TWO-MONTH TARGET TO PRIORITIZE FRENCH MILITARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000163

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO FR AF
SUBJECT: TWO-MONTH TARGET TO PRIORITIZE FRENCH MILITARY
DEPLOYMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. PARIS 64

B. PARIS POINT 07 OCT 25

C. KABUL 241

D. 07 USNATO 610

Classified By: CDA Mark A. Pekala for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. French military and civilian authorities
are "feeling the pressure" to step up France's military
engagement in Afghanistan and are actively reviewing options
that they plan to announce at the NATO summit in Bucharest.
In addition to planning associated with President Sarkozy's
decision to redeploy Special Forces (reported ref A),MFA and
MOD sources indicate that the other most viable option is a
move of the maneuver battalion currently in Kabul to RC-East,
while maintaining French air support operations from their
base in Kandahar. Embassy believes we may be able to
convince the GOF to move their maneuver battalion directly to
the south if we identify this to them as our clear top
priority and work with the French to address mission,
resource and partner concerns. We see little possibility for
deployment of a PRT to Nimroz or Dai Kondi provinces due to
firm military opposition. Current tensions with the UK over
counter-insurgency policies, and force protection and chain
of command issues with the Canadians and Dutch, add to French
reluctance to deploy in the south. Finally, cost and
capabilities are real concerns underpinning French military
planning. Given the two-month window before the summit in
Bucharest, we recommend that Washington prioritize our list
of requests for French military engagement and work with the
French to overcome concerns about deploying assets in the
south, including engagement at the highest levels. DefMin
Morin's January 31 meetings with the Secretary and SecDef
Gates provide a first opportunity, followed shortly by the
possibility for additional high-level engagement at the
Vilnius Defense Ministerial. End Summary.

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MANEUVER BATTALION: GOING EAST VS. SOUTH
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2. (C) Sources in the civilian and military bureaucracies
have all recently confirmed that French planners are focusing
on moving their maneuver battalion, currently based in Kabul,
to RC-East to focus on counter-insurgency and operations and
training of the Afghan National Army. This would entail
either relinquishing their Kabul mission to Afghan security
forces, or having Turkey or Italy assume a greater part of
the burden there. A move to the east satisfies several key
French concerns: the mission allows French forces to be
involved in challenging combat missions without dramatically
increasing the number of deployed troops or costs associated
with logistics support; they can partner with U.S. forces
with whom they share similar counter-insurgency doctrines;
and it eases chain of command and force protection concerns.
(NOTE: The French may reason that a re-deployment of their
maneuver battalion to the east may possibly free up a U.S.
battalion, which could then be deployed in the south.)


3. (C) However, SecDef Gates recently sent a letter to
DefMin Morin specifically requesting that a French battalion
be deployed in the south. DefMin Morin's trip to the U.S.
for high-level meetings on January 31, is a timely
opportunity to persuade the GOF to consider a move to the
south as a compromise solution, if we can overcome concerns
about resources, location and partners.

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PARTNERS: A KEY CONCERN
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4. (C) In general, any move of French forces to the south
raises the question of not only mission and location (i.e.,
whether they will be participating in hard combat missions in
areas that are a strategic priority for ISAF),but also of
coordination with specific allied partners. GOF sources
report that military leaders lack confidence in both the
rotating Dutch and Canadian commands (mostly over questions
of competence at commanding operations at what is essentially
a division level). At the same time, they regard the British
as being overly aggressive in counter-narcotics efforts, too
ready to cut side deals with Taliban leaders and over-reliant
on kinetic engagement. In addition, there remain some hard
feelings between the two countries following the UK's adamant
refusal to assist the French-led EU mission in Chad by

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approving a common funding mechanism (NOTE: Our UK colleagues
in Paris confirmed that a certain amount of blood and ink had
been spilled over this issue between France and the UK;
however, they assert that in the long-term it is in France's
interest as well as theirs not to establish a precedent in
which the biggest EU capabilities providers -- UK and France
-- are expected to "pay twice" by also becoming the primary
donors to fund EU operations).

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NO ONE WANTS NIMROZ
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5. (C) In the recent PRT delegation's meeting with Lt.
General Benoit Puga (J3),Puga firmly rejected any interest
in Nimroz province because of its isolation, saying, "There
is nothing there but snow and drug corridors to Iran." Both
conducting and supporting military operations in Nimroz would
require a significant air mobile capability which the French
don't have available. It would also require a large
investment in both civilian and military infrastructure,
again implicating resources which the French forces don't
have. Puga made clear that the French military is surprised
that ISAF considers establishing a PRT in Nimroz to be a
priority, as in France's assessment, the isolation of Nimroz
diminishes its importance to the larger goal of building
confidence in the Afghan central government. The MFA
hierarchy supports this stance, albeit more on the grounds
that they have no desire to exacerbate diplomatic
sensibilities with neighboring Iran. The MFA was grudgingly
impressed by the PRT team's presentation, particularly the
information on the extensive interaction between the PRT's
and local Afghan leaders, but they have acknowledged to us
that they alone are open to the concept of a PRT and even
they don't want to see a French PRT in Nimroz. One MFA
source also reported that the French military dislikes PRT's
because of the implied long-term commitment; they prefer to
look at less open-ended military options. Given the staunch
reluctance of the civilian and military bureaucracies on this
issue, we see little forward possibility of convincing the
GOF to stand up a PRT, either in Nimroz or elsewhere, within
the two month window prior to Bucharest, absent a direct fiat
imposed by President Sarkozy (cited as possible in ref C).

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REAL RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AT PLAY
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6. (C) Finally, cost and capabilities remain the significant
factor for French military planners (even if this is not
always openly acknowledged). French military planners have a
tacit requirement that French forces not be spread across
Afghanistan as France does not have the resources to
logistically support several, dispersed deployments.
Integrating French forces into other national contingents is
not optimal, because other nations often impose their
national caveats on the small attachments. A significant
move of forces, whether a PRT or a maneuver battalion, to the
south will likewise significantly raise supply logistics
costs and call into question whether the French have the
assets to support their own forces. Lower-level personnel
admit openly that the French don't have the capabilities --
particularly helicopter assets -- that they need to support
an operation in the south. The MOD is already bracing for
expected budgetary and personnel cuts upon completion of the
white paper review of defense and security priorities (with
publication expected in April/May as reported in previous
Paris Points). Even if the total defense budget is
maintained at 2% of GDP as the President has pledged, press
reports cite the Elysee (Presidency) sources to suggest
France may suppress between 20,000 and 50,000 positions in
the armed forces between now and 2011 (17% of the total
personnel). Budgets for new equipment are also expected to
be affected.

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COMMENT: THE SARKOZY WILD CARD
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7. (S) Comment and recommendation: We have approached the
GOF at different times with requests for a variety of
military options in Afghanistan (including helicopters,
additional OMLTs, a PRT, Special Forces and re-deployment of
their maneuver battalion). However, we have not told the
French which requests we consider to be the most crucial

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(refs C and D). French planning is now coalescing around
re-deployment of Special Forces and a possible move of the
French maneuver battalion from Kabul to RC-East. Our time
frame to affect these decisions is narrowing, with the
deadline for decisions focused on the NATO summit in
Bucharest only two months from now. As always, the French
President remains the wild card in this process; he is
perfectly capable of overruling the civilian and military
leadership (as we have seen in the past when he agreed to
deploy a French OMLT to Uruzgan, cited ref B),but his direct
intervention is unpredictable, particularly as he will have a
full agenda this spring with travel, municipal elections and
an ambitious domestic reform agenda. If we really want to
accomplish a move of the French battalion to the south, we
recommend that we clarify to them that this is the top USG
priority, including at the highest levels. End comment.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA