COUNSELOR COHEN ENGAGES FRENCH ON PAKISTAN,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001333 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018 TAGS: MCAP PGOV PREL EUN AF PA IR IZ FR SUBJECT: COUNSELOR COHEN ENGAGES FRENCH ON PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, ESDP Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas ons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. On July 8 and 9, State Department Counselor Eliot Cohen discussed Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel-Palestine, terrorism, ESDP, and the French Defense White Paper with officials from the French MFA, Elysee, MOD, and Secretariat General of National Defense (SGDN). MFA interlocutors were Philippe Errera, Advisor to FM Kouchner for Strategic Affairs, and Eric Chevallier, who serves as Special Advisor to FM Kouchner for Crises as well as Spokesperson and Director of Communications. At the Elysee, Dr. Cohen met with Strategic Affairs Advisor Francois Richier. On July 9, he met with Michel Miraillet, the MOD's Director for Strategic Affairs, as well as Francis Delon, Head of the SGDN. A civil society discussion arranged by SGDN with French experts on Pakistan and Afghanistan will be reported separately. ¶2. (C) French interlocutors agreed broadly that the situation in Pakistan is grim and that the GOF is seeking constructive ways to promote stability. Regarding Iran, the French officials agreed fully that the Israeli military threat is serious and maintaining or increasing pressure on the Iranian regime is critical. France is seeking to move forward on autonomous sanctions with a small coalition of EU partners. Finally, all interlocutors concurred that realistic goals on ESDP for France's six-month EU Presidency are mostly intangible, but that the focus will be on capabilities and promoting realistic threat assessment among EU leaders. End summary. ¶3. (C) Pakistan: On July 8, Dr. Cohen met separately with Philippe Errera and Eric Chevallier of the MFA. Errera summarized the MFA's views of Pakistan as being "very pessimistic" and "not having many levers." The GOF has high interest in Pakistan not only because of the upcoming arrival of French troops in eastern Afghanistan, but also because of France's current EU Presidency. Errera said that France needs to do more contingency planning and long-term thinking on Pakistan. At the Elysee, Richier said that President Sarkozy is very concerned, but concurred that France has more ideas than solutions. He shared his preliminary assessment that the GOF must choose one angle to focus on and one group of people to support, because trying to engage across the board would just produce more failure; he said France may choose the military because the politicians are "terrible" and civil society is a less obvious possibility. Cohen conveyed the need to reinforce our long-term commitment to the Pakistanis, and the need to understand and engage the military more effectively. Richier stated that we may not have time to implement such long-term strategies, and offered early GOF cooperation with the next U.S. administration on Pakistan. In July 9 discussions with Michel Miraillet, the MOD's Director for Strategic Affairs, and Francis Delon, Head of the SGDN, Miraillet said that the international community should ask the Saudis to bolster the GOP's budget. SGDN staff asked about U.S. views of Nawaz Sharif, saying the GOF sees "little positive" but still considers him a relatively useful interlocutor since he is not an Islamist. ¶4. (C) Afghanistan: Errera said that France has no timeline for its involvement in Afghanistan. He stated the need for ISAF to have stronger public diplomacy, as the current number of PD-focused personnel is far too low, with 2 PD officers in RC-South alongside 20,000 troops. Errera noted that FM Kouchner would like to see more public handovers to Afghanistan security forces, such as in the RC-C transition. Errera admitted that dual-hatting the ISAF and OEF commanders would bring certain advantages but would also complicate public opinion. On the domestic front, Errera characterized the Parliamentary debate on the increased Afghanistan deployment as tough and noted the lack of support within Sarkozy's UMP party. Later, Chevallier inquired about U.S. views of Afghan President Karzai's performance, noting that he is not sure Karzai handles appropriately Pakistan's destabilizing role in Afghanistan. He expressed concern about Kai Eide's perception that the UNSYG Special Representative/UNAMA head may not enjoy full U.S. support, which may be due to misunderstandings from the fact that the U.S. needs to maintain some distance from the UN mission in Afghanistan. Chevallier said the Afghan government uses communication breakdowns between the U.S. and the UK as an excuse to disregard our efforts to foster good governance and interagency coordination, while acknowledging that France is still a lesser player in Afghanistan than either the U.S. or PARIS 00001333 002 OF 004 the UK. ¶5. (S/NF) Iran: Errera characterized Iran's response to the EU as four pages of "garbage" with only one sentence of substance. The lack of serious content will heighten Israeli concerns. Errera said that Solana is among those who focus on Iran's professed readiness to negotiate as a success, rather than focusing on their lack of constructive engagement. He noted that Iran's ability to organize a formal response means there is unusual consensus in Teheran, which must stem from either conviction or fear. His sense is that for the first time since the U.S. NIE, the regime is actually worried, due largely to Israeli actions. The GOF believes the regime will begin to negotiate in good faith only when it feels an "existential" threat. Decreased Syrian isolation (including their participation at the Summit for the Union for the Mediterranean in Paris on July 13) and the strengthening of the Iraqi government are likely also raising pressure on the regime. ¶6. (S/NF) Though systemic financial sanctions have been and would likely continue to be effective, the GOF is also pursuing measures that could have a more immediate impact, with like-minded states outside of the EU. France, UK, Italy and Germany are moving forward on proposals to target areas like insurance (specifically, reinsurance; Richier later estimated this could have an impact in 6 months) and a catalytic converter used in oil refining that is produced by only 4 suppliers (which Richier noted could end Iranian oil refining within a year, due to the component's one-year life). Errera noted that although the EU will not move forward in the near term on further Iran sanctions, the current sanctions will stay in place as a unanimous vote would be required to lift them. Errera said that the GOF thinks "unconditional" talks with Iran would weaken the international community's collective hand. France is also lobbying European nations, such as the UK, to have more realistic views on working with Iran. Finally, Errera agreed that the possibility of a conflict such as a naval altercation in the Gulf is a real one. ¶7. (S/NF) At the Presidential Palace, Richier said he is "not optimistic" about Iran while noting that unity among the P5 1 constitutes a strategic goal in itself. Our joint efforts have raised the international level of concern about Iran while impeding the development of an Iranian threat, albeit insufficiently. Nonetheless, the GOF sees no better alternative than to continue along our current path. He agreed that the Israeli threat of military action is serious and stated that a channel to the Supreme Leader's office is desirable since this could be the only check on an overheated situation with the regime. In his view, a majority of the Iranian regime views their position as strong, while a minority is giving adequate weight to developments in the international community. He said the only established means we have for getting concessions is more sanctions, which must be imposed outside the UNSC due to the situation's pressing nature and the dynamics that hinder further steps there. Richier agreed that our timetable for sanctions is still longer than the Israelis'. ¶8. (S/NF) At the SGDN, Delon passed on a retired Israeli intelligence official's assessment that the Iranian regime is nervous regarding both Israel and President Bush (who they see as unpredictable),and may thus be more flexible in the near term. Israel estimates that Iran is making progress in enriching uranium using P-1 centrifuges, an assessment not shared by the GOF. The Israeli government's ensuing sense of urgency may make the end of 2009 a "deadline" if nothing has changed by then. Delon added that the GOF assessment includes the possibility of IR-2 and IR-3 enrichment methods, as well as any combination of Natanz and a possible clandestine site. Though the GOF assesses that Iran could have one or more nuclear weapons within a year of mastering the technological challenges, Delon said the GOF does not believe Iran has that capacity yet. Miraillet asked whether some elements of Iran's program might have come directly from China, or from Russian sites, rather than via the A.Q. Khan network. Delon shared his personal view that the only lever on Iran is the threat of war, and agreed that the Israelis will not hesitate to act militarily without regard to the consequences. For example, Syria had no reaction to the Israeli bombing in September, but Iran would have a strong reaction to such an event and the Israelis do not adequately factor that into their thinking. He characterized Israeli thinking as short-term and tactical than strategic. PARIS 00001333 003 OF 004 ¶9. (S) Israel-Palestine: Chevallier said he was very surprised by the "very negative" mood he encountered in July 7 discussions in the Quartet context (following on the December Palestinian Donors' Conference in Paris), particularly in light of some positive developments. He said the prevailing belief seemed that we have little leverage over the Israelis and that the Olmert-Abbas dynamic is not good. Miraillet noted that the Israelis were not optimistic about Gaza, and said Amos Gilad of the Israeli MOD had recently told him that Israel was prepared to accept 500 Israeli deaths in Gaza to crush Hamas. ¶10. (S/NF) Terrorism: Errera reported that France's external intelligence agency, DGSE, assesses that the threat environment in France is similar to that of 1994-1995, prior to the wave of bombings in France by Algerian Islamic militants. He said there are no active cells today in France, but that France's agencies are alert to the possibility of early networks of logistical cells that could later become operational cells. He noted that the largest terrorism-related concerns in North Africa are threats of opportunity, with the GOF's concerns being, in descending order, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, Mauritania, and Mali. He noted that the Maghreb countries deal better with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) than with more diffuse indigenous activity. Errera noted the absence of consensus on how closely AQIM is tied to al-Qaeda at large, but pointed out that a success for one terrorist is a success for all regardless of their ideological differences. Delon noted that radicalization is not a widespread phenomenon in France and that the GOF has acted where needed in prisons and mosques. ¶11. (C) ESDP: Errera noted that as the focus of France's efforts is capabilities rather than institutions, the complications with the Lisbon Treaty's ratification are not a serious impediment. Errera described France's goal as a series of capability projects in areas such as projection, helicopters, aircraft, carrier groups, space, and force protection. Though the projects will be undertaken under EU auspices, they will involve smaller, voluntary groups that Richier later described as "flexible." Errera said France would like to upgrade the ambition of the EU beyond the Headline Goal, to cover multiple concurrent missions along the civil-military spectrum. He said France hopes to establish this new goal for the next 10 years, without throwing out the Headline Goal (NFI). He said that other Europeans need to join in France's assessment of new threats, and noted a "huge" closed seminar taking place the week of July 14 on practical non-proliferation that France hopes will significantly raise awareness on that issue. ¶12. (C) Errera described strategic cooperation with the UK as easier than that with Germany, which can be "maddening" due to more bureaucracy and fewer resources. Errera noted that a strong British partner is in the GOF's interest, but said HMG is confused by strong U.S.-French cooperation and weakened by PM Brown's domestic troubles. France is also working with the Slovaks and the Poles, who have resources but have not yet put much effort into establishing a new strategic framework. Richier noted that many European leaders have difficulty thinking in terms of capabilities (rather than institutions) and appreciating the need for long-term capabilities planning. He said a realistic goal for the 6 months of the French EU Presidency would be production of a paper, as well as the intangible goal of heightening EU leaders' appreciation of realistic threat analysis as a determinant of defense planning. Miraillet noted that some European states fail to recognize the progress in ESDP over the last 10 years, and that those states mostly need to increase their own capabilities, including by incorporating the findings of the EDA about capacity shortfalls into their national planning. He noted France's goal of increasing central ESDP planning capability by 40-80 officers, and said that the weakness in NATO planning capabilities over the last 15 years bears some responsibility for anemic European defense budgets. Miraillet and Delon agreed that the threat environment has changed enough that more popular support for increased defense spending could be attainable, and noted that polls show over 70 percent of EU citizens support ESDP. ¶13. (C) Defense White Paper, NATO: Richier described the final product of the recently-released White Paper on Security and Defense as a compromise between the White Paper PARIS 00001333 004 OF 004 Commission and the Presidency, but said he is happy with the overall results. He said its conclusions regarding the continuum between domestic security and international security are important and new for France. He hoped that the prioritization of increased intelligence capabilities will enable closer cooperation with the U.S. Richier observed that no one but the U.S. seemed to notice France's stated goal of developing offensive capabilities in cyberdefense, an oversight he said was due to other nations' general lack of strategic thought. Miraillet dismissed recently published military criticism of the White Paper, noting that it did not spark any public dialogue and that the "old guard" of the French military has previously handled other challenges poorly, such as professionalization. Meanwhile, Delon noted that French spending on defense per se will increase, but that the funding outlook for national security programs will be "extremely difficult" over the next 2-3 years due in part to France's need to hew to the EU's three percent limit on deficit spending. Though the armed forces will be downsized, the savings will go into equipment; he noted that many of future modernization expenses will be paid by eventual cuts and said prioritization will be the biggest challenge. France will maintain a realistic deployment capability of 30,000 troops rather than the previous nominal goal of 50,000. Finally, regarding NATO, Richier observed that parts of the GOF are not in favor of NATO reintegration, but said he thinks the project will be successful. He said some members of Parliament--including members of the Defense Committee--have fundamental misconceptions about NATO, such as that France might be forced into deployments or procurements. ¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by Counselor Cohen. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce STAPLETON