Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OTTAWA773
2008-06-09 16:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:
P/DAS VOLKER CONSULTS WITH CANADIANS ON NATO
VZCZCXRO4804 OO RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHPW RUEHQU RUEHVC DE RUEHOT #0773/01 1611630 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 091630Z JUN 08 ZDS ///// ADDED NOFORN CAPTION ///// FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7990 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0188 RUEKJCS/DIA DAH WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000773
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ///// ADDED NOFORN CAPTION /////
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS AF CA
SUBJECT: P/DAS VOLKER CONSULTS WITH CANADIANS ON NATO
OTTAWA 00000773 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000773
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ///// ADDED NOFORN CAPTION /////
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS AF CA
SUBJECT: P/DAS VOLKER CONSULTS WITH CANADIANS ON NATO
OTTAWA 00000773 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Senior Canadian officials emphasized to
visiting EUR P/DAS Volker the similarity of views held by
Washington and Ottawa on NATO issues. On ISAF, the Canadians
were pleased by the Bucharest Summit outcomes, but they are
worried about the weak commitment and focus of some key
European partners, the lack of power and support assigned to
UN SRSG Kai Eide, and the challenges emanating from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Ottawa wants to
collaborate with the U.S. in an effort to face the range of
Russian challenges, to make MAP available to Ukraine and
Georgia, and to counter German efforts to steer NATO policy
in unhelpful directions. The Canadians are pleased by
France's likely change from spoiler to productive member of
NATO, and see it as an opportunity to improve NATO-EU
relations. Canada supports a "European focused" Ballistic
Missile Defense system. End Summary.
2. (C) Senior Canadian officials, in a series of meetings
with EUR P/DAS and Ambassador-designate to NATO Kurt Volker
in Ottawa on June 2, stressed the similarity of views shared
by the U.S. and Canada on the major issues facing the
transatlantic alliance, but expressed concern that some key
European partners may have lost the will and the ability to
address critical defense and security challenges. The
similarity of outlooks was particularly evident in Canadian
thinking on ISAF in Afghanistan (Ottawa's main foreign policy
preoccupation after U.S. relations),Kosovo, NATO enlargement
and Russian assertiveness, France's recalibration of its
place in the alliance, and European ballistic missile
defense. The Canadians emphasized the high value they placed
on their privileged access in Washington and their desire to
deepen bilateral collaboration on defense and security in
NATO and beyond.
3. (SBU) P/DAS Volker outlined U.S. thinking on NATO,
emphasizing the need to seize on progress made at the
Bucharest Summit in April. He also stressed the importance
of working to re-build NATO's sense of community, to put
Afghanistan on a path to success, and to get the alliance to
focus on 21-century security threats.
--------------
Afghanistan
--------------
-- Staying Focused and Winning --
4. (C) Deputy Minister of Defence Robert Fonberg told P/DAS
Volker that he had just returned from a comprehensive tour of
Afghanistan and a three-day visit with the 2,500 Canadian
troops in Kandahar. (Note: The current Canadian
contribution to OEF & ISAF is 2,973 troops. To date 85
soldiers and one diplomat have been killed, and 295 have been
wounded. End note.) Fonberg said he had been impressed by
the civil-military unity of purpose in the U.S. effort, in
particular the "Nangahar Inc." concept in RC-E, where
everyone he encountered understood the link between economic
development and strategic success.
5. (C) Fonberg noted, as did Canadian PermRep to NATO Rob
McRae subsequently, that Canada would like to see a partner
deploy additional troops to RC-S's border region near
Pakistan. After citing a rumor of an additional upcoming
QPakistan. After citing a rumor of an additional upcoming
U.S. surge into Afghanistan, Fonberg said that, if true, it
would "make a real difference" in RC-S given Canada's
inability to sustain control of more than the 45 square
kilometers where 80 percent of Kandaharis live.
6. (SBU) Separately, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM)
for Afghanistan Yves Brodeur told P/DAS Volker that the
Canadian-funded Afghanistan-Pakistan Cooperation Workshop
would complete its Dubai Action Plan on June 16. The Plan
would likely focus on harmonizing bilateral border management
and on increasing ANSF capacity in the border areas, he said.
Building this capacity is a big priority that we need to
"get across" to our partners now, he said.
7. (C/NF) Fonberg noted that, while he was impressed by the
U.S. effort in RC-E and those of Canada's key partners in
RC-S, he left Afghanistan "despairing" over the lack of
authority and support given to UN SRSG Kai Eide, the sniping
OTTAWA 00000773 002.2 OF 003
among ISAF members, and the fact that much of the aid did not
benefit its intended recipients in much of the country.
McRae picked up the same themes, expressing concern that some
key European allies had lost momentum in Afghanistan. McRae
said he agreed with General Craddock's recent assertion to
the NAC that "NATO time is not good enough," and that it was
necessary to make sure that the Europeans were not distracted
from the alliance's priority mission by "wind(ing) themselves
around the axle" about Kosovo.
8. (C) Unlike Fonberg, however, McRae was less concerned
about sniping among allies. He observed that, despite
"incredible misrepresentations" by the Germans and others
about counterinsurgency (COIN) practices of OEF and ISAF, it
seemed that with France -- and perhaps the Italians before
too long -- stepping-up in Afghanistan, underperforming
allies with their counterproductive views on Focused District
Development (FDD) and other matters would grow more isolated.
9. (C) Canada, McRae said, was generally happy with the
political military plan for Afghanistan that emerged from
NATO's Bucharest Summit, and now wanted to make a short list
of concrete tasks from it for ministers and senior officials
to accomplish. This list, he said, ought to include: "fixing
the helicopter piece;" turning the "dysfunctional"
Afghanistan-Pakistan Tripartite Commission into a
political-military body with UN and NATO participation; and,
integrating PRTs into NATO planning by identifying common
functions, milestones (not time-lines),and models of
transition to eventual Afghan ownership.
10. (C) Privy Council Office (PCO) Deputy Secretary David
Mulroney agreed with P/DAS Volker that one should not expect
much courage from Karzai on anti-corruption or other
difficult issues before the 2009 election (and even "after"
is an open question). This would make it even more
difficult, he said, for Prime Minister Harper and others to
succeed in getting Karzai to take ownership of the challenges
facing Afghanistan.
-- The UN and Eide --
11. (C) The UN's weak support for SRSG Kai Eide, and UNAMA's
poor performance in Afghanistan, was a recurring theme
throughout the day. Mulroney suggested that the U.S. and
Canada look for ways to fix New York's lack of support for
Eide as well as the member states and the UN staff's
"allergic reaction" to working with NATO. To this end,
Afghanistan Task Force Director General Kerry Buck said that
the Canadians were open to seeing Eide move from the UN's
DPKO to a place closer to the SecGen (e.g., Political
Affairs),where he would have the power required to make
UNAMA's success in Afghanistan important to the UN.
--------------
NATO, Russian Assertiveness, and Enlargement
--------------
12. (C) Picking up on P/DAS Volker's desire to strengthen
the sense of community among NATO Allies, Fonberg remarked
that the U.S. would find a "sympathetic collaborator" in
Canada. Fonberg added that he often worried about growing
factionalism in NATO. He also agreed with P/DAS Volker that
Qfactionalism in NATO. He also agreed with P/DAS Volker that
the German Grand Coalition's effort to steer NATO policy in
unhelpful directions vis-a-vis enlargement, missile defense,
and Russia presented the alliance with a major challenge.
McRae observed that the NATO-Russia Council was in difficulty
due to Russian antics while, thanks to German fecklessness,
our side was in disarray.
13. (C) Like Fonberg, McRae emphasized that the U.S. and
Canadian visions of NATO's future were "very closely
aligned." More immediately, he said, there was merit in
trying to get Germany involved in an effort to negotiate an
end to the conflict between Georgia and its Abkhaz minority.
We would need to engage Germany on this in a positive way, he
said, and to act firmly on our principles when we interact
with Russia. The Russians do not know where their borders
are, he added, so we need to be firm in telling them.
14. (C) Acting Foreign and Defense Policy Adviser to the
Prime Minister Jill Sinclair told P/DAS Volker that PM Harper
would made the point to the Ukraine leader in Ottawa during
OTTAWA 00000773 003.2 OF 003
their May 26 meeting that the Ukrainian government must be
clear about its desire to join NATO. McRae, in a separate
conversation, said that the Ukrainians must get serious now
or they will "kiss (MAP in) December goodbye." On his
subsequent trip to Europe May 27-29, Harper pressed his
Italian, German, French, and British counterparts for the
quick extension of MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, Sinclair said.
Canada's bottom-line, she added, is that MAP is "imperative
for Ukraine...but Georgia too."
--------------
NATO 60th Summit
--------------
15. According to McRae, Canada was thinking in terms of
suggesting "Twenty-First Century Challenges to a Twenty-First
Century NATO" as the theme for the 60th Jubilee. The theme
would logically lead to agenda items such as an "Afghanistan
Reality Check," with engagement as a litmus test for members,
and the good news story of France coming into the new NATO,
he said. The agenda risked being hijacked by Russia over
missile defense or the Ukraine and Georgia MAP issue, he
observed. Looking to the upcoming election in the U.S.,
McRae noted that NATO goes into disarray when the U.S. "does
not lead." Canada, he said, would like to work closely with
the U.S. over the coming year to ensure that NATO's 60th is a
success.
--------------
France
--------------
16. (C) McRae agreed with P/DAS Volker's observation that
France would likely expect a leadership position in NATO
commensurate with the new role it envisions playing, and that
at least some of its European neighbors might view the matter
as a zero-sum game. Assistant Deputy Minister and PolDir
Colleen Swords also agreed, noting that it would be
interesting to see how Europeans -- particularly the British
and the Germans -- adjust to the potential change. Swords
added that Canada was keen to get a look at the
long-anticipated French White Paper on defense in order to
see how it dealt with France's integration into NATO, with
support for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
and with improving NATO-EU relations.
17. (C) Sinclair characterized France's likely change from
spoiler to productive NATO member as "breathtaking," and
noted that she hoped to use the momentum behind positive
change at NATO to fix meetings there. In particular,
Sinclair said, Canada would like to work with the U.S., and
perhaps France and other like-minded allies, to ensure that
meetings were used to address hard issues that some members
wanted to avoid, and that meetings were structured in a
manner conducive to dialogue. PM Harper often leaves NATO
Summits frustrated and wishing he had had more open
discussion with his counterparts, she said.
--------------
Ballistic Missile Defense
--------------
18. (C) On Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),Sinclair agreed
that it was a subject that defense ministers would have to
face June 12-13 in order to maintain NATO's commitment. She
noted that President Bush and PM Harper had agreed on
"elegant" language on the way forward for BMD, with Canada
able to support a "European-focused system."
Qable to support a "European-focused system."
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ///// ADDED NOFORN CAPTION /////
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS AF CA
SUBJECT: P/DAS VOLKER CONSULTS WITH CANADIANS ON NATO
OTTAWA 00000773 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Senior Canadian officials emphasized to
visiting EUR P/DAS Volker the similarity of views held by
Washington and Ottawa on NATO issues. On ISAF, the Canadians
were pleased by the Bucharest Summit outcomes, but they are
worried about the weak commitment and focus of some key
European partners, the lack of power and support assigned to
UN SRSG Kai Eide, and the challenges emanating from the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Ottawa wants to
collaborate with the U.S. in an effort to face the range of
Russian challenges, to make MAP available to Ukraine and
Georgia, and to counter German efforts to steer NATO policy
in unhelpful directions. The Canadians are pleased by
France's likely change from spoiler to productive member of
NATO, and see it as an opportunity to improve NATO-EU
relations. Canada supports a "European focused" Ballistic
Missile Defense system. End Summary.
2. (C) Senior Canadian officials, in a series of meetings
with EUR P/DAS and Ambassador-designate to NATO Kurt Volker
in Ottawa on June 2, stressed the similarity of views shared
by the U.S. and Canada on the major issues facing the
transatlantic alliance, but expressed concern that some key
European partners may have lost the will and the ability to
address critical defense and security challenges. The
similarity of outlooks was particularly evident in Canadian
thinking on ISAF in Afghanistan (Ottawa's main foreign policy
preoccupation after U.S. relations),Kosovo, NATO enlargement
and Russian assertiveness, France's recalibration of its
place in the alliance, and European ballistic missile
defense. The Canadians emphasized the high value they placed
on their privileged access in Washington and their desire to
deepen bilateral collaboration on defense and security in
NATO and beyond.
3. (SBU) P/DAS Volker outlined U.S. thinking on NATO,
emphasizing the need to seize on progress made at the
Bucharest Summit in April. He also stressed the importance
of working to re-build NATO's sense of community, to put
Afghanistan on a path to success, and to get the alliance to
focus on 21-century security threats.
--------------
Afghanistan
--------------
-- Staying Focused and Winning --
4. (C) Deputy Minister of Defence Robert Fonberg told P/DAS
Volker that he had just returned from a comprehensive tour of
Afghanistan and a three-day visit with the 2,500 Canadian
troops in Kandahar. (Note: The current Canadian
contribution to OEF & ISAF is 2,973 troops. To date 85
soldiers and one diplomat have been killed, and 295 have been
wounded. End note.) Fonberg said he had been impressed by
the civil-military unity of purpose in the U.S. effort, in
particular the "Nangahar Inc." concept in RC-E, where
everyone he encountered understood the link between economic
development and strategic success.
5. (C) Fonberg noted, as did Canadian PermRep to NATO Rob
McRae subsequently, that Canada would like to see a partner
deploy additional troops to RC-S's border region near
Pakistan. After citing a rumor of an additional upcoming
QPakistan. After citing a rumor of an additional upcoming
U.S. surge into Afghanistan, Fonberg said that, if true, it
would "make a real difference" in RC-S given Canada's
inability to sustain control of more than the 45 square
kilometers where 80 percent of Kandaharis live.
6. (SBU) Separately, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM)
for Afghanistan Yves Brodeur told P/DAS Volker that the
Canadian-funded Afghanistan-Pakistan Cooperation Workshop
would complete its Dubai Action Plan on June 16. The Plan
would likely focus on harmonizing bilateral border management
and on increasing ANSF capacity in the border areas, he said.
Building this capacity is a big priority that we need to
"get across" to our partners now, he said.
7. (C/NF) Fonberg noted that, while he was impressed by the
U.S. effort in RC-E and those of Canada's key partners in
RC-S, he left Afghanistan "despairing" over the lack of
authority and support given to UN SRSG Kai Eide, the sniping
OTTAWA 00000773 002.2 OF 003
among ISAF members, and the fact that much of the aid did not
benefit its intended recipients in much of the country.
McRae picked up the same themes, expressing concern that some
key European allies had lost momentum in Afghanistan. McRae
said he agreed with General Craddock's recent assertion to
the NAC that "NATO time is not good enough," and that it was
necessary to make sure that the Europeans were not distracted
from the alliance's priority mission by "wind(ing) themselves
around the axle" about Kosovo.
8. (C) Unlike Fonberg, however, McRae was less concerned
about sniping among allies. He observed that, despite
"incredible misrepresentations" by the Germans and others
about counterinsurgency (COIN) practices of OEF and ISAF, it
seemed that with France -- and perhaps the Italians before
too long -- stepping-up in Afghanistan, underperforming
allies with their counterproductive views on Focused District
Development (FDD) and other matters would grow more isolated.
9. (C) Canada, McRae said, was generally happy with the
political military plan for Afghanistan that emerged from
NATO's Bucharest Summit, and now wanted to make a short list
of concrete tasks from it for ministers and senior officials
to accomplish. This list, he said, ought to include: "fixing
the helicopter piece;" turning the "dysfunctional"
Afghanistan-Pakistan Tripartite Commission into a
political-military body with UN and NATO participation; and,
integrating PRTs into NATO planning by identifying common
functions, milestones (not time-lines),and models of
transition to eventual Afghan ownership.
10. (C) Privy Council Office (PCO) Deputy Secretary David
Mulroney agreed with P/DAS Volker that one should not expect
much courage from Karzai on anti-corruption or other
difficult issues before the 2009 election (and even "after"
is an open question). This would make it even more
difficult, he said, for Prime Minister Harper and others to
succeed in getting Karzai to take ownership of the challenges
facing Afghanistan.
-- The UN and Eide --
11. (C) The UN's weak support for SRSG Kai Eide, and UNAMA's
poor performance in Afghanistan, was a recurring theme
throughout the day. Mulroney suggested that the U.S. and
Canada look for ways to fix New York's lack of support for
Eide as well as the member states and the UN staff's
"allergic reaction" to working with NATO. To this end,
Afghanistan Task Force Director General Kerry Buck said that
the Canadians were open to seeing Eide move from the UN's
DPKO to a place closer to the SecGen (e.g., Political
Affairs),where he would have the power required to make
UNAMA's success in Afghanistan important to the UN.
--------------
NATO, Russian Assertiveness, and Enlargement
--------------
12. (C) Picking up on P/DAS Volker's desire to strengthen
the sense of community among NATO Allies, Fonberg remarked
that the U.S. would find a "sympathetic collaborator" in
Canada. Fonberg added that he often worried about growing
factionalism in NATO. He also agreed with P/DAS Volker that
Qfactionalism in NATO. He also agreed with P/DAS Volker that
the German Grand Coalition's effort to steer NATO policy in
unhelpful directions vis-a-vis enlargement, missile defense,
and Russia presented the alliance with a major challenge.
McRae observed that the NATO-Russia Council was in difficulty
due to Russian antics while, thanks to German fecklessness,
our side was in disarray.
13. (C) Like Fonberg, McRae emphasized that the U.S. and
Canadian visions of NATO's future were "very closely
aligned." More immediately, he said, there was merit in
trying to get Germany involved in an effort to negotiate an
end to the conflict between Georgia and its Abkhaz minority.
We would need to engage Germany on this in a positive way, he
said, and to act firmly on our principles when we interact
with Russia. The Russians do not know where their borders
are, he added, so we need to be firm in telling them.
14. (C) Acting Foreign and Defense Policy Adviser to the
Prime Minister Jill Sinclair told P/DAS Volker that PM Harper
would made the point to the Ukraine leader in Ottawa during
OTTAWA 00000773 003.2 OF 003
their May 26 meeting that the Ukrainian government must be
clear about its desire to join NATO. McRae, in a separate
conversation, said that the Ukrainians must get serious now
or they will "kiss (MAP in) December goodbye." On his
subsequent trip to Europe May 27-29, Harper pressed his
Italian, German, French, and British counterparts for the
quick extension of MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, Sinclair said.
Canada's bottom-line, she added, is that MAP is "imperative
for Ukraine...but Georgia too."
--------------
NATO 60th Summit
--------------
15. According to McRae, Canada was thinking in terms of
suggesting "Twenty-First Century Challenges to a Twenty-First
Century NATO" as the theme for the 60th Jubilee. The theme
would logically lead to agenda items such as an "Afghanistan
Reality Check," with engagement as a litmus test for members,
and the good news story of France coming into the new NATO,
he said. The agenda risked being hijacked by Russia over
missile defense or the Ukraine and Georgia MAP issue, he
observed. Looking to the upcoming election in the U.S.,
McRae noted that NATO goes into disarray when the U.S. "does
not lead." Canada, he said, would like to work closely with
the U.S. over the coming year to ensure that NATO's 60th is a
success.
--------------
France
--------------
16. (C) McRae agreed with P/DAS Volker's observation that
France would likely expect a leadership position in NATO
commensurate with the new role it envisions playing, and that
at least some of its European neighbors might view the matter
as a zero-sum game. Assistant Deputy Minister and PolDir
Colleen Swords also agreed, noting that it would be
interesting to see how Europeans -- particularly the British
and the Germans -- adjust to the potential change. Swords
added that Canada was keen to get a look at the
long-anticipated French White Paper on defense in order to
see how it dealt with France's integration into NATO, with
support for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
and with improving NATO-EU relations.
17. (C) Sinclair characterized France's likely change from
spoiler to productive NATO member as "breathtaking," and
noted that she hoped to use the momentum behind positive
change at NATO to fix meetings there. In particular,
Sinclair said, Canada would like to work with the U.S., and
perhaps France and other like-minded allies, to ensure that
meetings were used to address hard issues that some members
wanted to avoid, and that meetings were structured in a
manner conducive to dialogue. PM Harper often leaves NATO
Summits frustrated and wishing he had had more open
discussion with his counterparts, she said.
--------------
Ballistic Missile Defense
--------------
18. (C) On Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),Sinclair agreed
that it was a subject that defense ministers would have to
face June 12-13 in order to maintain NATO's commitment. She
noted that President Bush and PM Harper had agreed on
"elegant" language on the way forward for BMD, with Canada
able to support a "European-focused system."
Qable to support a "European-focused system."
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS