (which had replaced France). All of this
would happen in 2009 as well, Joubert noted.


7. (C) Joubert and Ambassador Nigro agreed that U.S.-French
cooperation on Chad had been beneficial to Chadian stability
and political process. They agreed as well on the key role
that EU resources and expertise were playing in the August 13
electoral reform process. Joubert stressed that France
welcomed U.S. engagement in Chad and spoke approvingly of his
ability to work well with USG officials responsible for
Africa. Ambassador Nigro noted the increased role in Chad
that Nigeria seemed ready to play and commented on the
professionalism of its diplomats. Joubert said that Saudi
Arabia's interest in Chad was growing as well. Joubert
acknowledged the difficulty in tracking and understanding
Libya's role in the region. Libya sometimes favored Chad,
sometimes Sudan. Since the February 2008 fighting, Libya
seemed to Have tilted toward Chad, but whether it would
continue to do so was difficult to determine.

SUDAN/ICC


8. (C) SUDAN/ICC: Asked about the possible implications of
Sudan's taking legal action against ICC indictee and
janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb (reftel),Joubert reminded that
France, including President Sarkozy, had consistently
insisted that Sudan make "radical changes" to its policies in
order to hope that France and others would even consider some
sort of ICC relief. Sudan had to show progress in several
broad areas: (1) peace in Darfur (including genuine progress
on political reconciliation with rebel groups),(2) cessation
of hostilities with Chad and support for Chadian rebels, (3)
cooperation with UNAMID, and (4) cooperation with the ICC.
On this latter point, Joubert noted that Sudan had acted (or
had said it would do so) against Kushayb but had not done
anything about Haroun. Moreover, whatever action Sudan took

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with respect to Kushayb had to have ICC approval for it to
mean anything. Joubert said "we are still waiting" for
Sudanese action on all areas of concern, indicating that
Sudan's move to take action against
Kushayb, in and of itself, would not amount to anything
significant in French eyes.

COMMENT


9. (C) We agree with Joubert that the French are indeed in
a sense "prisoners of Chad" in that there is a significant
gap between concrete French interests inside Chad and the
amount of political and financial capital they are willing to
invest there to maintain the country's (and the region's)
stability. We think the French see a stable Chad as a
bulwark against disintegrative forces emanating from the
north and east that could endanger more concrete French
interests in the region and involve France in onerous future
military and other commitments in Chad and elsewhere. We see
the success of EUFOR and of MINURCAT as major triumphs for
French policy in Chad and the region. Without France's
willingness to keep investing politically and diplomatically
in Chad, the future of MINURCAT II, of the international
community's ability to assist refuges and IDPs in Chad, and
of Chad's stability -- indeed of its viability as a state --
would be in serious jeopardy. END COMMENT.


10. (U) Ambassador Nigro has cleared this message.


11. (U) TRIPOLI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.



STAPLETON