FRENCH READOUT OF EU MISSION TO MOSCOW AND NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001708 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 TAGS: PREL GG RU FR EU SUBJECT: FRENCH READOUT OF EU MISSION TO MOSCOW AND NEXT STEPS ON GEORGIA Classified By: Political M/C Kathleen Allegrone, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. On September 10, Political M/C met with Damien Loras, Advisor to President Sarkozy on Russia and the Caucasus, who provided a readout of President Sarkozy,'s September 8 trip to Moscow and the reasoning behind the provisions in the final agreement on Georgia. Despite the difficulty of the EU-Russian discussions, the French expect Russia will abide by their commitments despite strong arm Russian efforts to twist the agreement to their own ends. The French are offering 75 observers to the prospective EU mission and they state that the AOR includes areas within the disputed territories. The GOF is also planning for the October 15 international discussions, for which they have identified South Ossetian and Abkhazian participation in the international discussions as a problem requiring a creative solution that does not implicitly recognize the two breakaway regions. Finally, France currently has the only candidate for the new position of EU Special Representative to Georgia and the EU's promised reconstruction conference should take place at the end of October or early November. End summary. -------------- A "BITTER" BEGINNING -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Loras described the preparations with the Russians for the meeting as "bitter" and said that the Russians had completedly refused their first draft agreement, so the EU delegation led by Sarkozy wasn't sure what to expect when they left for Moscow. The main objective for the French was to get the Russian forces to withdraw and to have international monitors on the ground as soon as possible. When they landed, the Russians were prepared with a revised French draft that imposed a number of new Russian conditions which were designed to shift the burden of action (like adding police, etc) onto the EU and international community. The actual negotiations were long, and the Russians kept moving the bar and adding more conditions each time it appeared that the EU could meet their previous requests. In one case, as the French press reported (and Loras confirmed), President Sarkozy became so exasperated by Russian FM Lavrov's attempts to change the agreed text that he threatened to leave the room, but the situation was resolved when Medvedev returned and an agreement was reached. The 
Russians had expected the Georgian pledge of non-use of force to be a major obstacle, but Sarkozy came prepared with written agreement from President Saakashvili which removed that from the table (to the Russians chagrin). Prime Minister Putin was not present, but Loras said that his presence was palpable as it was clear he was being consulted throughout the discussions. -------------- MAJOR POINTS OF CONTENTION -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Loras was quite candid that in order to draw the Russians into the agreement, several points were left more vague than the EU (or USG) would have preferred, but he noted that their priority goals were to get a ceasefire that holds, a withdrawal as far as possible and monitors on the ground. To begin, the EU had to accept the Russian construction of troops as "peacekeeping forces" because any other reference to "Russian forces" was exploited by the Russians to mean that it did not apply to those forces it has re-categorized as "peacekeepers." For the French Presidency, the agreement that OSCE and UNOMIG would remain where they were authorized on August 7 was critical, as these are the only missions with a mandate allowing them to patrol within the enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. -------------- INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) The EU negotiators selected the October 15 dates for the "international discussions" (a specific point promised in the August 12 ceasefire agreement),as late enough to be past the UNOMIG mission renewal. The French want this renewal to be a fait accompli and not fall victim to what could be long-standing discussions on the thornier issues of the conflict. Geneva was chosen simply as a neutral city. The agenda for the discussions will specifically include security and stability in the region and the question of refugees and internally-displaced persons. The French intend to keep the issue of "final status" on the table to show the Russians that the issue remains unresolved. ¶5. (C/NF) Loras said that the EU realizes that there will be difficulties over the question of who participates in the international discussions in Geneva. In order to obtain Russian participation, they believe that South Ossetian and Abkhaz officials will have to be present in some capacity and that we all have to "think creatively" on the format and modalities (so that the officials are present, but not "at the table" and without a flag). The French do not want to do anything to implicitly recognize the two breakaway regions. They are only now considering under whose auspices the discussions should take place, whether the UN, OSCE, EU or other organization. The GOF views these discussions as very important, whether they achieve anything in the short-term, because it keeps the conflict as an unresolved item on the agenda of the international community. -------------- RUSSIAN COMMITMENT -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Loras expressed his belief that the Russians would abide by their commitments in the September 8 agreement, because ultimately the Russians will realize that it is in their interest to have a way out of the crisis. At the same time, the French are dismayed, but not surprised, at Russian tactics including trying to change the meaning of the agreements after the fact. Specifically, Loras said that the French will strongly refute Russian FM Lavrov's claims that the EU "lied to them" and changed the wording in the original August 12 agreement (a reference to whether the agreement applied to areas "in" or "of" the two disputed regions). France is sending the original copy of the agreement, which was negotiated in French, to the OSCE, as proof. ¶7. (C/NF) In addition, an irritated Loras noted that the Russians announced they would send in a large troop presence the day after Sarkozy left, which was poorly received in Paris. The President's chief diplomatic advisor, Jean-David Levitte (NSA-equivalent) immediately protested the announcement to the Russian President's aide Sergey Prikhodko, stating that it was viewed in Paris as a provocation that "could only damage confidence between the two leaders." Loras said that the EU can argue that the September 8 agreement's language requiring withdrawal "to the positions prior to the start of hostilities" means that the total number of Russian peacekeepers should remain within the limits defined by the previous agreements (as in fact, the Russians expect the UN and OSCE missions to do). However, at the same time, Loras recognized the legal difficulty of requiring Russia to abide by previous agreements that have been denounced by Georgia, all of which may be moot as the Russians now say that they will base their presence on state-to-state agreements. Ultimately, for the GOF, the most important thing is to get monitors on the ground in the disputed territories to prevent further ethnic cleansing. -------------- INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Loras informed us that France is prepared to take the lead in sending international observers under an EU mission. They currently plan to provide 75 observers (and could do more, but they want the mission to reflect the EU and not just appear as a French initiative). The UK has also offered observers and they fully expect that the EU mission can be on the ground by October 1. In terms of the Areas of Responsibility (AOR),Loras told us that the first three bullets of point two in the agreement authorize the resumption of already mandated missions in the areas where they were operating, which includes within the borders of S. Ossetia and Abkhazia. Loras showed us on a map the areas inside the disputed enclaves in which the observers were and should operate. Bullet four integrates the EU mission into those areas, not least because it says the EU mission will act as guarantor of the principle of non-use of force and therefore will need to operate within the disputed territories. Loras also emphasized that Sarkozy himself reiterated this interpretation of the text several times during the meeting with Medvedev and Lavrov and that the Russians agreed orally. Unfortunately, the Russians are now again attempting to publicly backpedal from their agreed commitments, just as they did with the August 12 ceasefire agreement. ¶9. (C/NF) Loras expressed hope that the renewal of the UNOMIG mission at the UN will not get bogged down in statements of principle and theological arguments which will only help the Russians. The GOF believes that the renewal can be best achieved as a straightforward technical renewal, which also implies that the laws in force on August 7 continue to apply. The GOF would like to see a very simple text for renewal, along the lines of, "the UNOMIG mission is renewed within its current mandate for an additional three months." That said, he noted that the Russians may create difficulties even with this terminology, since it refers to UNOMIG by it's original names which includes a reference to the disputed areas as "Georgia" and the Russians may not accept that. Loras hoped that they may be able to delay the issue by assuring a technical renewal early, although they may then put the UNOMIG name issue or other changes on the agenda of the international discussions on October 15. -------------- -------------- EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND RECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Loras said that the French have put forward the name of a candidate for the position as the EU Special Representative on Georgia and for now it is the only name under consideration (post comment: we believe that Amb. Pierre Morel is their designated candidate -- a highly regarded and experienced diplomat). While the GOF would like other candidates to be presented, if only to prevent the appearance of a too-evident French faces behind EU actions, they support having a candidate quickly named to the post to keep the pressure on the Russians. ¶11. (C/NF) Loras said that the EU hoped to host a donor's conference for the reconstruction of Georgia by the end of October or early November. It appears that Prague may be favored site, but it had not yet been formally decided (although Loras noted with a grin the symbolism of having the conference in the Czech Republic, which is another country familiar with Russian invasion). Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce STAPLETON