COUNSELOR, CANADIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS PAKISTAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000951

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR NATO PK AF IR CA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CANADIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS PAKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. OTTAWA 918

B. 07 OTTAWA 2133

C. OTTAWA 310

Classified By: Pol-Mil Officer Brett Mattei, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Canadian officials discussed
challenges confronting Canada and the United States in
Pakistan and Afghanistan with Counselor of the State
Department Eliot Cohen in Ottawa July 2 and 3. The Canadians
shared Dr. Cohen's bleak assessment of developments in
Pakistan and raised concerns about their effect on regional
stability. Ottawa's forthcoming policy to engage Pakistan
probably will feature close cooperation with the U.S. and the
U.K, and with NATO, on re-engaging the Pakistani military and
security establishments. Canada is "concerned but not
discouraged" by the intensity of the current fighting season
in Afghanistan, is open to -- but has not yet decided whether
to support -- double hatting one ISAF/OEF commander, and is
keen to coordinate the arrival of 1,000 U.S. troops in
Kandahar. Canadian forces (CF) are operating under the
assumption that they will withdraw from Kandahar in 2011, but
it is too early to tell whether elected officials will extend
the CF deployment. End summary.


2. (C) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen met
senior Canadian foreign affairs, security and defense
officials in Ottawa on July 2 and 3 to discuss Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and the region. The Canadians shared Dr.
Cohen's negative assessment of recent developments in
Pakistan which, they said, were destabilizing the region and
undermining progress in Afghanistan. In light of their
limited resources and influence in Islamabad, the Canadians
said they were looking to the U.S. to lead the development,
coordination, and execution of an allied plan to help
Pakistan's brittle government improve national and regional
stability.

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Pakistan:
--------------

-- Dismal Assessment --


3. (C) The Canadians asked Dr. Cohen to brief them on his
recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar. The Counselor painted
a bleak picture of Pakistan, noting that oil and food prices
were skyrocketing nationwide, blackouts had become regular
occurrences in Islamabad, capital flight was on the rise, and
elected officials seemed unwilling or incapable of resolving
the country's core political problems. In Peshawar things
were bleaker still, he said. Security had declined
dramatically in the regional capital, where armed Taliban
fighters moved about, and throughout the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The formerly capable
system of Political Agents and Maliks had broken down,
perhaps irretrievably, due to the intimidation and murder of
those officials and community leaders. The out-gunned
Frontier Corps is in need of help and often reluctant to
accept it.


4. (C) National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister
Margaret Bloodworth responded that Dr. Cohen's report, and
the challenges it presented, confirmed what Canadian analysts
had been telling her in recent weeks. Based on this, the
Canadian interagency had been "taking stock of what (Canada)
could possibly do," preferably in concert with the U.S. and
the British who have "far more influence" in Pakistan, she
said. Bloodworth noted that the Canadians had been thinking
about ways to help reconstitute the FATA's social structures,
Qto include the Maliks. But if they are no longer viable, she
asked, "then where do we go from here?" Bloodworth responded
favorably to Dr. Cohen's suggestion that Canada deepen its
engagement with the Pakistani armed forces, and noted that
the Canadian military had argued that Canada's decision in
1998 to cut military ties and sales had been "short-sighted."


-- Re-Engage the Military --


5. (C) Acting Deputy Minister of Defence Vincent Rigby
argued that it had been a mistake "after 9/11 to continue to
block relations with Pakistan while asking them to do so
much." Rigby said that he and his counterparts at the Privy
Council Office (PCO) and the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade (DFAIT) would soon complete

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interagency discussions on how to expand engagement with
Pakistan and its military. The discussions so far had
focused on bolstering governance and development in the FATA,
enhancing security, immigration and customs controls along
the border with Afghanistan, identifying ways to re-engage
the military, and seeking support for these endeavors from
allies and Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. (Note:
Pakistan ISI Director General for Counterterrorism Major
General Mahmood Rashad will meet senior Canadian officials in
Ottawa on July 17. End note.)


6. (C) Rigby asked if, despite our "enormous frustration"
with the Atlantic Alliance, Canada and the U.S. should press
for greater NATO outreach to Pakistan. NATO political cover
would be useful for the Canadian government, he said, before
suggesting that, in order to move swiftly, Canada would be
willing to coordinate and execute its Pakistan engagement
with only the U.S. and the UK. Whatever we do, he added, we
have to find a way to assure the Pakistanis that we will
deliver on our promises, we are in for the long haul, and we
are willing to take into account their regional security
interests. PCO Deputy Minister for Afghanistan David
Mulroney picked up Rigby's last point, and characterized
Pakistan's suspicions of Afghan and Indian mischief-making as
"not entirely unreasonable." Mulroney added, however, that
"we must make it clear to the government that we cannot abide
Pakistanis contributing to the deaths of U.S. and Canadian
troops in Afghanistan."


7. (C) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT) Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Afghanistan Yves
Brodeur told the Counselor that Canadian officials were
struggling to develop a strategy to overcome the "total lack
of cohesion" among Pakistani political, military, and
intelligence officials. Even if we did get the right
officials to agree to something, it's unlikely that they
would be able to deliver on their promise, Brodeur said.

--------------
Afghanistan:
--------------


8. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, PCO Deputy Minister Mulroney
described the security environment there as "worse" this year
due to an intense fighting season. He noted that Taliban
fighters had won a propaganda victory via the "impressive and
complex" Sarpoza prison break and rumors that they had taken
control of Arghandab and other neighborhoods around Kandahar
City. We need to acknowledge all of this and "get back on
our game," he said. Bloodworth echoed Mulroney's remarks,
emphasizing that she was "concerned but not discouraged" by
how the fight had unfolded so far this summer, and stressing
that Canada was looking forward to the deployment of U.S.
troops to Kandahar.

-- U.S. Deployment --


9. (C) Rigby at DND posited that the arrival of 1,000 U.S.
troops would make a substantial difference in Kandahar, and
that the 2,500 Canadian soldiers there were eager to know the
specific capabilities of the incoming U.S. battle group, and
how it intends to deploy. The Canadian and U.S. militaries
have started to engage on how to flow U.S. troops to the
south, Rigby added, but we do not yet have a clear grasp of
how the military commands and the civilian elements will
interact.


10. (C) Brodeur remarked that Canada was keen to learn the
Q10. (C) Brodeur remarked that Canada was keen to learn the
lessons of Regional Command - East (RC-E) and, hopefully, to
see U.S. troops deploy to the RC-South (RC-S) border with
Pakistan. Brodeur worried, however, that transplanting the
entire RC-E model into RC-S without taking regional
differences into account could provoke friction. Detainee
handling could also become a political "hot button" issue for
Canada, he added (ref C). Canadian and U.S. military and
civilian officials need to talk through potential issues, and
resolve differences, in advance of the U.S. deployment, he
said. According to Brodeur, getting these relationships
right would be a greater challenge than before because Canada
had effectively "civilianized" the leadership of its PRT in
Kandahar.


11. (C) On this point Rigby clarified that the government
had been compelled to follow the Manley Panel recommendation
that it increase the profile of its civilian operations (ref
B) in Afghanistan in order to maintain domestic support for

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the broad range of Canadian engagement there, such as combat
operations. Despite the change in emphasis, he said, the
Canadian Forces (CF) presence in Kandahar would grow in the
year ahead to accommodate the deployment of helicopters and
unmanned aerial vehicles also called for by the Panel.

-- Two Hats? --


12. (C) Dr. Cohen asked Rigby if Canada would support
"double-hatting" a single ISAF/OEF commander. Rigby
responded that it "feels right" to Defence Minister Peter
MacKay. The minister understands the benefit to operational
efficiency and unity of command, he added, but Mackay will
need to get interagency approval, and then think through a
strategy to win European support, before he discusses the
issue again with Secretary Gates this summer.

-- Stay Power --


13. (C) Counselor Cohen asked Brodeur what government
ministers meant when they said that the Canadian Forces would
complete their mission to Kandahar at the end of 2011. It
means that the CF must pull out of Kandahar at that time, but
the PRT could remain in place if another ISAF battle group
was willing to take over the provision of security there,
Brodeur said. When Dr. Cohen asked if the decision was
written in stone, Brodeur responded that the question was a
political one that would have to be decided by elected
officials in Parliament. Three years is an eternity in
politics, he added, so anything could happen. Rigby
meanwhile observed that the ISAF and OEF missions had
helpfully undercut Canada's "great peacekeeper myth" and the
notion that Canada could be a "moral superpower" while other
countries did the hard jobs. Significant, observable
progress in Kandahar over the next two years should help to
cement this change in attitude, he said.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) In follow up conversations with embassy officers,
interlocutors at DND and DFAIT suggested that Canadian
support for dual-hatting was not yet assured. Post
recommends proactive senior-level engagement on this matter.
Brodeur, Rigby and Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) Vice President for Afghanistan Steven Wallace have
asked to meet officials from State, DOD, NSC, and USAID on
July 17 to discuss the "integration" of U.S. and Canadian
civilian PRT activities in Kandahar. The Canadian officials
will ask for detailed explanations of U.S. plans for
coordinating with Canadian forces in Kandahar, and will want
to discuss border issues related to the growing instability
in Pakistan.

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