FRANCE/SYRIA: WAITING FOR BASHAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001261

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM FR SY LE IS SA
SUBJECT: FRANCE/SYRIA: WAITING FOR BASHAR

REF: PARIS POINTS FOR 3 JULY 2008

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (C) In addition to what was reported in ref, French
Presidency NEA adviser Boris Boillon discussed Syria and
Lebanon with us July 2. French President Sarkozy, according
to Boillon, raised the status of the indirect dialogue
between Syria and Israel via Turkey with Israeli PM Olmert.
The Israelis indicated a desire to move toward direct talks,
but not for a while, i.e., until a greater measure of trust
and confidence had built up. Boillon claimed the Israelis
also stated that they would eventually insist on a link
between any resolution of the Golan territorial issue and a
rupture of Syria's currently close relations with Iran and
Hizballah. Meanwhile, the Syrians have effectively echoed
Israel's lack of enthusiasm for the immediate opening of
direct talks by expressing their own preference to keep the
talks indirect, particularly given the Israelis' failure to
respond positively to the security paper passed via the
Turks. Boillon thought the two sides would wait a further
six months before deciding definitively on switching to
direct talks.


2. (C) Given this context, Boillon was doubtful a much
rumored side meeting brokered by the French in Paris between
Olmert and Asad would be possible. He would not completely
rule it out, because the headstrong Sarkozy is likely to wait
to see whether a potential occasion presents itself, but he
claimed France was not nave on this score. Indeed, the
Syrians have consistently insisted that they do not want to
be seated near the Israelis or pushed into situations that
would require handshakes with Israeli officials.


3. (C) In terms of presidential meetings related to the
summit, Boillon said the only one-on-ones planned were with
Egyptian President Mubarak, Lebanese President Sleiman, and
Syrian President Asad. (Comment: We are surprised that he
did not mention Algerian President Bouteflika. End comment)
These would occur on July 12, i.e., a day before the summit
takes place. On the 13th, Sarkozy would meet jointly with PM
Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas. Boillon stressed
that this session would in no way undercut U.S.-led efforts
under the Annapolis process but were intended to reinforce
the message that the two parties needed to work hard and take
the lead in order to reach agreement. The Elysee, however,
would make available a meeting room so the two men could
transact any business between them as they wished.


4. (C) Although Boillon heaped scorn on the "Ayatollahs and
Mullahs" at the MFA, he independently made the same assertion
we had heard at the Quai d'Orsay: Asad's presence would be
more difficult to justify publicly than it already is without
the formation of a new Lebanese government beforehand. To
this end, the French are putting pressure on Lebanese actors
to reach agreement before July 13. They will do the same
with Syrian FM Mu'allim when he visits Paris July 4 to
advance President Asad's visit. Should there be no
announcement of a new Lebanese government, the GOF would
consider hosting a tripartite meeting between Sarkozy, Asad,
and Sleiman. As we explored this concept further, Boillon
allowed as how it could draw in other regional actors (NFI).
He also said that Sarkozy may try to get Sleiman and Asad
together even if a new government had been formed in order to
begin discussions of normalizing Syrian/Lebanese relations.
Boillon underscored that France's top two priorities
vis-a-vis Lebanon currently were formation of a new
government and normalization of Syrian/Lebanese relations.
On the latter, and further to meetings with visiting NEA A/S
Welch in mid-June, the French are drawing up a list of
benchmarks related to normalization that would include
opening embassies, exchanging ambassadors, and formally
demarcating international boundaries.


5. (C) With respect to the details of Mu'allim's July 4
visit, Boillon indicated he would have a working lunch with
FM Kouchner followed by meetings from 1600-1800 at the
Elysee. The latter meetings would be with French Presidency
SecGen Claude Gueant, Presidential diplomatic adviser Jean
David Levitte, and Boillon. Depending on how the meeting
went, Sarkozy might participate briefly. (Comment: The MFA
announced July 3 that Kouchner would not be able to meet with
Mu'allim because Kouchner had departed Paris for Bogota in
the wake of the release of Colombian/French national hostage
Ingrid Betancourt. In Kouchner's place, the MFA SecGen
Gerard Errera will receive Mu'allim. End comment)

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6. (C) Boillon also spoke a bit about what we have heard
was the furious Saudi reaction to Asad's invitation to Paris.
Boillon acknowledged that an emissary (who we subsequently
learned was Minister of Commerce and Industry Ali Reza)
visited Paris about two weeks ago to deliver a message from
King Abdallah. Boillon claimed the letter suggested Abdallah
had been misinformed as to the main reason Asad was coming to
Paris and had focused on his attendance at the July 14
military parade. Abdallah complained that it was wrong to
reward Asad, given Syria's responsibility for the situation
in Lebanon. We have heard separately that Sarkozy exploded
in anger upon receiving the letter, but Boillon did not
reveal Sarkozy's immediate reaction. He did, however,
dismiss much of what motivated Abdallah as an unacceptable
vision of the Muslim world divided between hostile Sunni and
Shi'a camps. Boillon also maintained that France had a hard
time accepting the Saudi view of the situation when it knows
the Saudis have been a primary sponsor of Salafist networks
for years. Sarkozy also took pains to remind Ali Reza that
he was not Chirac and refused to personalize issues related
to Lebanon as Chirac had and Abdallah still does. The Elysee
subsequently sent a response to Abdallah clarifying the
situation involving Asad (i.e., that he would attend the July
14 parade as a courtesy extended to other heads of state
attending the summit),and Boillon claimed that tensions had
since eased.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce

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