Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS1519
2008-08-06 07:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

SUDAN/DARFUR: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF

Tags:  PREL KJUS PHUM UNSC SU FR 
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VZCZCXRO4402
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #1519/01 2190747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060747Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4036
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001519 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: PREL KJUS PHUM UNSC SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUSPENDING AN ICC INDICTMENT TO IMPROVE SUDANESE BEHAVIOR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1140

B. PARIS 1369

C. USUN 693

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001519

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: PREL KJUS PHUM UNSC SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUSPENDING AN ICC INDICTMENT TO IMPROVE SUDANESE BEHAVIOR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1140

B. PARIS 1369

C. USUN 693

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The French have discussed with Sudan FM
Deng Alor things that Sudan could do, in its own interests,
that might alleviate pressure stemming from a possible ICC
indictment of President Bashir, but have not promised that if
Sudan behaved in a certain way that France would try to stave
off such an indictment. The GOF is waiting to see what the
ICC does and how Sudan responds to the advice France and,
separately, the UK have provided. The French believe it is
possible to secure tangible improvements in Sudanese behavior
to an extent that may warrant consideration of a suspension
of an eventual indictment, under Article 16 of the Rome
Treaty. The U.S., UK, and France are scheduled to discuss
this further in London on August 23. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MFA Sudan desk officer Frederic Bouvier on August 4
reviewed the Sudan/ICC issue (ref A) in the context of Sudan
FM Deng Alor's visit to Paris on July 21. Deng Alor had been
in Paris on July 16 (ref B),had gone to Dakar for the Darfur
Contact Group meeting, returned to Paris for the July 21
meeting, went to London, and then returned to Sudan. Deng
Alor met with FM Kouchner on July 21.

FRANCE URGES COOPERATION BUT IS NOT OFFERING A "DEAL" TO SUDAN


3. (C) Bouvier said that Kouchner stressed the need for
Sudan to cooperate on a number of fronts and that doing so
would be in Sudan's interest, especially in view of activity
at the ICC. Kouchner said that Sudan could improve its
standing at the ICC and in the world's eyes by, for example,
cooperating with the ICC on the two Sudanese already under
indictment, improving cooperation with UNAMID, making
concrete progress on improving conditions in Darfur, and
talking to rebel elements in order to reach a political
settlement. Kouchner also said that Khartoum should carry
out its obligations under the North-South CPA.


4. (C) Bouvier stressed that Kouchner did not offer Deng
Alor a "deal," i.e. that in return for Sudan's doing certain
things, France would try to block an ICC prosecution of
Bashir. The issue was not ripe. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
had asked for an indictment, but the court itself would not
rule until the October/November period. Talk of scuttling a
prosecution now was thus premature.

PARALLEL FRENCH AND UK EFFORTS TO PRESSURE SUDAN


5. (C) Bouvier said that France had been consulting with
the UK on how to handle this issue but was not "coordinating"

with the UK in the sense that they were working together to
achieve certain ends. "We share many ideas with the UK and
are moving on parallel tracks, but we are not working
jointly." Bouvier said. (NOTE: Paris UK emboffs made
similar comments during a July 31 meeting. END NOTE.)


6. (C) Deng Alor was in a receptive mood and did not plead
with the French to block ICC action, according to Bouvier.
Deng Alor said that he personally believed that Sudan should
do many of the things Kouchner suggested, but that he would
take the message, along with the UK's message, back to Sudan
for consideration by the "big chiefs." Bouvier said that
France was waiting for Sudan's response. He said that the UK
and France had wanted to give the Sudanese a few ideas, in
order to have them come forward with proposals, rather than
have the UK and France provide something definite. One
reason was to avoid the appearance that the UK and France
were showing Sudan a way to bargain its way out of an ICC
prosecution, which could serve as an unfortunate precedent.

TRIAL BALLOON: SUSPENSION OF AN ICC PROSECUTION THAT FOSTERS
TANGIBLE ACTION


7. (C) Bouvier said that France was in a "wait and see"
mode and that events could well determine where this issue
should go. First, the ICC had to act. Then, Sudan would
respond, perhaps with a list of things it would do. Bouvier
said that it was possible (stressing the word "possible")
that Sudan could promise to do enough that it would be in the
greater interest for France and others to consider seeking a
suspension of the ICC prosecution under Article 16 of the
Rome Treaty, which permits suspensions for up to 12 months,
with the possibility of renewal. "Let's say we suspend it
for 12 months, with a review every three or four months. We

PARIS 00001519 002 OF 002


could use that review to ensure that they keep doing what
they said they would. This would help us achieve our ends
and also preserve our prerogatives with the ICC," he
reasoned. "If they don't cooperate, we end the suspension
and the ICC goes into action."


8. (C) Bouvier repeated that this scenario was still
speculative. "We are not saying now that a suspension is in
order, simply that events could develop in a way that
suspending ICC action could be in everyone's best interest."
Bouvier said that the French did not provide Deng Alor with a
non-paper. According to Bouvier, the "Franco-British"
proposal that Deng Alor mentioned upon returning to Khartoum
(a copy of which may have been the document he provided to
Embassy Khartoum, ref A) was his own written synthesis of
what he had heard in Paris and London.


9. (C) Bouvier remarked that many Africans and other
non-Western countries were already clamoring for blocking ICC
action. This would likely increase over time, and perhaps
become a big issue at the September UNGA. Bouvier said the
French were a bit disappointed in the EOV the U.S. gave after
its abstention on the UNSC vote on renewing UNAMID's mandate
(ref C). He said that the EOV's very firm position in
support of the ICC could put the U.S. in a position where it
might be difficult to exercise flexibility at a later stage.

P-3 DISCUSSION


10. (C) Bouvier said that French Presidential Deputy
Diplomatic Advisor Bruno Joubert and Kouchner Cabinet Advisor
Eric Chevallier discussed Deng Alor's visit and the ICC issue
in a July 31 telephone conference call with Sudan Special
Envoy Williamson. Bouvier said that the UK would host in
London on August 23 a meeting to continue the discussion,
with the U.S. and French participating. The GOF MFA and
Presidency would both be represented at the meeting, which
would be divided into two sessions, one featuring the P-3
plus the new Sudan mediator, Burkina Faso FM Djibril Bassole,
to discuss Sudan generally, and a second one with only the
P-3, to focus on the ICC issue.

COMMENT


11. (C) We want to stress again that Bouvier was not saying
that we should now start making a deal with Khartoum over the
ICC issue. He was suggesting that events down the road could
unfold in such a way that we may be in a position later to
consider invoking an Article 16 suspension (which could
always be canceled) if Sudanese behavior changed to the
degree that a suspension might be in everyone's interest.
END COMMENT.





Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce

STAPLETON

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