A/S SILVERBERG REVIEWS UN ISSUES WITH FRENCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000139 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR IO, EUR/WE, AF, NEA, SCA, AND EAP, E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNGA PHUM KPKO AF ET ER CD BM, LE, SF, IZ, LY, JA, CH, UP, EUN, FR SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG REVIEWS UN ISSUES WITH FRENCH COUNTERPART Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A/S Kristen Silverberg reviewed international organization issues with French counterpart Sylvie Bermann on January 22 in Paris. Bermann signaled doubt that France would host an International Compact on Iraq, described the aftermath of the NIE on Iran as "disastrous," reiterated French policy regarding next steps in deploying an EU mission and supporting Kosovo's independence, outlined challenges in preventing manipulation of the Human Rights Council, noted the "inexperience" of the Libyan delegation contributed to their "rocky" UNSC presidency, noted the difficulty of working with South Africa, reiterated GOF support for the Arab League plan for Lebanon while discounting the effectiveness of potential new steps in the UNSC at this time, considered sanctions a logical next step to address Burma in the UNSC while urging continued pressure on China and Japan, reviewed French policy in Africa with respect to UN peacekeeping missions in Chad, Darfur, Eritrea/Ethiopia, MONUC, and expressed support for Paddy Ashdown as new UN/EU envoy to Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) A/S Kristen Silverberg met French A/S-equivalent Sylvie Bermann in Paris on January 22 for a 90 minute review of U.N. related issues. Iran and the "disastrous" National Intelligence Estimate -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Bermann described the text and the timing of publication of the unclassified Iran NIE as "disastrous" to our joint efforts to address Iran's nuclear ambitions. While we can all focus on the elements of the NIE that address increasing numbers of centrifuges for which Iran has no peaceful need, she said the presentation of the NIE could have covered the same ground with different phrasing -- particularly the first sentence -- that would not have made our work as difficult as the released edition did. On next steps by the P5 1, Bermann noted the PRC appears to be playing a productive role at this time, while the Russians, in contrast, remained quite obstructionist. (Comment: News of the P5 1 agreement on the elements of a new UNSCR broke after this meeting. End Note) 
Iraq Compact Meeting -------------- ¶4. (C) In response to a question about France's next steps with respect to Iraq, Bermann noted that France would soon open an office in Irbil that would eventually become a consulate. The office would be staffed by Dr. Frederic Tissot a medical doctor who is close to FM Kouchner and would focus on the health sector. ¶5. (C) While confirming the U.S. proposal was still under consideration, Bermann expressed doubt that France would agree to host the next meeting of the Iraq Compact. Bermann said she believed that the GOF would be reluctant to take this on for domestic political reasons. Silverberg noted that the ICI was a joint UN - Iraq led effort to which Bermann replied simply that France supports the Compact. Kosovo: "We are not blinking" -------------- ¶6. (C) When asked for USG views on disucssion of a delay to the Kosovars' timeline, Silverberg said it was "dangerous" and noted strong support for the European mission in Kosovo would help ensure UNSYG Ban ki Moon kept his resolve. Silverberg confirmed that Secretary Rice and USUN Ambassador Khalilzhad had engaged with UNSYG Ban on this issue. Europeans seeking "solidarity" rather than "Unity" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Bermann noted that France continues to support PARIS 00000139 002 OF 004 deployment of the European mission and recognition of an independent Kosovo. She said France recognized that some members of the EU such as Greece, Cyprus, and Slovakia had problems with Kosovar independence but they would, nevertheless, support a "policy of solidarity" within the EU even in the absence of a unified position on independence. With regard to the EU mission, this required particularly careful attention to the CONOPS language. She noted that Italy's FM D'Alema was less firm than previously on the timetable of recognition. She also described Madrid as having signaled over recent weeks Spanish concerns about their own electoral timetable that prompted suggested delays in implementing the contact group strategy. Bermann noted that EU CSFP HighRep Solana would write to UNSYG Ban noting the EU was ready to launch its mission. France hoped that UNSYG Ban would reply with a letter that would help those governments that had concerns about the legality of the mission. Human Rights Council -------------- ¶8. (C) On the question of action in the UNSC and the Human Rights Council on the rocket attacks and Israeli shutdown of the Gaza borders, Bermann said the French position was to negotiate a text on the basis of clear redlines. Bermann opposed blocking discussion of this issue in the HRC because the Europeans would need to have the cooperation of the Arab League and others in the HRC in the future to address issues such as Darfur. Setting the precedent of negotiation will help us when we in turn need cooperation of the majority. ¶9. (C) Silverberg noted such an approach would encourage unhelpful special sessions every time there is an incident in effect leaving it to the Organization of Islamic States (OIC) to dictate the agenda. She described as worrisome flexible redlines and the prospect of numerous European abstentions on a potentially unhelpful statement. Silverberg suggested instead that European members consider absenting themselves from such meetings so as to deny those who seek to manipulate the HRC in counter-productive ways. If the HRC stopped blocking or took balanced action on other human rights violations such as in Zimbabwe or in Belorussia, then the Europeans could participate in a more productive body. ¶10. (C) Bermann said she fully understood the U.s. position but warned that if the Human Right Commission becomes a total failure, then the only winners in such a struggle would be those who continued to violate human rights. Challenges in the UNSC: Libya and South Africa -------------- - ¶11. (C) In response to a question, Silverberg described Libyan Foreign Minister Shalgham's visit to the U.S. and meeting with Secretary Rice as relatively positive. Unfortunately it was followed up by a visit from Tehran that included unhelpful public comments on the unity of Libyan and Iranian positions. Bermann described a recent visit to Tripoli that underscored the fact that the Libyan Permrep in NY has broad room to take positions on issues that are not of direct importance to Colonel Qadhafi, such as the attack on the UN peacekeepers in Sudan. Both agreed that the Libyans had little experience in how the UN and the rest of the world works -- resulting in a rather "rocky" month with Libya holding the Presidency of the Council. ¶12. (C) Bermann shared French impressions of South Africa playing the most difficult and ideological role on the UNSC. She said Permrep Dumisani Kumalo has free rein, allowing him to act irresponsibly. She cited the example of South Africa's position on the Burma resolution and the response to the attack on the UN Peacekeepers in Darfur. She added that France would engage in a Strategic Dialogue meeting with South Africa in mid-February. (Note: President Sarkozy intends to visit South Africa February 26-27, when he is expected to give a major speech on France,s Africa policy. The Strategic dialogue Bermann mentioned presumably would be designed to set the stage for that trip and to minimize any PARIS 00000139 003 OF 004 disharmony in Franco-South African policies. END NOTE) ¶13. (C) Silverberg noted their votes in the Council were at times contrary to South Africa,s publicly stated policy, including opposition to the resolution on Burma in 2007 for which Pretoria received substantial criticism. Lebanon: continued support for the Arab League plan -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Bermann noted the French Presidency's initiative to encourage Syria to take a productive role on the Lebanon issue was unsuccessful. She reiterated French policy in support of the Arab League initiative and noted the French saw no pressing need for action in the UNSC now for two reasons: a) a certain amount of Lebanon fatigue in the UNSC, and b) a realization there are few levers to ensure parties in the region accept and implement what the UNSC might decide. When asked what FM Kouchner had in mind when he suggested action in the UNSC on Lebanon, Bermann explained, somewhat elliptically, that Kouchner's idea had not been fully thought through and was no longer in play. ¶15. (C) Silverberg noted that to mediate in Lebanon only has the counter-productive result impact of raising the potential price demanded by Syria for a positive outcome. Turning to the Lebanon Tribunal and underscoring the importance of securing financing to launch this important initiative, Silverberg welcomed Bermann's confirmation that Paris had already made good on France's pledge. She noted that the international community needs to do more to ensure the rest of the pledges were paid. Holding firm on "no justification" for terrorism -------------- - ¶16. (C) Silverberg expressed concern that the UNSC Presidential statement condemning the car bomb attack on a U.S. diplomatic vehicle omitted standard language that the international community condemns terrorist attacks regardless of the motivation of the attacker. She noted that Heads of Government statements on terrorism included this language and that the U.S. wants to ensure the weaker language on the Lebanon car bombing does not become a precedent. Bermann agreed with this sentiment and noted that the French Permrep in New York expressed surprise that the U.S. had conceded this point. Burma: Arms Embargo is a logical next step - Need to pressure China, Japan and Ukraine -------------- ¶17. (C) Silverberg described Rangoon's failure to grant special envoy Gambari a visa combined with a lack of progress on the ground and lack of action by ASEAN as compelling reasons to try new tactics. She noted the P-3 had developed a paper on benchmarks that might be a good starting point and cited the most effective next step might be an arms embargo. The Government of India has indicated it would stop selling arms to the Junta in Rangoon, she said, while the Ukrainians continue to sell weapons and ought to take independent action ahead of any UNSC action. ¶18. (C) Bermann agreed that sanctions were a logical next step that Beijing would likely veto. Nevertheless, such a veto could be useful in pressuring China, particularly since the Chinese are starting to consider Burma as a backburner issue. She did note that Japan continues to take a very mild stance vis-a-vis Rangoon -- particularly in the face of the killing of the Japanese journalist during the monk-led protests. Africa: French military presence a "strength" -------------- - ¶19. (C) Bermann reported that France had agreed to supply the needed helicopters for the EU mission in Chad/C.A.R. that would have a helpful impact on the security situation in neighboring Sudan. She noted that France would reduce the PARIS 00000139 004 OF 004 numbers of troops deployed in Cote d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne) without jeopardizing its ability to carry out its mission in support of UNOCI. Looking strategically at France's basing in Africa, Bermann described the French presence a "strength" and noted that the French military is keen on keeping the current basing structure. In the context of the "White Paper" review of French Defense capabilities, France sought to have efficient and operational quick reaction forces in the region. UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa -------------- ¶20. (C) Turning to peacekeeping operations, Bermann noted that the UNMEE mission between Eritrea and Ethiopia was a humiliation for the UN given the Eritrean treatment of the mission, but was nevertheless an important tripwire that should not be withdrawn. She described the Eritreans as having concluded they were in the right in this conflict with Ethiopia and therefore justified in their unhelpful actions. Silverberg suggested the French Ambassador in Asmara might usefully urge the Eritreans to take positive actions regarding UNMEE. Bermann agreed. ¶21. (C) On expanding MONUC's mandate, Silverberg described U.S. constraints by noting the requirement for a Congressional Notification and a concomitant 15-day review period depending on whether the Department's Legal Advisor determines that a change in the mandate would be sufficient to trigger the Notification requirement. Bermann appreciated the warning and urged a prompt response given the importance of MONUC,s being a robust mission. ¶22. (C) Turning to Darfur, Bermann noted the need to pressure the PRC in addition to pressuring Khartoum. She stated that both the Secretary and French Foreign Minister pushed for full operational capability of the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) as soon as possible. However, the DKPO had said early deployment was not realistic. As a result of following this compressed timetable, we have a partially deployed force that is not fully capable, one that Khartoum will test. Bermann argued our public pressure should be on Khartoum rather than on the DKPO. ¶23. (C) On UNAMID, Silverberg noted continued obstruction by the Government of Sudan. She said the U.S. had pressed for earlier deployment to Sudan based on the assessments of capabilities by U.S. Military advisors and cited failure by the DKPO to take early action on such issues as contracting authority or staffing to ensure deployment could proceed expeditiously. Silverberg cited UNIFIL's deployment in four weeks as an example of how quickly DPKO can take action when there is the will to act. While the U.S. has been critical of DKPO, U.S. criticism is always in the context of the UN as a partner. Silverberg did note that Sudanese obstructionism has not been effectively called to account and cited the example of a 10-15 minute firefight with a UN convoy that only resulted in a weak UNSC Presidential statement of regret. Afghanistan: support for Ashdown -------------- ¶24. (C) Silverberg and Bermann agreed that both France and the U.S. supported Paddy Ashdown as the UN and EU representative to Afghanistan and that it should be possible to address President Karzai's concerns. ¶25. (U) A/S Silverberg cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm PEKALA