PANAMA: KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE DEMARCHE DELIVERED

O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000126 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE (SSHIRATORI),WHA/PPC, WHA/CEN (ETELLO) AND IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK UN UNSC YI EU PM SUBJECT: PANAMA: KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE DEMARCHE DELIVERED REF: STATE 13716 Classified By: Ambassador William A. Eaton. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) "I will consult immediately with the Foreign Minister," Acting FM Ricardo "Dicky" Duran told POLCOUNS on February 11 in response to delivery of reftel demarche. Initially viewing the demarche through actions that the might be taken on the UNSC, Duran noted that Panama's Ambassador to the UN was following this matter closely and that Panama was "worried" that Kosovo might declare independence soon. Duran said that he believed that Russia would veto any UNSCR on Kosovo. Steering Duran to the matter at hand -- Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence -- POLCOUNS urged Panama to recognize Kosovo quickly and publicly. First VP and FM Lewis is presently in New York City where Panama currently holds the presidency of the UNSC; he is expected to return to Panama on February 12. Ambassador will attempt to reach Lewis by phone, and post recommends that USUN also seek to engage Lewis on this matter. End summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (C) Noting that the Russian Ambassador had visited him last week, Acting FM Ricardo "Dicky" Duran said that Panama had been following the situation in Kosovo very closely and was "worried" that Kosovo might declare independence soon, in response to POLCOUNS's presentation of reftel demarche on February 11. Resigned to accepting the difficult political realities in the region, Duran accepted that a negotiated agreement concerning Kosovo's final status was not achievable, that the events of the 1990s had created a situation in which Serbia could never once again govern Kosovo, and that after nine years of institutional separation it would be impossible to reintegrate Serbia and Kosovo. ¶3. (C) "Russia will veto," Duran said. "At least that was the strong impression that the Russian Ambassador gave me." Acknowledging that Russia had other views on this matter, POLCOUNS noted that, while it sought negotiated agreement, UNSCR 1244 did not require such agreement. Trying to steer Duran away from approaching Kosovo's independence in terms of what action might take place in the UNSC, POLCOUNS explained, that the matter at hand was the imminent declaration of independence by Kosovo, that would be recognized hours afterwards by the U.S. and European states. Urging Panama not to adopt a "wait and see attitude," POLCOUNS asked that Panama recognize Kosovo as soon as possible, ideally within the first day after Kosovo declared independence. Duran welcomed particularly the point made by POLCOUNS that Kosovo was a special case that should not be seen as a precedent. Duran undertook to consult with First VP and FM Samuel Lewis who was in New York City. Duran expected Lewis to return to Panama on February 12. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador will attempt to reach Lewis by phone to convey reftel points as well. Additionally, post recommends that USUN reach out to Lewis who is in New York for the first half of Panama's UNSC Presidency. Generally, Panama prefers to run always to the center of consensus and does not like to be either the odd man out or to be forced to chose sides on tough issues. Conflict averse, Panama may be relieved if Kosovo does not return to the UNSC -- particularly during its presidency -- as it will not want to take sides in a dispute that divides the U.S., UK and France on one side and Russia and China on the other side. At the same time, however, post expects that at a minimum Panama will lag in its eventual recognition of Kosovo waiting until a sufficient critical mass of recognitions by other countries have been made before taking its own position on the issue. EATON