Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OTTAWA790
2008-06-11 21:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

CANADA FURTHER INCREASES AFGHANISTAN AID, WITH NEW

Tags:  PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF CA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7027
OO RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHPW RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0790/01 1632153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 112153Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8013
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1002
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0191
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0911
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000790 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA FURTHER INCREASES AFGHANISTAN AID, WITH NEW
DIRECTIONS

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000790 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF CA SUBJECT: CANADA FURTHER INCREASES AFGHANISTAN AID, WITH NEW DIRECTIONS Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Canadian government on June 10 announced an increase of C$600 million in its assistance package to Afghanistan, taking the total from C$1.3 billion to C$1.9 billion through 2011. Also marking a shift favoring some "signature projects" and increasing its diplomatic presence in both Kandahar and Kabul, Canada's reconstruction and development programs will focus even more on Kandahar province, which will over the next three years receive over 50 percent of total Canadian aid to Afghanistan, up from the current 17 percent. The move should bring civilian and military elements of Canada's engagement into better alignment. Canadian officials have expressed a desire to intensify and broaden U.S.-Canada military working level coordination, to include both countries' foreign affairs and aid agencies, in advance of the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Kandahar in 2009. Despite the success in forging bipartisan political support for the expansion of the Canadian Forces' mission in Kandahar until 2011, Afghanistan remains a tough sell to the public and the government will quickly need to demonstrate clear progress on the benchmarks that should appear in its next quarterly report to Parliament. End summary. Canada Ups Afghanistan Pledge to 1.9 Billion -------------- ¶2. (U) New (interim) Foreign Minister -- and Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan -- David Emerson on June 10 announced major revisions to Canada's reconstruction and development priorities for Afghanistan, along with a C$600 million (Canadian and U.S. dollars are currently at about par) increase to its 10-year (2001-11) $1.3 billion commitment, bringing it to $1.9 billion. Joined by Defence Minister Peter MacKay and International Development Minister Bev Oda, Emerson stressed continuity of purpose and noted that Canada's ultimate goal remained the same as it has been since assuming responsibility for ISAF RC-S -- "to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country that is better governed, more peaceful, and more secure." He promised that Canada would work to secure and reconstruct key infrastructure in Kandahar and to bolster Afghan national institutions that reach into the province. ¶3. (U) Summarizing the first of new quarterly reports to &#x
000A;Parliament on "Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan -- Setting a Course to 2011" (available on DFAIT's website http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca),Emerson described how four of Canada's six top priorities for Afghanistan are in Kandahar Province: -- create a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP),and supporting complementary efforts in the areas of justice and corrections; -- strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services by providing jobs, education, and essential services like water; -- provide humanitarian assistance to people in need; and, -- enhance the management of security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, including bilateral dialogue. QAfghanistan-Pakistan border, including bilateral dialogue. ¶4. (U) Emerson emphasized the central role of Canada in Kandahar, noting that the province would soon get over 50 percent of Canadian foreign assistance in Afghanistan, up drastically from 17 percent. Three projects would be among the most prominent in this effort and would mark the kind of Canadian "signature projects" that the "Manley Panel" had advocated : -- rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system; -- building, expansion, and/or repair of 50 schools along with training of 3,000 teachers; and, -- polio immunization (7 million vaccinations) with a goal of eradicating the disease in Afghanistan by the end of 2009. ¶5. (U) On a national level, Canada would continue to: -- build Afghan national institutions that are also central to the priorities in Kandahar: -- support democratic processes such as elections; and, -- contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts OTTAWA 00000790 002 OF 003 aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace. ¶6. (U) The government also indicated that Canada will significantly increase its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, going from 27 to 71 officials in Kandahar and from 24 to 32 officials in Kabul. Aligning Engagement -------------- ¶7. (C) On June 2, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Afghanistan Yves Brodeur previewed the June 10 announcement to U.S. officials. (Deputy Minister of the Afghanistan Task Force in the Privy Council Office David Mulroney separately on June 10 briefed Ambassador and on June 11 briefed the Department's Counselor Eliot Cohen.) He characterized the revised policy as part of the response to the "Manley Panel" recommendations -- which the March 13 House of Commons motion largely incorporated as part of the bipartisan consensus to extend the mandate of the Canadian Forces to 2011 -- that the government do a better job of aligning Canada's C$1 billion annual military engagement with its diplomatic and foreign assistance objectives in Afghanistan. As part of the same motion and recommendations, the government is bound also to improve its effort to communicate what it does in Afghanistan to the Canadian people, which the new quarterly reports to Parliament will help to do. ¶8. (C/NF) Separately on June 2, DM Mulroney reiterated to visiting U.S. Ambassador-designate to NATO Kurt Volker the need for all Canadian players better to align priorities and resources. He said that from his new position in the PCO (having moved from DFAIT in March),he had the power to "be more persuasive" in forging interagency agreement on Afghanistan. The government had made great progress in aligning military and diplomatic priorities, he commented, so one of his highest priorities was to press Canada's aid agency -- the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) -- to get more into step with the military and the diplomats in Kandahar. ¶9. (C) According to Mulroney, the revised plan would entail the deployment of many more, and more senior, diplomatic and aid officers to Kandahar. The new civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) was now a co-equal to the Canadian military commander in theater, he noted, and would raise the profile of Canada's non-kinetic activities there. Mulroney added that many of the new diplomatic and aid personnel would be deployed "outside the wire" and given authority to allocate resources and commit funds in a timely fashion, making them much more effective. Despite the rising profile of the civil side, Brodeur pointed out separately, the government's revised plan did not call for a reduction in Canada's military presence in Kandahar. ¶10. (C) On communications, Mulroney observed that one of the reasons the government faced criticism for focusing on military operations at the expense of diplomatic and foreign assistance activities was that the military had assigned 10 public affairs personnel to Kandahar to tell its story to the Canadian media, parliamentarians, and others, while CIDA had QCanadian media, parliamentarians, and others, while CIDA had only one media officer. He predicted that this should be an "easy fix," admitting that Canadians need to know what CIDA is doing. ¶11. (C) Separately, members of the House of Commons' Standing Committee on National Defence just returned from a committee visit to Afghanistan described to PolMinCouns demonstrable progress on the ground from their last visit about sixteen months ago, while expressing some frustration over the incremental nature of change. They voiced frustration that more information about progress on the ground was not yet appearing in the Canadian media, along with a hope that the new quarterly reports -- as well as the proceedings of the new Commons' Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan -- would more effectively bring these messages to the Canadian public and sustain public and political support for Canada's involvement in OTTAWA 00000790 003 OF 003 Afghanistan. U.S.- Canada Coordination in Kandahar -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) On June 6, DFAIT Afghanistan Task Force (FTAG) Provincial Reconstruction Team Operations Officer David Fairchild queried about the likely date in 2009 when U.S. forces would deploy new combat troops to bolster the Canadian presence in Kandahar, following the expected December departure of the more than 2,000 "surge" troops now in RC-S. Fairchild said Canadian planners and operators were thinking about these and other important questions, and were keen to know U.S. military and civilian preferences on many issues: whether they favored combined or separate command; whether they preferred sharing or splitting Kandahar Province's geography; whether the U.S. would deploy civilian leadership akin to Canada's RoCK; whether under combined command U.S. CERP funds would be available to the Canadian-led PRT; and how State and DFAIT officials would interact with each other, as well as with their counterparts at USAID and CIDA. (The Members of Parliament on the Defence Committee separately raised similar questions about command responsibilities after February 2009.) ¶13. (C/NF) Fairchild commented that, the more Canadian officials thought about it, the more they were coming to the conclusion that a "common operational framework" would be needed to ensure that two sides partnered well in Kandahar on a broad range of issues. Given their concern, and the fact that 2009 is just seven months away, Fairchild said that the Canadian interagency was talking internally about organizing a "whole of government" trip to Washington in late June to engage U.S. military and civilian working level officials on these and other issues. (The Commons' new Special Committee also plans a trip to Washington in early August to meet with Congress and the Executive Branch, as well as a trip to NATO over the summer and to Afghanistan in September.) Comment -------------- ¶14. (C/NF) Already an active and effective partner in Afghanistan, Canada is additionally stepping up to the plate with greater assistance and a sharper developmental focus, as Minister Emerson will describe at the June 12 Paris Donors' Conference. Despite the success in forging bipartisan political support for the expansion of the Canadian Forces' mission in Kandahar, Afghanistan remains a tough sell to the public, and the government will need quickly to demonstrate clear progress on the benchmarks that should appear in its next quarterly report to Parliament. Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada WILKINS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -