COUNSELOR, CANADIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS PAKISTAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000951 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR NATO PK AF IR CA SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CANADIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN REF: A. OTTAWA 918 ¶B. 07 OTTAWA 2133 ¶C. OTTAWA 310 Classified By: Pol-Mil Officer Brett Mattei, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Canadian officials discussed challenges confronting Canada and the United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan with Counselor of the State Department Eliot Cohen in Ottawa July 2 and 3. The Canadians shared Dr. Cohen's bleak assessment of developments in Pakistan and raised concerns about their effect on regional stability. Ottawa's forthcoming policy to engage Pakistan probably will feature close cooperation with the U.S. and the U.K, and with NATO, on re-engaging the Pakistani military and security establishments. Canada is "concerned but not discouraged" by the intensity of the current fighting season in Afghanistan, is open to -- but has not yet decided whether to support -- double hatting one ISAF/OEF commander, and is keen to coordinate the arrival of 1,000 U.S. troops in Kandahar. Canadian forces (CF) are operating under the assumption that they will withdraw from Kandahar in 2011, but it is too early to tell whether elected officials will extend the CF deployment. End summary. ¶2. (C) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen met senior Canadian foreign affairs, security and defense officials in Ottawa on July 2 and 3 to discuss Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the region. The Canadians shared Dr. Cohen's negative assessment of recent developments in Pakistan which, they said, were destabilizing the region and undermining progress in Afghanistan. In light of their limited resources and influence in Islamabad, the Canadians said they were looking to the U.S. to lead the development, coordination, and execution of an allied plan to help Pakistan's brittle government improve national and regional stability. -------------- Pakistan: -------------- -- Dismal Assessment -- ¶3. (C) The Canadians asked Dr. Cohen to brief them on his recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar. The Counselor painted a bleak picture of Pakistan, noting that oil and food prices were skyrocketing nationwide, blackouts had become regular occurrences in Islamabad, capital flight was on the rise, and elected officials seemed unwilling or incapable of resolving the country's core political problems. In Peshawar things were bleaker still, he said. Security had declined dramatically in the regional capital, where armed Taliban fighters moved about, and throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The formerly capable system of Political Agents and Maliks had broken down, perhaps irretrievably, due to the intimidation and murder of those officials and community leaders. The out-gunned Frontier Corps is in need of help and often reluctant to accept it. ¶4. (C) National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister Margaret Bloodworth responded that Dr. Cohen's report, and the challenges it presented, confirmed what Canadian analysts had been telling her in recent weeks. Based on this, the Canadian interagency had been "taking stock of what (Canada) could possibly do," preferably in concert with the U.S. and the British who have "far more influence" in Pakistan, she said. Bloodworth noted that the Canadians had been thinking about ways to help reconstitute the FATA's social structures, Qto include the Maliks. But if they are no longer viable, she asked, "then where do we go from here?" Bloodworth responded favorably to Dr. Cohen's suggestion that Canada deepen its engagement with the Pakistani armed forces, and noted that the Canadian military had argued that Canada's decision in 1998 to cut military ties and sales had been "short-sighted." -- Re-Engage the Military -- ¶5. (C) Acting Deputy Minister of Defence Vincent Rigby argued that it had been a mistake "after 9/11 to continue to block relations with Pakistan while asking them to do so much." Rigby said that he and his counterparts at the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) would soon complete OTTAWA 00000951 002 OF 003 interagency discussions on how to expand engagement with Pakistan and its military. The discussions so far had focused on bolstering governance and development in the FATA, enhancing security, immigration and customs controls along the border with Afghanistan, identifying ways to re-engage the military, and seeking support for these endeavors from allies and Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. (Note: Pakistan ISI Director General for Counterterrorism Major General Mahmood Rashad will meet senior Canadian officials in Ottawa on July 17. End note.) ¶6. (C) Rigby asked if, despite our "enormous frustration" with the Atlantic Alliance, Canada and the U.S. should press for greater NATO outreach to Pakistan. NATO political cover would be useful for the Canadian government, he said, before suggesting that, in order to move swiftly, Canada would be willing to coordinate and execute its Pakistan engagement with only the U.S. and the UK. Whatever we do, he added, we have to find a way to assure the Pakistanis that we will deliver on our promises, we are in for the long haul, and we are willing to take into account their regional security interests. PCO Deputy Minister for Afghanistan David Mulroney picked up Rigby's last point, and characterized Pakistan's suspicions of Afghan and Indian mischief-making as "not entirely unreasonable." Mulroney added, however, that "we must make it clear to the government that we cannot abide Pakistanis contributing to the deaths of U.S. and Canadian troops in Afghanistan." ¶7. (C) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Afghanistan Yves Brodeur told the Counselor that Canadian officials were struggling to develop a strategy to overcome the "total lack of cohesion" among Pakistani political, military, and intelligence officials. Even if we did get the right officials to agree to something, it's unlikely that they would be able to deliver on their promise, Brodeur said. -------------- Afghanistan: -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, PCO Deputy Minister Mulroney described the security environment there as "worse" this year due to an intense fighting season. He noted that Taliban fighters had won a propaganda victory via the "impressive and complex" Sarpoza prison break and rumors that they had taken control of Arghandab and other neighborhoods around Kandahar City. We need to acknowledge all of this and "get back on our game," he said. Bloodworth echoed Mulroney's remarks, emphasizing that she was "concerned but not discouraged" by how the fight had unfolded so far this summer, and stressing that Canada was looking forward to the deployment of U.S. troops to Kandahar. -- U.S. Deployment -- ¶9. (C) Rigby at DND posited that the arrival of 1,000 U.S. troops would make a substantial difference in Kandahar, and that the 2,500 Canadian soldiers there were eager to know the specific capabilities of the incoming U.S. battle group, and how it intends to deploy. The Canadian and U.S. militaries have started to engage on how to flow U.S. troops to the south, Rigby added, but we do not yet have a clear grasp of how the military commands and the civilian elements will interact. ¶10. (C) Brodeur remarked that Canada was keen to learn the Q10. (C) Brodeur remarked that Canada was keen to learn the lessons of Regional Command - East (RC-E) and, hopefully, to see U.S. troops deploy to the RC-South (RC-S) border with Pakistan. Brodeur worried, however, that transplanting the entire RC-E model into RC-S without taking regional differences into account could provoke friction. Detainee handling could also become a political "hot button" issue for Canada, he added (ref C). Canadian and U.S. military and civilian officials need to talk through potential issues, and resolve differences, in advance of the U.S. deployment, he said. According to Brodeur, getting these relationships right would be a greater challenge than before because Canada had effectively "civilianized" the leadership of its PRT in Kandahar. ¶11. (C) On this point Rigby clarified that the government had been compelled to follow the Manley Panel recommendation that it increase the profile of its civilian operations (ref B) in Afghanistan in order to maintain domestic support for OTTAWA 00000951 003 OF 003 the broad range of Canadian engagement there, such as combat operations. Despite the change in emphasis, he said, the Canadian Forces (CF) presence in Kandahar would grow in the year ahead to accommodate the deployment of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles also called for by the Panel. -- Two Hats? -- ¶12. (C) Dr. Cohen asked Rigby if Canada would support "double-hatting" a single ISAF/OEF commander. Rigby responded that it "feels right" to Defence Minister Peter MacKay. The minister understands the benefit to operational efficiency and unity of command, he added, but Mackay will need to get interagency approval, and then think through a strategy to win European support, before he discusses the issue again with Secretary Gates this summer. -- Stay Power -- ¶13. (C) Counselor Cohen asked Brodeur what government ministers meant when they said that the Canadian Forces would complete their mission to Kandahar at the end of 2011. It means that the CF must pull out of Kandahar at that time, but the PRT could remain in place if another ISAF battle group was willing to take over the provision of security there, Brodeur said. When Dr. Cohen asked if the decision was written in stone, Brodeur responded that the question was a political one that would have to be decided by elected officials in Parliament. Three years is an eternity in politics, he added, so anything could happen. Rigby meanwhile observed that the ISAF and OEF missions had helpfully undercut Canada's "great peacekeeper myth" and the notion that Canada could be a "moral superpower" while other countries did the hard jobs. Significant, observable progress in Kandahar over the next two years should help to cement this change in attitude, he said. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) In follow up conversations with embassy officers, interlocutors at DND and DFAIT suggested that Canadian support for dual-hatting was not yet assured. Post recommends proactive senior-level engagement on this matter. Brodeur, Rigby and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Vice President for Afghanistan Steven Wallace have asked to meet officials from State, DOD, NSC, and USAID on July 17 to discuss the "integration" of U.S. and Canadian civilian PRT activities in Kandahar. The Canadian officials will ask for detailed explanations of U.S. plans for coordinating with Canadian forces in Kandahar, and will want to discuss border issues related to the growing instability in Pakistan. Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada WILKINS