SYRIAN FM MU'ALLIM VISITS PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001323 SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER FR SY LE IS SUBJECT: SYRIAN FM MU'ALLIM VISITS PARIS REF: A. DAMASCUS 498 ¶B. PARIS 1261 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for reas ons 1.4. (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Syrian Foreign Minister Mu'allim visited Paris July 4 -- the same day Ingrid Betancourt triumphantly returned to France following her liberation from captivity in Colombia -- and met French FM Kouchner as well as French presidency officials (including a drop by from an otherwise distracted President Sarkozy). The discussions reportedly focused heavily on Lebanon -- normalization of ties between Damascus and Beirut as well as formation of a new Lebanese government )- as well as Syrian discussions with Israel and regional relations. Publicly and in private, Mu'allim indicated there would likely be no Olmert/Asad meeting on the margins of the July 13 Paris summit to launch the Union for the Mediterranean and that direct talks with Israel would similarly take more time. The discussions on bilateral ties seem to have yielded no formal game plan for moving ahead but confirmed a clear French desire to move forward, including with a Sarkozy visit to Damascus by the end of 2008, assuming Syria meets various French benchmarks related to Lebanon and other issues. France is ready to revive a stalled ratification process for the EU association accord with Syria, although the process may take longer than the French presidency to play out. In addition to Iraq, Kouchner brought up Syria's human rights record and gave Mu'allim a list of prisoners about whom the GOF is concerned, albeit with little realistic expectation of a Syrian goodwill gesture before the July 13 summit. French officials flatly refute any suggestion they are considering or want to offer a deal favorable to the Syrians on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. End summary ¶2. (SBU) Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim visited Paris July 4 for consultations with French officials partly aimed at paving the way for Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's attendance of the July 13 Paris summit of EU and Mediterranean countries. Some of Mu'allim's program was disrupted by the arrival in Paris later that same day by recently freed Franco-Colombian hostage Ingrid Betancourt. Indeed, the French MFA originally announced that FM Kouchner would be unavailable to meet Mu'allim because he had gone to Bogota to escort Betancourt to France. That apparently changed, as Kouchner had a working dinner with Mu'allim that followed consultations with French Presidency officials earlier in the afternoon. ¶3. (SBU) In addition to his official meetings, Mu'allim gave a public talk, widely reported in the media, at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI). Israeli polcouns Ella Aphek told us she was among the sizable audience that heard what Mu'allim had to say. We have heard that Mu'allim generally sought to portray as reasonably as possible Syria's position on most issues and to speak in terms of a new page in bilateral relations with France. He discounted speculation of an early transformation of the ongoing indirect talks between Israel and Syria via Turkey into direct talks and flatly ruled out the possibility of an Asad/Olmert meeting on the margins of the July 13 summit. ¶4. (C) Our readout from the Elysee on the Mu'allim meeting was spare. NEA adviser Boris Boillon told us July 7 that there were few surprises or revelations. As reported in the July 8 Paris Points, French Presidency SecGen Gueant, diplomatic adviser Levitte, and Boillon insisted on real normalization of relations between Syria and Lebanon as the sine qua non for significant improvement in French/Syrian relations (including an eventual visit by President Sarkozy to Damascus). The immediate priority, according to Boillon, was ensuring that Lebanon had a new government before Asad and Lebanese President Sleiman arrived in Paris for the summit. Failing that, Boillon suggested Sarkozy might try to convene a three-way meeting with Asad and Sleiman, although the French preference was for Asad and Sleiman to hold their first meeting since Sleiman took office in Paris without Sarkozy present. Despite the distraction of the Betancourt visit, and reflecting an assessment that the discussions with Mu'allim were going well, Sarkozy dropped in on the meeting to greet Mu'allim and chat briefly. ¶5. (C) French MFA DAS-equivalent Ludovic Pouille was a bit more expansive July 8, especially with respect to Kouchner's July 4 working dinner with Mu'allim: PARIS 00001323 002 OF 004 --Lebanon and the normalization of ties between Beirut and Damascus was one of the main topics discussed. Mu'allim reiterated Syria's readiness to normalize ties but was vague in terms of concrete commitments on opening embassies, demarcating land borders, or other details. Pouille restated France's intention to draw up a list of areas it expected progress (borders and embassies being at the forefront)from Syria, although he did not say whether the GOF would share that list with us or the SARG and GOL. (Comment: The French have not mentioned the idea floated when NEA A/S Welch last visited about drawing up a list of principles, partly based on the Arab League charter, to guide Lebanese/Syrian relations). Pouille did include in his quick list tracking the status of bilateral agreements between the two countries to ensure Syria did not annul or dilute those bilateral accords currently favorable to Lebanon. --There was not a lot of detailed discussion of the situation in Lebanon and the implementation of the Doha accord beyond a review of Lebanese efforts to form a new government. --Kouchner and Mu'allim discussed the state of peace negotiations in the Middle East, notably the status of indirect Syrian/Israeli peace talks. Pouille provided nothing beyond what has either been publicly or previously reported except the Syrian observation that one constraint on the talks is the inexperience of the Israeli negotiating team vis-a-vis their Syrian counterparts. Mu'allim had observed that the Syrians are essentially the same officials involved when talks broke off in 2000, whereas the Israelis have an entirely new group. This has obvious implications in terms of the "learning curve" and the creation of trust among the negotiators. Pouille claimed that Mu'allim explained the Syrian aim was to arrive at a common set of principles to be applied toward direct negotiations should they start as expected in a few months (i.e., after a new U.S. administration has taken office). Mu'allim was clear with Kouchner, as he was at IFRI, that Syria has no desire to work with the current U.S. administration. --On the Palestinian/Israeli negotiations, Mu'allim claimed that Syria fully supported Palestinian Authority President Abbas. --Kouchner asked Mu'allim about Syrian attitudes toward Iraq and encouraged Syria to do more to control foreign fighters entering Iraq through Syria as well as improve its relationship with the Iraqi government. Mu'allim replied that Damascus would be able to consider how it might deal differently with both of these aspects after the Bush administration leaves office. He did, however, stress to Kouchner the need for external assistance to help cope with the huge number of Iraqi refugees who have taken up residence in Syria. --Mu'allim reportedly indicated to Kouchner, as he had done publicly at IFRI, that Syria is not about to alter its relationship with Iran overnight or in a dramatic fashion. Nevertheless, it would adjust that relationship as the regional situation changed. (Note: At IFRI, we understand Mu'allim linked the evolution of the peace process with Israel and Syria's ties to Iran, although he also made it clear that Damascus would not cut or reduce its ties to Tehran as a precondition for entering into direct discussions with Israel. End note) --Kouchner presented Mu'allim a list of imprisoned Syrian activists and opposition figures France was concerned about. When asked whether Kouchner had asked for their release before the summit or indicated an expectation of some sort of gesture in connection with President Asad's attendance of the July 13 summit, Pouille demurred and stated that this part of the conversation was handled as a strict tete-a-tete. Pouille added, however, that the GOF had no realistic expectation the people on the list would be released. (Comment: Mu'allim took a hard line publicly when asked at IFRI about Syria's abysmal human rights record, rejecting such questions as interference in Syria's internal affairs. Pouille and others in the GOF are well aware that critiques of Asad's much ballyhooed attendance of the July 14 military parade are mostly based on Syria's human rights record. Despite Kouchner's intervention on this score, we doubt the Syrians will give the French any satisfaction before or during the summit. The political sensitivity of this subject, however, was quite evident the day Mu'allim visited when Sarkozy told reporters during an impromptu encounter at the Elysee celebrating Betancourt's release that France would PARIS 00001323 003 OF 004 always be a beacon for those championing human rights, even in Syria. We would expect Sarkozy to raise the subject quietly with Asad but not to press the issue in any public way or to make it a "benchmark" for improving relations with Syria. End comment) ¶6. (C) Pouille did not refer to a working paper or concrete game plan as far as the way forward with Syria, but he did sketch out the following indications of the way forward: --Sarkozy and Asad would discuss the bilateral relationship in terms of Syrian and French expectations. --Sarkozy would likely visit Damascus before the end of 2008, but with enough time for Syria to have realized its Lebanon- and any non-Lebanon-related benchmarks. --Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Dardari (whom Pouille described as the official in charge of Syrian "privatization") will visit Paris at the end of July to discuss in more concrete detail the way forward (including, based on what Pouille said, "deliverables" that might be linked to a Sarkozy visit). --In response to repeated pleas from Asad and Mu'allim, the GOF will use its presidency of the EU to revive the ratification process for its association agreement with Syria. ¶7. (C) We asked about concerns Washington had expressed about new rumors in Lebanon that France was considering a deal with Syria at the expense of the Tribunal dealing with Lebanon. Pouille repeated the same stout denials that we had heard at the Elysee as well as France's full support to the UNIIIC and the investigation its commissioner, Daniel Bellemare, is undertaking. He rejected any notion that France would seek to undercut Bellemare's mission or impose conditions on his work. ¶8. (C) Recently installed NEA A/S-equivalent Patrice Paoli on July 9 added a few more details/insights: --Regarding the EU association agreement, Paoli claimed that France was responding to a wider EU desire to revive the long stalled ratification process. With the addition of two new members since the accord was negotiated, this will likely take some time (the implication was that it would well exceed the six-month term of France's presidency of the EU). Paoli initially said it would be "all the better" if the GOF could figure out how to use the accord as a lever to compel more constructive Syrian behavior, but he quickly added that he could not speak for President Sarkozy in terms of how the accord might be used as a reward for "good conduct." Pouille, who was also present, emphasized that for many members of the EU, eager to normalize ties with Syria, ratifying the accord was a high priority. --Paoli described Mu'allim as happy to have been received at the level he was received and to have been "treated seriously." Reflecting a widely held GOF view of Mu'allim, Paoli called him as a "senior functionary" with a "rational and good perspective" on key issues. Referring to the discussion on Iraq with Kouchner, Paoli said that Mu'allim complained that the Syrians feel "trapped" in the sense that they feel the U.S. has a veto over any Iraqi decision to respond to Syrian overtures for a better bilateral relationship. Paoli said this reflected more broadly Mu'allim's and the SARG's paranoia vis-a-vis the U.S. in that they feel there is no possible "redemption" for Damascus in Washington's eyes. --Paoli referred to Kouchner's presentation of the list of Syrian detainees to Mu'allim and suggested that Kouchner did pressure Mu'allim to make a positive gesture before the July 13 summit. ¶9. (U) Late note: French media are now reporting that some members of the French military and Sarkozy's political party have added their voices to those unhappy over Asad's presence at the July 14 parade. This is due to longstanding suspicions Syria was behind the October 1983 bombing at the Drakkar barracks near Beirut that killed 58 French parachutists participating in the multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Lebanon (the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks occurred at the same time). A battalion of the parachute regiment concerned, named after one of the soldiers killed in the attack, will file past Asad and other dignitaries. Some commentators have already drawn links PARIS 00001323 004 OF 004 between this "affront" to the French military and recent media reports of growing tension between Sarkozy and military leaders. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce STAPLETON