Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS1908
2008-10-17 12:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRENCH PRESIDENCY REACTS TO GENEVA MEETING ON
VZCZCXRO8078 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHFR #1908 2911247 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 171247Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4549 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1623
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001908
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUN FR RS GG
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY REACTS TO GENEVA MEETING ON
GEORGIA, EXPECTS EU TO DEFER DECISION ON TALKS WITH RUSSIA
Classified By: DCM Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001908
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUN FR RS GG
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY REACTS TO GENEVA MEETING ON
GEORGIA, EXPECTS EU TO DEFER DECISION ON TALKS WITH RUSSIA
Classified By: DCM Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d).
1. (C) French presidency adviser for Russia, Central Asia,
and the Americas Damien Loras on October 16 provided DCM an
update on French thinking about Russia and Georgia following
the October 15 meeting in Geneva. He argued that France
preferred to regard the Russian withdrawal from areas
adjacent to the disputed territories of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as "positive" even as it questioned Russian
intentions to reduce troop levels, as promised, to those of
August 7. Loras predicted Russia would not withdraw per its
full obligations under the accords agreed to in Moscow and
Tbilisi, leaving the question of how to respond and whether
to emphasize the need to continue the discussions opened
October 15 in Geneva. He described Georgian President
Saakashvili's remarks after the Geneva meeting as "not
helpful," particularly what he called Saakashvili's
"denunciation" of the Moscow and Tbilisi accords. Loras
returned to this matter to contrast the relatively positive
and constructive aspects of the Geneva talks with
Saakashvili's "unhelpful" statements. While acknowledging
Saakashvili's difficult domestic situation, Loras asked
whether Saakashvili was capable of being a statesman instead
of a local politician.
2. (C) Musing a bit about alternatives, Loras asserted that
the GOF did not want to get into a "legalistic argument" with
the parties or the U.S. The EU, he continued, cannot put its
relations with Russia on hold indefinitely. Paris was
inclined to "secure the situation on the ground" as a first
priority and consolidate the talks that had started in
Geneva. Loras lamented how the situation in Georgia, since
conflict erupted, had changed from one that was in Georgia's
favor to one that now favors Russia. DCM noted that the USG
is advocating "strategic patience" by Georgia and using the
talks begun in Geneva to pressure Moscow in the immediate
term, for example, to allow more observers into the disputed
territories. When Loras nodded and spoke of the need "to try
to manage things," DCM added "while giving economic and other
support to Georgia."
3. (C) In response to DCM's question about possible legal
measures that could be taken against companies doing business
in South Ossetia or Abkhazia without Georgian permission,
Loras declared that Europe "cannot afford" sanctions or other
legal measures. Gazprom, he observed, is present in Abkhazia
and the EU would guard against any restrictions "backfiring"
on it. France is not in as vulnerable a position as others
in the EU, Loras explained, since it relies more on other
sources for natural gas like Algeria. The problem, however,
arises in seeking to arrive at a common EU position on
economic measures. At that point, the vulnerability of other
EU states arises. Loras cited Poland as an example of an EU
state that might emotionally wish to take a hard line against
Russia but can hardly afford to given its total dependence on
Russia for natural gas supplies. Loras said the EU would
also need to weigh the pros and cons of individual travel
bans or economic measures targeting individuals. France, he
opined, preferred subtler methods, such as its recent
insistence that a South Ossetian leader apply for a visa in
Tbilisi (which he would not do) instead of Moscow. The
hypersensitivity of South Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders was
another factor that had to be taken into account, and Loras
pointed to the near collapse of the talks in Geneva when
representatives of the de facto regimes threatened to walk
out over their credentialing. We need to take these
sensitivities into account if we want the process to continue.
4. (C) In response to DCM's question about the EU position
to be announced at the conclusion of the current European
Council meeting, especially over negotiation of a partnership
agreement, Loras responded that it was still under discussion
in Brussels. He was nevertheless confident that, "at the end
of the day," negotiations will resume. The question, then,
was on the approach. Loras claimed that there was a growing
awareness within the EU that progress on Georgia was probably
not a good benchmark for deciding whether to move ahead on
the partnership agreement. He predicted that the Council
would not say that talks would resume but it would also not
say that they should be stopped. Instead, it will probably
call for a further review of the situation after the
EU/Russia summit in Nice on November 14.
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUN FR RS GG
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENCY REACTS TO GENEVA MEETING ON
GEORGIA, EXPECTS EU TO DEFER DECISION ON TALKS WITH RUSSIA
Classified By: DCM Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d).
1. (C) French presidency adviser for Russia, Central Asia,
and the Americas Damien Loras on October 16 provided DCM an
update on French thinking about Russia and Georgia following
the October 15 meeting in Geneva. He argued that France
preferred to regard the Russian withdrawal from areas
adjacent to the disputed territories of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as "positive" even as it questioned Russian
intentions to reduce troop levels, as promised, to those of
August 7. Loras predicted Russia would not withdraw per its
full obligations under the accords agreed to in Moscow and
Tbilisi, leaving the question of how to respond and whether
to emphasize the need to continue the discussions opened
October 15 in Geneva. He described Georgian President
Saakashvili's remarks after the Geneva meeting as "not
helpful," particularly what he called Saakashvili's
"denunciation" of the Moscow and Tbilisi accords. Loras
returned to this matter to contrast the relatively positive
and constructive aspects of the Geneva talks with
Saakashvili's "unhelpful" statements. While acknowledging
Saakashvili's difficult domestic situation, Loras asked
whether Saakashvili was capable of being a statesman instead
of a local politician.
2. (C) Musing a bit about alternatives, Loras asserted that
the GOF did not want to get into a "legalistic argument" with
the parties or the U.S. The EU, he continued, cannot put its
relations with Russia on hold indefinitely. Paris was
inclined to "secure the situation on the ground" as a first
priority and consolidate the talks that had started in
Geneva. Loras lamented how the situation in Georgia, since
conflict erupted, had changed from one that was in Georgia's
favor to one that now favors Russia. DCM noted that the USG
is advocating "strategic patience" by Georgia and using the
talks begun in Geneva to pressure Moscow in the immediate
term, for example, to allow more observers into the disputed
territories. When Loras nodded and spoke of the need "to try
to manage things," DCM added "while giving economic and other
support to Georgia."
3. (C) In response to DCM's question about possible legal
measures that could be taken against companies doing business
in South Ossetia or Abkhazia without Georgian permission,
Loras declared that Europe "cannot afford" sanctions or other
legal measures. Gazprom, he observed, is present in Abkhazia
and the EU would guard against any restrictions "backfiring"
on it. France is not in as vulnerable a position as others
in the EU, Loras explained, since it relies more on other
sources for natural gas like Algeria. The problem, however,
arises in seeking to arrive at a common EU position on
economic measures. At that point, the vulnerability of other
EU states arises. Loras cited Poland as an example of an EU
state that might emotionally wish to take a hard line against
Russia but can hardly afford to given its total dependence on
Russia for natural gas supplies. Loras said the EU would
also need to weigh the pros and cons of individual travel
bans or economic measures targeting individuals. France, he
opined, preferred subtler methods, such as its recent
insistence that a South Ossetian leader apply for a visa in
Tbilisi (which he would not do) instead of Moscow. The
hypersensitivity of South Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders was
another factor that had to be taken into account, and Loras
pointed to the near collapse of the talks in Geneva when
representatives of the de facto regimes threatened to walk
out over their credentialing. We need to take these
sensitivities into account if we want the process to continue.
4. (C) In response to DCM's question about the EU position
to be announced at the conclusion of the current European
Council meeting, especially over negotiation of a partnership
agreement, Loras responded that it was still under discussion
in Brussels. He was nevertheless confident that, "at the end
of the day," negotiations will resume. The question, then,
was on the approach. Loras claimed that there was a growing
awareness within the EU that progress on Georgia was probably
not a good benchmark for deciding whether to move ahead on
the partnership agreement. He predicted that the Council
would not say that talks would resume but it would also not
say that they should be stopped. Instead, it will probably
call for a further review of the situation after the
EU/Russia summit in Nice on November 14.
STAPLETON