SURINAME: RESPONSE TO CARIBBEAN SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARAMARIBO 000249 SIPDIS WHA/CAR FOR JACKIE ROSHOLT AND MICHAEL FORTIN WHA FOR GIOVANNAI SNIDLE INL FOR KEVIN BROWN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MOPS SNAR XL NS SUBJECT: SURINAME: RESPONSE TO CARIBBEAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT REQUEST REF: SECSTATE 51747 Classified By: Political-Economic Section Chief Geneve Menscher for Rea sons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Post is pleased to respond to Reftel request for information. Answers are keyed to Reftel. ¶A. REFTEL QUERY: How could the United States help enhance Caribbean regional cooperation in addressing transnational crime and terrorism, including by providing additional resources? -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) POST RESPONSE: The United States should continue to bring Caribbean countries together in order to enhance their cooperation on transnational crime and terrorism. SOUTHCOM has made regional engagement the focal point of its strategy in the Caribbean. One of the primary mechanisms used by SOUTHCOM to achieve this strategy is joint training, which not only enhances the professionalism of the partner nation, but also provides benefits by bringing people together. The USG, as a whole, should continue to bring participants from around the Caribbean to train together and form working relationships with each other. Many USG agencies hold training sessions, conferences, and meetings on security-related issues of interest to Suriname. Post has noted there is, however, a lack of USG funding available for countries such as Suriname to send participants to already existing Caribbean-wide or South American-wide activities. For example, as a non-public diplomacy presence post, Post has the opportunity to send only two or three Surinamers a year as participants in the "International Visitor Program" to WHA Regional Projects or other programs. Increasing the budget of Post so that Surinamers could participate in already existing programs would be a cost-effective way of making sure that Suriname, already an "outsider" in the region in part due to its official language (Dutch),can become less isolated and more of a regional player. Increased support for the Suriname Armed Forces (SAF) and police (KPS) would support Embassy Mission Strategic goals of fostering strong democratic and judicial systems by effective law enforcement and improved professionalism of the SAF, with interoperability for joint enforcement, security, combat and humanitarian operations. Interoperability between the United States and its Caribbean partners is problematic. Increasing our aid in terms of training and equipment to all countries could set them on the path to considering interoperability with the United States during their acquisitions processes. ¶B. REFTEL QUERY: Describe the host government's current security activity, and how the host government would like to augment those efforts, and what additional U.S. assistance would be needed to get nations to address security concerns more effectively. -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) POST RESPONSE: The population density outside the coastal region of Suriname is low, which results in government inability to monitor its porous borders or vast interior. Suriname is at special risk for being, and in fact already is, a transit point for transnational crime. There is no Coast Guard (although the Government intends to establish one),and the Navy is unable to sufficiently patrol the country's coastal waters due to a lack of resources. There is no capability to intercept illegal fishers, let alone pirates or members of criminal organizations. In regards to airspace, Suriname has no radar coverage, including at the international airport. The government is incapable of monitoring air traffic without the cooperation of the aircraft itself -- a situation which is being exploited by international drug traffickers, and possibly others. ¶4. (C) The Government of Suriname does not have an adequate system in place to monitor the presence, either authorized or unauthorized, of aliens in Suriname. Visa issuances (and refusals) are executed in a seemingly ad hoc manner, with lack of linked computer systems, last minute airport requests, and political pressure all contributing to a system impossible to control and vulnerable to malfeasance. Suriname, in fact, does not have a consolidated watch-list, nor a reliable mechanism to determine whether the person entering/departing the country appears on any national or international watch-list. ¶5. (C) Suriname-Guyana cooperation on the western border of the country is nearly non-existent. Suriname maintains sovereignty over the entire water surface of the Corantijne River between the two countries. Although incapable of adequately monitoring the cross-border traffic, Suriname adamantly refuses to consider joint patrolling with the Guyanese. On May 19, 2008, the Government of Suriname and Government of Guyana did sign a security cooperation agreement, which reportedly covered the following points: criminality, drug violations, money laundering, human trafficking, smuggling, and piracy. The media reported the two governments also discussed drafting a legal aid treaty for information exchange between the two countries. Results of these agreements remain to be seen. ¶6. (C) Suriname-French Guiana (France) cooperation on the eastern border is more developed. The two countries signed an agreement in 2006 aimed at improving cross border controls and allowing for joint patrols along the Marowijne River and up to 2 km inside each others' territories. However, this agreement has not been ratified and is not in force. Regular information-sharing at the border occurs. Government officials have, however, expressed concern that differences in the laws of the two countries (such as the ease of buying a gun in French Guiana, or the ability of the French government to destroy the belongings of deported gold miners) creates new problems for Suriname. ¶7. (C) Suriname enjoys a good relationship with Brazil, its neighbor to the south. The Brazilian army is present along this southern border, but its presence does not appear to deter the thousands (estimated to be 20,000) of Brazilians illegally in Suriname and conducting gold mining activities in Suriname's interior. At times, the SAF conducts joint patrolling with the Brazilians. ¶8. (C) Suriname's interactions with the Caribbean community on security issues and transnational crime can be improved. Suriname is considering participation in, or already participates in, several regional security initiatives, including bilateral consultations and information sharing with Guyana and French Guiana, law enforcement cooperation agreements with both Aruba and Curacao, and proposals for enhanced information sharing and collaboration through CARICOM. In particular, the Ministry of Justice and Police has been especially active in seeking partnership and collaboration with other countries in the region. The government often tells us it would like to do more, but complains of a lack of resources. The lack of resources for the military is especially clear. ¶9. (C) The Ministry of Justice and Police recognizes that combating threats on national, regional and global security cannot be carried out in isolation due to their transnational nature, and provided the Embassy in June 2007 with an English version of its Security Policy Strategy. The Strategy addresses achievements to date, and then lists areas for improvement, including: the need for more bilateral and regional assistance in conducting criminal and financial investigations, the need for assistance in the bilateral and regional context for protecting Suriname's airspace and maritime zone, and a lack of sufficiently skilled staff. The Strategy goes on to list additional needs, such as: capacity building in the field of intelligence gathering and analysis, training for judges and prosecutors on money laundering and asset forfeiture, development of a mechanism for intelligence gathering analysis and sharing, development of mechanisms to manage assets seized and forfeited in drug trafficking cases, development of a common approach among countries in the region to deal with corruption, and development of regional teams of drug trafficking investigators to provide assistance to countries that are actively managing cases. ¶10. (C) The Suriname government functions slowly, and the government's ability to absorb funds provided to it by donors is low. Although the government does manage to hold seminars and issue findings, it does not fare well when it comes to developing or implementing projects using donor funds. There are pots of money that are still waiting to be used, including "treaty funds" promised by the Dutch upon Suriname's independence more than thirty years ago. Given this situation, cooperative projects with the United States tend to be initiated by the USG and require a great deal of follow-through and follow-up during the implementation phase. U.S. projects, such as assistance for the military, have focused mostly on training due to the high quality of U.S.-provided expertise. Additional training in a wide variety of areas would be an added benefit to these forces in their efforts to secure their borders and professionalize their military. Law enforcement assistance, on the other hand, provided items ranging from simple gear, to training, to computer databases and networks. Areas of focus for the central government do not always match up with U.S. estimates of what is needed in Suriname to fight transnational crime. U.S.-proposed projects and training as additions to, and in conjunction with, Surinamese government plans and projects make sure the Government of Suriname focuses on areas that match U.S. national interests. ¶C. REFTEL QUERY: Post should identify current funding levels for security/safety programs and organizations (including police, military/security forces and disaster preparation), comment on training effectiveness of police/military/security personnel, detail history and effectiveness of cooperation and coordination with regional neighbors and assess critical perceived weaknesses in host governments' capacities for external cooperation and information sharing. -------------- -------------- POST RESPONSE: Post channeled the following aid to Suriname in 2007: 50,000 USD International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) 80,000 USD Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 138,000 USD International Military Education and Training (IMET) ¶11. (C) The Government of Suriname (GOS) welcomes USG-sponsored training and equipment. For example, at the 2007 Caribbean Chiefs of Defense Conference, SAF Commander Ernst Mercuur stated that the United States was not just the preferred partner of the SAF, but the "only" viable partner. His view is based, in part, on our relationship built upon a shared vision, mutual interests, and a long view of military strategy interests. He has since noted that U.S. military training and equipment respond to SAF needs and request, while some other donors provide equipment and training of inferior quality and usefulness. The recent ordnance destruction project carried out by U.S. contractor RONCO and subsequent assessment of weapons and ammunitions stockpiles revealed inferior and unsafe Chinese grenades and ordnance. SAF officials have also complained of the inferiority of donated Chinese vehicles. Mercuur has expressed a desire to decommission and replace the Army's AK-47s because of their negative reputation as the "weapons of terrorists," and because the AK-47 is not compatible with NATO standard items necessary to become a more viable regional partner. ¶12. (C) Equipment and training is invaluable in meeting the host nation's strategic priorities (e.g., interdiction of transnational criminal threats, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance),and is essential to helping Suriname become a strong partner in achieving U.S. objectives in the execution of Operation Enduring Freedom/Caribbean Central America (OEF/CCA). The SAF's needs run from boots and uniforms to side-arms and rifles. IMET continues to be a critical tool for engaging military and instilling respect for democratic institutions, and should be expanded to further professionalize the SAF. Increasing FMF and providing Excess Defense Articles (EDA) would strengthen the SAF's capability to train alongside the U.S. and other regional partners in Joint Combined Exercises such as Tradewinds, exercises with the South Dakota National Guard (under the State Partnership Program),and other training opportunities. ¶13. (C) With respect to supporting cooperation and capabilities of the KPS, the ad hoc INL funding we generally receive as a "windfall" sometime during the calendar year -- which is much appreciated by Post and the GOS -- cannot begin to address the Ministry of Justice and Police's extensive needs and Post's priorities. Among the projects under consideration by the Embassy Interagency Law Enforcement Working Group are a digital fingerprint database system (based on the FBI's APHIS system),a computerized court case management network linking prosecutors and the courts, assistance in drafting more effective asset forfeiture legislation, an assets forfeiture "benchbook" for judges, drug crime scene and investigative techniques, surveillance training, and legislation authorizing undercover operations. The small, and seemingly shrinking, INL funds Post receives are grossly insufficient to meet the needs of the host nation and achieve Post's objectives. ¶14. (C) A lack of resources and equipment in both the SAF and KPS has kept both from realizing the full potential of USG training and equipment donations; however, these programs have effectively increased the knowledge, skills and capabilities of Surinamese law enforcement and security forces to carry out operations against criminals and terrorists. Furthermore, the level of cooperation and support in the GOS for U.S. training remains high. Participants in USG sponsored training are extremely professional and attentive. The SAF and KPS attempt to support training though the nomination of qualified participants, provision of training facilities, and logistical support. ¶15. (C) Suriname and France (French Guiana) have a high level of cooperation and coordination on Suriname's eastern border. There is a French law enforcement presence in the French Embassy that runs programs aimed at improving Suriname's capabilities on the Suriname side of their joint border. Suriname and Brazil appear to have a good relationship as evidenced by their occasional joint patrols. The Suriname-Guyana relationship on fighting transnational crime on Suriname's western border leaves much room for improvement. ¶16. (C) Suriname does not have one overarching government plan on security and law enforcement -- it has several. The Ministry of Justice and Police has a plan. The local intelligence service has a plan. The military has a plan. These plans are not coordinated. In addition, everything in Suriname moves slowly. The government is incapable of making a quick decision, and decisions often come at the last moment, or too late. Suriname may find it difficult to keep up with its regional neighbors when it comes to information sharing due to a lack of computerized link-ups within and between its own ministries, a lack of government cohesiveness or an "overall plan" on security initiatives, and all of the red tape inherent in its large bureaucracy. SCHREIBER HUGHES