TFGG01: AUGUST 20: FRENCH PRESIDENCY ON SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001601

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM MOPS OSCE UNSC FR GG RU RS UN
SUBJECT: TFGG01: AUGUST 20: FRENCH PRESIDENCY ON SITUATION
IN GEORGIA

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone. Rea
sons 1.4b,d


1. (C) We met August 20 with Boris Boillon, who normally
covers NEA issues but was filling in for a colleague who
covers Russia and the CIS, at the Elysee to discuss the
missing copy of the six-point cease-fire accord with Russian
President Medvedev's signature. Boillon handed over a
Russian language text (sent separately to the task force and
others) containing Medvedev's signature. He explained that
the main cause of the recent confusion over conflicting
versions of the document signed by Russian and Georgian
leaders was due to Russian FM Lavrov maneuvering French FM
Kouchner into a "corner" and coaxing him into agreeing to
chapeau language that appeared to elevate Russia's status
from that of party to the conflict to one of the guarantors
of the accord. This chapeau did not appear in any other
version of the text. Sarkozy, who had worked out the main
points himself with Medvedev and Saakashvili, was not
immediately aware this side-discussion was going on or that
Lavrov, whom Boillon described as a very crafty hardliner,
had unilaterally added language.


2. (C) Boillon affirmed several times that the GOF
considers only the original version of the six points --
without the chapeau -- to be the authoritative text. Sarkozy
realized what the Russians had done, adamantly refused to
accept the chapeau, and did not sign the document. Boillon
acknowledged, however, that the Elysee had not realized that
two variations of the text were in play when the Secretary
took the draft accord to Tbilisi for President Saakashvili to
sign.


3. (C) On point five of the document, and in general, what
was key, in Paris' view, was the beginning of a process to
manage and ultimately remove the Russian presence, with
international oversight, as opposed to allowing the Russians
carte blanche in terms of imposing their own rules on the
ground. France seeks a "realistic" outcome, and Boillon
stressed that all interested parties need to fully appreciate
the "reality on the ground" and take into account ) and
avoid ) the possibility for Russia to establish a fait
accompli.


4. (C) Boillon described Sarkozy's telephonic exchanges
with Medvedev as extremely frank. Medvedev in the last
conversation promised that all Russian troops, except for 500
"blue helmets," would be withdrawn from Georgian territory by
no later than August 21. According to Medvedev, the "blue
helmets" (a term Boillon claimed Medvedev insisted on using)
would remain in a buffer zone just south of the boundary of
South Ossetia. Sarkozy reminded Medvedev that failure to
live up to his commitment by the evening of August 21 would
leave Sarkozy with no choice but to convene the Council of
Europe to review the EU's relationship with Russia. Medvedev
took the point but warned Sarkozy not to resort to threats,
adding that, if faced with a choice between defending
Russia's image or its security interests, there was no
question that Medvedev would defend Russia's security
interests. Boillon noted that Medvedev made clear to Sarkozy
his poor regard for Saakashvili as well as Medvedev's view
that a U.S.-armed Georgia is inconsistent with Russian
national security.


5. (C) Sarkozy, according to Boillon, is determined that
the Russians implement their commitments under the cease-fire
agreement but is not seeking confrontation with the Russians.
His top priority is verifying Russian compliance with its
promises. We asked, in the context of the recent op-ed piece
that ran in "Le Figaro" and "The Washington Post," what
Sarkozy meant by regarding Russian actions in Georgia as a
single action but not necessarily as an indication of a
greater and more menacing reorientation of Russian policy.
Does France not consider Russian actions in Georgia serious
enough to warrant a tough response? Boillon answered that
Russian actions in Georgia have been completely
disproportionate, and he repeated that the way forward would
test whether the now prevalent notion of a more threatening
and assertive Russia was truly valid. In that context, the
U.S. and France needed to coordinate their response. France
wants to be firm but does not want to press too quickly for
open confrontation with Moscow.


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