(SBU) SCENESETTER AND READ-AHEAD FOR THE VISIT OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARAMARIBO 000101

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS A. SHANNON
DEPART FOR WHA/CAR VMDEPIRRO AND JROSHOLT
SOUTHCOM FOR COMMANDER ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL NS
SUBJECT: (SBU) SCENESETTER AND READ-AHEAD FOR THE VISIT OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS A. SHANNON AND ADMIRAL JAMES G.
STAVRIDIS TO PARAMARIBO, SURINAME FRIDAY, MARCH 28, 2008.

REF: 08 PARAMARIBO 95


1. (SBU) THE FOLLOWING SCENESETTER IS A
SENSITIVE-BUT-UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF REFTEL.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TRIP AGENDA: Everyone at
Embassy Paramaribo joins me in welcoming you to Suriname.
Although we cannot yet confirm your appointment with
President Venetiaan, who is out of the country, our tentative
plan for your three-hour visit would include a short
meet/greet with Embassy staff, a working lunch/Country Team
briefing at the Embassy, and the afore-mentioned meeting with
President Venetiaan (perhaps with other Cabinet Ministers
present; decision is pending with the President).
Time-permitting, we then propose two additional, separate
meetings for Assistant Secretary Shannon: (1) Foreign
Minister Kraag-Keteldijk and, (2) Religious Leaders of the
Inter-Faith Council (proposed venue: the Central Mosque).
For Admiral Stavridis, we propose meetings with (1) Defense
Minister Ivan Fernald and, (2) Commander of the Armed Forces
Col. Ernst Mercuur. If any of the previously-noted Ministers
is not available to meet, we would pursue meetings with other
Ministers of interest to both Assistant Secretary Shannon and
Admiral Stavridis, specifically, Health Minister Waterberg
(USNS Comfort, MEDRETES, Beyond the Horizon, medical
diplomacy) and Justice and Police Minister Santokhi (counter
narcotics, money laundering, terrorism, trafficking in
persons, regional security). We expect media to be present
for at least a portion of your visit, and will seek to invite
them for any mosque visit. Although we have discussed the
above proposed agenda with the Foreign Ministry, further
arrangements remain pending the President's decision. We
will provide briefing materials for all confirmed
appointments via septel. END SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TRIP
AGENDA; FOLLOWING TEXT PROVIDES SCENESETTER INFORMATION.

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Suriname Overview and International Relations
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3. (SBU) Suriname, formerly know as Dutch Guiana and
independent from the Netherlands since 1975, lies on the
northeastern coast of South America. It is approximately the
size of Georgia, has a population of less than half a
million, and has traditionally been the Dutch-speaking
"misfit" of the Western Hemisphere. A member of the UN, OAS,
CARICOM, NAM, and the Islamic Conference, Suriname's
political traditions, culture, history, and immigration tries
are neither Spanish/Portuguese (like most of South and
Central America),nor British/French (like most of the
Caribbean). Although migration trends, economic assistance,
and remittances still keep Surinamers looking to the
Netherlands (home to an estimated 300,000 Dutch/Surinamese),
historic resentments and ethnic and cultural differences also
mean that Suriname does not align easily with Europe.
Consequently, it seeks to expand its ties with China, India,
and Indonesia as part of a foreign policy initiative to
reduce dependency on the Dutch.


4. (SBU) In the region, Suriname has received sustained,
well-publicized medical assistance from Cuba, in part funded
by Venezuela. This very successful program seems to be
helping Cuba and Venezuela gain popular support among
ordinary Surinamers. Surinamers enjoy good relations with
Brazil and France (French Guiana),although a territorial
border dispute remains with French Guiana. More serious
border disputes complicate Suriname's relationship with
Guyana, and remain an emotional issue for many Surinamers.
Given the tensions surrounding the borders, in March 2007
Post worked with the State Department Office of the
Geographer to ensure that all official United States
Government (USG) maps of Suriname (which invariably depict
the borders to favor Guyana and French Guiana) include the
following standard policy disclaimer: "Boundary
representation is not necessarily authoritative." In part
due to the border dispute, an anti-Guyana bias permeates
Surinamese society.

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U.S. -Suriname Bilateral Relations
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5. (SBU) Except in the 1980's when then-military dictator
Desi Bouterse's friendly relationship with Daniel Ortega and
Fidel Castro kept Suriname on the map of U.S. foreign policy

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priorities, in recent years the country has received scant
attention from U.S. policy makers. Nor does Suriname receive
appreciable development assistance from the United States.


6. (SBU) For its part, the Government of Suriname (GOS)
often demonstrates a lack of affinity for USG foreign policy
priorities. For example, Suriname supports the one-China
policy. It refused to issue any form of pro-democracy
statement after Raul Castro assumed power in February,
instead sending a congratulatory note to the new leader. Nor
does the GOS support the USG position on Kosovo, despite the
Embassy's best efforts. Although the U.S. Embassy appears to
enjoy some level of popular support among the people of
Suriname, official USG-GOS relations are "cordial and
correct,' but they are not "warm." There are, however, two
exceptions to this generalization: our defense relationship
with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Suriname Defense
Forces (SDF),and with the law enforcement community of the
Ministry of Justice and Police. Not coincidentally, these
are the only two Ministries that in the past could regularly
count on USG development assistance (modest amounts of IMET,
FMF, and INCLE). The Embassy also has a strong relationship
with the cultural community and Suriname's lone University.


7. (SBU) Through our Embassy in Paramaribo, the USG's
short-term goals in Suriname remain four-fold: strengthening
the police and judiciary, helping professionalize journalists
and the military, investing in people (including the fight
against HIV/AIDS) and the environment, and encouraging
measures to facilitate economic growth investment. However,
our longer-term strategic goal is to transform our bilateral
relationship into an overall positive partnership whereby the
United States can count on Suriname as a friendly partner (on
a case-by-case basis) in international forums such as the UN
and OAS, and Suriname can count on the United States to
recognize that this tiny country can be relevant to U.S.
strategic interests in both the Caribbean region and the
South American continent.

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Military Coups, Desi Bouterse, and the
December Murders of 1982
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8. (SBU) Independent in 1975, Suriname suffered military
coups in 1980 and 1990; civilian rule was re-established in

1992. Under the control of Desi Bouterse, who led the first
military coup, the military government executed 15 prominent
citizens in 1982 for their opposition to the regime. In
early 2005 the Government of Suriname notified Bouterse, who
remains active in politics and is a sitting member of
Parliament, of its intent to prosecute him and 23 other
suspects for the murders. Begun amidst high societal tension
in November 2007, the slow, legalistic pace of the trial,
inter alia, has thus far diffused societal fears that the
trial would be disruptive. There have been four one-day
sessions in four months, all procedural. Bouterse stayed
away, and vows to continue to do so. If, however, a guilty
verdict appears possible (perhaps late in 2008 or in 2009),
tensions likely will rise.

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Civilian Military Relations
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9. (U) Since military rule ended in Suriname, there has been
a strained relationship between the civilian government and
the armed forces. In 1992, during President Venetiaan's
first of three terms, the civilian authority took bold steps
to strip the military of its overreaching constitutional
powers, despite strong protest from the military. Venetiaan
and several of his close associates had been detained by the
military during the military regime. During Venetiaan's last
term, his Minister of Defense was disliked by many in the
armed forces who perceived him as unresponsive to their
needs. Since being installed three years ago the current
Minister, Ivan Fernald, has been more engaged with members of
the armed forces. However, to date he has failed to bring
much-needed resources and training, nor any noticeable change
in civilian-military relations.

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Criminal Activity Pervasive, Just Below the Surface
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10. (SBU) Although Suriname is not an openly violent
society, the rule of law is nevertheless under threat.
Suriname is a major transshipment point for South American
cocaine en route to Europe and, to a lesser degree, to the
United States. The government's inability to control its
borders and the lack of law enforcement presence in the
largely unmonitored interior allow traffickers to move drug
shipments via sea, river, and air with little if any
resistance. Suriname lacks the resources to properly equip
the marine and air wings of its national military, which are
responsible for protecting its borders--a mission which may
be transferred to a yet-to-be established Coast Guard.

Note: There is some skepticism amongst USG experts of the
GOS's ability to stand up a Coast Guard. The Embassy
recently (March 2008) shared with the MOD the May 2006 US
Southern Command- prepared assessment of the feasibility of
establishing a Suriname Coast Guard. Delay in providing this
assessment to the GOS was due in part to uncertainty whether
there was authorization to share such a frank assessment with
the host government. The report identified a series of
problems in standing up a Surinamese Coast Guard, including:
inadequate resources and legislation, complicated
bureaucratic requirements, drug-related corruption, relative
geographic isolation, and weak judicial institutions. End
note.

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Economy Stable, but not Sustainable
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11. (SBU) The United States remains Suriname's largest
trading partner. Largely thanks to high commodity prices,
the Surinamese economy has stabilized over the last six years
after the deep economic decline and high inflation of the
late 1990's. However, the GOS has not implemented the reforms
necessary to liberalize its economy and realize its full
economic potential, particularly should commodity prices
fall. Income from the bauxite sector, dominated by SURALCO,
a subsidiary of U.S. based ALCOA, accounts for more than 30%
of GDP and about 60-70% of export earnings. Higher world
prices for gold have led to the increased value of Suriname's
second-most mined mineral. Lumber, fishing, and agriculture
are other major industries. Three international oil
companies, Occidental, Repsol YPF, and Noble Energy, have
formed a joint venture with the state oil company,
Staatsolie, to prospect offshore.

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Internal Politics
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12. (U) With an area previously noted as roughly equal to
the state of Georgia and a population of only 492,000,
Suriname is one of the least densely populated countries in
the world. It is an ethnically diverse land with people of
East Indian, African, Indonesian, Chinese, and European
descent whose constant wrangling for pieces of the pie color
Suriname's economic and political atmosphere. On May 25,
2005, Suriname held its fourth successive free and fair
election since the restoration of democracy. President
Ronald Venetiaan's ruling New Front coalition, which
consisted of three ethnically-based parties and one labor
union party, lost its simple majority in the National
Assembly but still fell short of an effective governing
majority. To form a working majority, the New Front joined
with a Maroon-based coalition (Maroon is the term to describe
the descendants of escaped slaves) which had parliamentary
seats for the first time, and with a one-seat progressive
party. Slowed by a bias for strong consensus and typified by
a spoils-system favored by the entrenched ethnic parties, the
government's "don't upset the apple cart" politics have not
been a public relations success. The often cynical
Surinamese public gives the government extraordinarily low
marks (one March poll indicated 90% of Surinamers don't want
President Venetiaan back in 2010). However, the government
seems to have convinced the public that the turmoil an early
transition of power to the opposition might cause would be
worse than the current perceived stagnation. Rare street
actions attract few participants. Presidential elections are
next scheduled for 2010.

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Visit of Assistant Secretary Shannon and Admiral Stavridis
will demonstrate USG commitment to Suriname, and to the region

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13. (SBU) We expect that your visit, albeit only
hours-long, will demonstrate to President Venetiaan and to
his Cabinet, the National Assembly, the Surinamese Military,
and civil society that the United States has a strong
commitment to this country, and to the region. Your presence
will provide an effective counterpoint to the high-level
attention that Suriname already receives from China,
Venezuela (President Chavez visited in 2000),and the ongoing
success of Cuba's "health diplomacy" initiatives in Suriname.
We welcome your visit.
SCHREIBER HUGHES