FRENCH MFA EMPHASIZES THAT IRAQ'S PROBLEMS ARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000155

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: PREL KDEM FR IZ UN
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA EMPHASIZES THAT IRAQ'S PROBLEMS ARE
FUNDAMENTALLY POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC OR SECURITY, IN NATURE


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (U) Action request at para 7.


2. (C) At the end of a January 25 briefing by visiting
Washington analysts on transition/security issues in Iraq,
French MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Franck
Gellet expanded on French reluctance to host the next meeting
on the Iraq Compact (ICI). Gellet stated that the GOF had
earlier in the week (he thought it might have been January 21
or 22) responded to the UN Special Representative for Iraq
Staffan de Mistura via French Permrep Ripert. This was
reportedly in response to de Mistura's proposal that France
host the next ICI meeting and consider linking it to a
separate conference France would also host on national
reconciliation that would involve representatives of all
Iraqi factions. Gellet said that such a proposal made no
sense on its face, in part because the participants in a
conference on national reconciliation would involve many more
participants than would be at a Compact meeting.


3. (C) Gellet emphasized that France's main problem with
ICI is its economic focus. The issues preventing peace and
reconstruction in Iraq are not related to economic resources
(which are abundant) or even security (which affects many
other activities but has recently improved in many parts of
the country). The signal failure in Iraq, in France's view,
is the lack of progress in achieving national reconciliation.
For the compact to be relevant to Iraq's needs, Gellet
argued, it needs to be more "politically oriented."


4. (C) When pressed on the form a French-sponsored national
reconciliation conference might take, Gellet referred to the
2004 Cairo conference that brought contending Iraqi factions
together as a viable framework. That conference, he claimed,
allowed for participation by all factions, parties, and
movements, including ex-Ba'thists. He recalled that most
participants found the gathering useful and blamed the
failure to follow through on U.S. uneasiness with the call
for the withdrawal of foreign military forces as quickly as
possible. The situation is now quite different, Gellet
continued, inasmuch as all parties agree that U.S. troops can
and should remain present for the time being as an
interposition force preventing a breakdown into total civil
war. The GOF's view is that the time is ripe for a new
effort to convene a conference. France has offered to host
it but does not insist on doing so if the Iraqis would prefer
someone else do so. When asked what France has done to
pursue an initiative that Gellet acknowledged had passed
almost unnoticed since Kouchner formally proposed it in
Istanbul last November, Gellet answered that it was waiting
for the Iraqis to signal a desire to go forward.


5. (C) We stressed that we had no instructions to comment
on French ideas regarding a national reconciliation
conference. We nevertheless noted that Washington skepticism
is probably fueled by the failure of this past summer's
intra-Lebanese conference in Selle St. Cloud to avert a
presidential vacuum in Lebanon or overcome deep political
differences among its leaders. We added, however, that we
were open to further discussion of what was needed to advance
national reconciliation, as evidenced by S/I Satterfield's
discussions in Paris last month. Further discussion here or
in Washington with Satterfield and/or other officials about
how best to promote national reconciliation as well as the
ICI seemed called for; Gellet readily agreed.


6. (C) In addition to Gellet, French interministerial
coordinator for Iraqi reconstruction Xavier Roze, former
French ambassador to Eritrea Gerard Sambrana (on his way out
to become de Mistura's political adviser),and Iraq desk
officer Olivier Masseret attended the briefing. Their
questions and ensuing discussion highlighted French
uncertainty that recent improvements in Iraq's security
situation would translate into durable progress toward
national reconciliation and political stability. Among the
key points:

--Sunni Arab/Kurdish tensions in the north posed a constant
threat to stability in that region. Sunni Arabs fear being
pushed into a "sea of sand" with no resources. Although
France tries to calm the Kurds down and to warn them not to
press matters to the breaking point, Gellet argued that we
needed to work together to contain the situation. This could
include delaying as long as possible any referendum on Kirkuk
to reduce the Kurds' "obsession" over its status. Within
Kurdistan, the French notice a growing rift between older
generation leaders, who prefer greater autonomy or outright
independence, and younger Kurds who prefer staying within
Iraq partly to fend off the Turks and reap economic benefits

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of national unity. Continued Sunni Arab/Kurdish tensions, if
not carefully managed, carry the ongoing risk of sparking
civil war.

--The French were very interested in USG assessments of the
long-term viability of "awakening councils" in Sunni Arab
areas and whether they might become real political movements
or parties that would challenge existing leaders. They also
asked about the risk, as al-Qa'ida in Iraq was beaten back,
of armed Sunni Arab irregulars turning on coalition troops.
The French wondered as well whether Sunni Arabs prominent in
the awakening councils shared traditional Sunni attachment to
preserving Iraq's national unity.

--In the south, the French asked who inhabitants there think
controls Iraq's oil resources, Iran's role and intentions in
the region, and the majority view of possible creation of a
Shi'a state or broadly autonomous region.

--Throughout the country, the French wanted an overall
assessment of political transition and its implications for
the U.S. presence in Iraq. Similarly, did the population and
local leaderships accept provincial councils as permanent
fixtures on the Iraqi political landscape? As a segue into
his points about the Iraq Compact and national
reconciliation, Gellet stated that France was not generally
optimistic about political trends despite positive security
developments. (Note: Gellet added that France does not say
this publicly so as not to undermine the situation. End
note) This explains why France regards Iraq's most important
problems as political in nature and emphasizes seeking
political solutions over giving first priority to treating
Iraq's economic and security ills.


7. (C) Comment and action request: We continue to wait for
the GOF's formal response to S/I Satterfield's paper, which
we understand will be further delayed pending all the
necessary political approvals. This exchange, however, gave
us a much needed opportunity to enter into a detailed
exchange of how we each perceive various aspects of the
situation on the ground in Iraq. Gellet's further
explanation of France's reluctance to associate itself
closely with the Compact (including hosting a follow-up
conference) and its conception of how best to spur progress
on national reconciliation seem to merit further high-level
discussion. We would encourage S/I Satterfield to engage
further with the French on these subjects either here or in
Washington at his earliest opportunity.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA