THEMES FROM THE 10TH CROSS-BORDER CRIME FORUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 OTTAWA 000635 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS KCRM CA SUBJECT: THEMES FROM THE 10TH CROSS-BORDER CRIME FORUM REF: A. OTTAWA 436 ¶B. OTTAWA 440 ¶C. OTTAWA 444 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the 10th Cross-Border Crime Forum, 120 participants led by the U.S. Attorney General and the Canadian Ministers of Public Safety and Justice reviewed progress in eight areas, received a threat assessment, and discussed lessons learned from three case studies. From Mission Canada's perspective, the issues that deserve the most further attention are: information and intelligence sharing; further development and synchronization of cross border law enforcement architecture (IBETs); finalization of Shiprider agreement; exploration of what principles of Shiprider could apply to land enforcement models; increased placement of liaison officers to enhance information sharing and joint operational effectiveness; and cross border weapons carriage. End Summary. 10TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING SHOWCASES VALUE AND PROGRESS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Cross-Border Crime Forum (CBCF) met March 18-19 in Quebec City under the leadership of U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Canadian Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day, and Canadian Justice Minister Rob Nicholson. (DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff was unable to attend at the last minute.) The principals attended on March 19, following a day of working level talks. Richard Wex, Assistant Deputy Minister of the Policing, Law Enforcement, and Interoperability Branch of Public Safety Canada, and Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. Department of Justice's Criminal Division, opened the working-level meeting on March 18 by reviewing the progress since the first CBCF in 1997. The CBCF started as a very limited forum dealing primarily with contraband and telemarketing fraud in the East, but has now expanded into an inter-agency forum to address counterterrorism, mass marketing fraud, human trafficking, organized crime, border enforcement, drug trafficking, and firearms violations. It also examines how to improve the architecture of cross-border law enforcement cooperation in areas such as prosecutions and interoperability. SUCCESSES -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Wex and Swartz cited a number of successes from the Forum, including: -- enhanced understanding of shared challenges (drugs, firearms, human trafficking, organized crime assessments); -- joint action plans to address shared threats; -- identification of best practices and venue for sharing lessons learned; -- improved operational collaboration and strengthened networking, with Swartz highlighting Shiprider as a model for close U.S.-Canada cooperation and the integration of cross-border law enforcement efforts; and, -- joint public outreach on key issues such as phishing and identity theft. LESSONS LEARNED -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Wex and Swartz highlighted a number of lessons learned from the CBCF over the past decade. First, political leadership must provide clear direction and offer leverage Qleadership must provide clear direction and offer leverage and resources to implement its decisions. Second, input from front-line field officers is essential to keep the CBCF's work relevant. Third, there is a broad array of interests represented and the agenda must reflect the shared priorities of all parties. Fourth, the CBCF must have continuity in its core organization along with sufficient adaptability through ad hoc groups to deal with specific issues as they arise. CHALLENGES OTTAWA 00000635 002 OF 008 -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The co-chairs laid out their vision of the challenges the CBCF faces in order to stay relevant: -- how to manage front-line expectations? -- how to resolve cross-border impediments while respecting both countries, legal frameworks? -- how to identify appropriate partners on complex issues involving multiple jurisdictions and mandates? -- how to ensure the appropriate legislative and policy framework supports operational collaboration? and, -- how develop a shared vision among the partners? ¶6. (SBU) The group also discussed whether the CBCF is fully integrated with other similar fora, and how best to leverage the work of other groups to inform its work. Significantly, participants discussed how to continue to adapt the CBCF, especially the composition of its sub-groups, to meet the changing realities of cross-border law enforcement. PROSECUTION SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The various sub-groups described their work over the past year. The Prosecution Sub-Group (PSG) highlighted the core challenge of lining up the two countries' legal systems in order to make the MLAT and extradition processes work efficiently and effectively. The PSG continues to work to improve these processes. The PSG is also developing a more streamlined process for obtaining third-party records in a timely manner. Working Guides explaining the MLAT process in Canada and in the U.S. were available in paper and CD-ROM formats for distribution at the CBCF, for use as a training tool for prosecutors and investigators on both sides of the border. The PSG is preparing a working guide to explain the process for obtaining Internet Service Provider records in the U.S. Finally, the PSG is revising its work plan, with a renewed focus on concerns relating to the extradition process between Canada and the U.S., and encouraging broader participation in the workings of the subgroup and enhanced opportunities for consultation on issues of concern. MASS MARKETING FRAUD SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The sub-group completed and released a report on mass marketing fraud with five year trends, which it made available at the meeting. It will receive broader distribution (especially in Canada) after translation into French. The sub-group issued a joint public advisory on counterfeit checks, which has a different focus than the joint advisory on counterfeit checks released at CBCF 9. U.S. co-chair Jonathan Rusch pointed out the importance of fraud surveys as an analytical tool; one participant pointed to this area as one of the "real triumphs" of the CBCF. The subgroup cited several challenges for the future, including: -- harmonizing strategies and ensuring a commitment to interagency enforcement; -- synchronizing seizure and forfeiture procedures for proceeds of crime; -- improving information sharing (especially better methods of face to face info sharing); and, Qof face to face info sharing); and, -- coordinating training more and improving cross-border training techniques. FIREARMS TRAFFICKING SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The co-chairs reviewed progress to date on the issue of firearms trafficking. With the connection of the Ontario Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit (PWEU) and the Canadian National Firearms Tracing Center to the e-trace system of ATF, some 1700 traces took place in 2007. The MOU that Minister Day and AG Gonzalez signed at CBCF 9 linked the OTTAWA 00000635 003 OF 008 Canadian Integrated Ballistics Information Network to the U.S. National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, but to date no cross-border hits have been detected because the current system deals with a very low volume of exchanges. The Firearms Reference Table (FRT) that the RCMP created and shared with U.S. agencies is increasingly in use by U.S. agencies; Interpol has adopted the FRT as a model for identifying firearms. Finally, ATF has expanded its work with Canadian agencies, hosting cross-border trainings, conducting a joint awareness campaign with posters at border crossings, and increasing its attache support in Canada with new positions in Toronto and Vancouver. Canadian interlocutors also cited strengthened gun laws in Canada as a positive move to enhance cross-border gun trafficking enforcement. COUNTER-TERRORISM SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The sub-group highlighted two cases -- Ahmed Ressam case (Millennium Bomber, 1999) and the Charlotte Hizballah Case (1996) -- in its publication "Best Practices in the Development and Prosecution of Cross-Border Terrorism Cases," released at CBCF 10, to review lessons learned in cross-border counter-terrorism cases. Most of the issues raised from analyzing these cases have to do with information-sharing between Canada and the U.S., which is further complicated by the challenge of sharing information between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The publication also made a series of recommendations for future cases, again with a special emphasis on information-sharing. Notably, it recommended that "communications should focus on the timely exchange of information without regard to whether such information is of potential evidentiary value," and urged that information exchanges should "include relevant national security intelligence." It suggested that relevant agencies "consider cross-border co-location of CT personnel to promote effective situational awareness on both sides of the border." According to one of the co-chairs, there is an MOU in progress that would facilitate personnel exchanges between RCMP INSETs and FBI JTTFs. The U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York made the case for robust information-sharing, stating that "seemingly insignificant pieces of information can take on greater importance when put together with other pieces of information." The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington expressed concern that much information-sharing takes place at the SBU level and is not as robust as it might be. INTEROPERABILITY SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The sub-group reported that it had completed a joint comparative analysis of the similarities and gaps between the Canada Public Safety Information Network (CPSIN) data standards and the U.S. National Information Exchange Model (NIEM),and had concluded that the framework of current standards are adequate. It made recommendations for Qstandards are adequate. It made recommendations for developing and completing cross-border data exchanges. The co-chairs briefed the sub-group on various pilot projects to pursue, including several related to the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver. Specifically, representatives will review the range of options possible to implement a LInX pilot in the region. DRUGS & ORGANIZED CRIME SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The sub-group tabled the U.S.-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment at CBCF 10. The co-chairs provided an overview of the assessment,s key findings, including: -- despite best efforts, significant drug trafficking still occurs in both directions across the border; -- the principal illicit substances smuggled across our shared border are MDMA/Ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana; -- MDMA/Ecstasy production has increased in Canada, and there is increased availability on both sides of the border; OTTAWA 00000635 004 OF 008 -- the U.S. is the primary transit country for South American cocaine entering Canada and accounts for 40% of its seizures; -- cannabis cultivation is thriving on both sides of the border, but marijuana seizures at the border have dropped 50%; -- both countries have significantly enhanced bilateral cooperation on drug trafficking issues and will continue to do so. ¶13. (SBU) The co-chairs also briefed the group on assessments of the Asia-Pacific corridor of organized crime groups and the need for a global approach to tackle a global problem. The participants discussed the need for ongoing personnel exchanges between the various law enforcement organizations to ensure robust information exchanges and better operational capacity. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christie McCampbell briefed the group on the Merida Initiative and suggested a tie-in between the work Canada is doing in the Caribbean and the work the U.S. will be doing in Mexico and Central America. BORDER ENFORCEMENT SUB-GROUP -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The Border Enforcement sub-group (BEG) underscored progress on the Shiprider initiative as the highlight of its program this year, and a model for enhanced land based cooperation. (Negotiations for a Shiprider agreement commenced immediately following CBCF 10.) The co-chairs briefed the group on the development of the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET),five of which (with the recent merger of the Rocky Mountain IBET) are co-located; the remaining ten have joint meeting space. The IBET leadership is in the process of evaluating locations for four IBET analysts, and has just completed a joint threat assessment based on analysis from the IBET. The co-chairs pointed to improving and expanding existing radio communications and selecting the site for a one year radio interoperability pilot project as key next steps. The group also discussed the issue of weapons carriage by law enforcement officers whose duties require them frequently to cross the border, a long-standing impediment to effective cross-border enforcement. EMERGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Greg Fyffe, Executive Director of the International Assessment Staff of Canada's Privy Council Office delivered a speech describing the three drivers in international crime as drugs, terrorism, and human smuggling. He emphasized that drugs will continue to be the backbone of international and national illegal activity by providing the huge profits that fuel other forms of criminality, while corrupting national institutions. Its disruption is long-term and complex, and demand will remain consistent. Terrorism thrives on the current breakdown of stable order, which creates safe zones for instability, and on the multi-generational transmission of hate, which is at the heart of international terrorism. Fyffe highlighted the resilience of the al-Qaeda movement, QFyffe highlighted the resilience of the al-Qaeda movement, pointing out that after five years of aggressive counter-terrorism operations, our success in "turning" leaders of AQ was zero; the movement has not been seriously degraded. Terrorism will continue to be a huge driver for a generation. People smuggling is now part of the largest movement of people in history, which has gone on for the past 20 years and will likely continue unabated. It establishes routes that can also be used for other activities. OTTAWA 00000635 005 OF 008 ¶16. (SBU) Fyffe cited another trend that deserved attention: gray corporations, i.e., large multinational companies -- either state-supported or tacitly allowed to function by the state -- that are involved in criminal enterprises. They have a certain amount of protection under the law due to their connection to states (e.g., Russia),and are "morally fractured," with many legitimate enterprises masking illegitimate enterprises. ¶17. (SBU) Fyffe pointed to four wildcards to watch in the future for their disruptive effect: -- pandemics that could combine with other disasters to create large openings for criminal enterprises; -- energy shocks disrupting normal markets and creating urgent new demand that criminal syndicates can fill; -- climate change that creates water challenges and disasters in low lying areas; and, -- continued growth of internet use that makes cyber-crime and cyber-penetration of national security institutions an increasing security issue. CASE STUDY I -- FIREARMS SMUGGLING INVESTIGATION -------------- --- ¶18. (SBU) An Ontario PWEU officer and a Toronto-based ATF attache briefed the group on a nine-month investigation into a firearms smuggling case as an example of how close cooperation can disrupt and distract criminal gangs. The gangs in the Greater Toronto Area are closely connected to the U.S., in this case driving marijuana and ecstasy down to Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and bringing arms and ammunition back up to Canada. This collaborative investigation included joint monitoring and tracking devices, surveillance units, and drug purchases. It included participation from ICE, ATF, PWEU, and state and local police. The presenters pointed to the "multi-disciplinary" (guns, gangs, drugs) and multi-jurisdictional nature of the operation as requiring new thinking in dealing with these kinds of crimes. They pointed to a number of investigative hurdles: -- educating counterparts on national protocols and procedures; -- intelligence and information-sharing; -- grand jury proceedings and new and effective tools for sharing grand jury information; -- GPS across the border; -- wiretap procedures and technical specifications; -- travel challenges; and, -- operational issues, e.g. two different elements of probably cause. DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Another multi-agency cross-border product unveiled at CBCF 10 was the "United States-Canada Border Threat Assessment 2007," which described several trends in cross-border drug trafficking, including: -- Canada becoming the largest source of its own MDMA; -- the rise of Asian gangs as movers of drugs (primarily MDMA and high-potency marijuana) into North America; -- the implementation of Canada's chemical watch program; -- increasing production of precursors in Canada for both the Canadian and U.S. markets; and, -- the U.S. becoming the main transit country for South Q-- the U.S. becoming the main transit country for South American cocaine into Canada. ¶20. (SBU) The study also contained a concise section of outlooks for cross-border drug projections, including judgments on MDMA trends, grow ops, cocaine trafficking, and precursor chemicals. CASE STUDY II -- E-PARAGON/RAMAN NOODLE -------------- ¶21. (SBU) A joint team presented a second case study that OTTAWA 00000635 006 OF 008 involved DEA, FBI, ICE, and IRS on the U.S. side, and included participation by the Australian and New Zealand Federal Police, the Hong Kong Police, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The case involved an organized crime group with cells in Orange County, Vancouver, and Australia moving precursors from Asia to Vancouver, and from Vancouver to Los Angeles. When the case was complete, there were seizures in eight countries including drugs, money, and property. The briefers noted four trends that were evident during the investigation: -- the globalization of the drug trade; -- fusion of criminal groups; -- increasing sophistication of traffickers; and, -- enhanced trafficker technology. ¶22. (SBU) The case study sparked a discussion among participants on how to remove barriers to effective investigations and prosecutions, how to improve the MLAT process, and how to enhance communications between multi-agency and international law enforcement. Minister Nicholson suggested that this case highlights the ability of criminal syndicates to exploit law enforcement's vulnerabilities in legislation, policy, and presence, and how their loose organization allowed them to work with great flexibility and reconstitute easily. Minister Day noted the trend of small labs for the chemical production, and said that, as we break up the larger operation, traffickers move to utilize smaller labs. A DEA rep confirmed that, as state and local laws have made super-labs more difficult to manage, traffickers have moved to Mexico, where they utilize small labs. From 2001 to today, there has been a 90% drop in super labs in the United States. 2008 IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶23. (SBU) A final panel focused on the Joint IBET Threat Assessment and the collective law enforcement response. The major highlights from the Threat Assessment were that: -- organized crime is the single largest threat encountered at the Canada/U.S. border, with the greatest concentration of organized crime located in large cities close to the border; -- illegal migrants are intercepted regularly at the Canada/U.S. border, and human-smuggling networks established in large cities close to the Canada/U.S. border often use smaller groups in border areas to assist them; -- marijuana and ecstasy are smuggled into the U.S. from Canada, while cocaine is smuggled into Canada from the U.S., with the quantity of marijuana and cocaine seized between the ports of entry decreasing but the number of seizures increasing; -- the U.S. is the primary source of firearms smuggled into Canada, and the significant majority of all firearms seized at Canadian POEs are personal firearms originating from the U.S. but, overall, the number of firearms seized between the ports of entry increased in 2006; -- the quantity of currency (illegal proceeds) seized between the ports of entry increased, with the amounts seized often large and usually from couriers (most likely the Qoften large and usually from couriers (most likely the proceeds from illicit drug transactions); -- a number of organized crime groups are responsible for smuggling contraband cigarettes into Canada from the U.S., mainly through Native American/First Nations reserves; -- the marine environment is particularly vulnerable, with threats including the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, currency, tobacco, alcohol, and people; and, -- couriers regularly employed by organized crime groups use all modes of transportation, including air smuggling, but couriers increasingly use sophisticated concealment methods, the latest technologies, and counter surveillance techniques. ¶24. (SBU) The panel reviewed the conclusions of the assessment, namely: -- IBETs have made tremendous progress in advancing cross-border cooperation between partner agencies; -- the continued sharing of criminal information and OTTAWA 00000635 007 OF 008 intelligence has led to the ongoing success of IBET; -- investigations to combat cross-border organized crime are a critical contribution to overall national security; -- successful intelligence-led IBET investigations displaced criminal activity to other parts of the border, which neighboring IBET units identified and countered; and, -- displacement activity is not easy to predict, but existing IBET partnerships provide the capacity to respond effectively. SHIPRIDER -------------- ¶25. (SBU) Coast Guard Rear Admiral Wayne Justice co-presented on the status of the Shiprider program, which removes the international maritime boundary as a barrier to law enforcement by enabling seamless, continuous law enforcement operations across the border. Shiprider represents an integrated operational approach to maritime law enforcement and security in shared waters (inland and coastal),not just information and intelligence sharing. Several pilot programs of Shiprider in the last couple of years have shown it to be a successful model. The panel recommended that Shiprider should be established permanently and that: -- locations be identified to deploy Shiprider operations using joint threat and risk assessments; -- costs and logistical issues be assessed with establishing permanent Shiprider teams; -- Shiprider should be integrated within the IBET framework; and, -- Shiprider should be expanded to include other law enforcement partners. ¶26. (SBU) The panel concluded by stating that Shiprider negotiations would be commenced immediately following CBCF 10, with a view of implementing a Framework Agreement in advance of the 2010 Olympics. (The Shiprider negotiation teams met later in the day to agree on the terms of reference for the next day's talks, and made significant progress on March 20 toward reaching an agreement that would make the Shiprider program permanent -- ref A.) ¶27. (SBU) Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz noted that there was not enough time for the presentation he had planned with Assistant Deputy Attorney General Don Piragoff (Justice Canada) on developing a joint legal framework to address the many legal issues that arise within the integrated law enforcement context. He mentioned that Shiprider would provide a good context to start these discussions, and urged that the respective Departments of Justice work together to provide advice on the legal aspects of Shiprider and to consider adapting the framework agreement to other integrated cross-border law enforcement operations in the future. In final comments by the Canadian Ministers and Attorney General, Minister Day asked point blank "what is holding up the Shiprider negotiations?" He confirmed that the program has full political support from the Government of Canada, which would like to see it move forward as soon as possible. CASE STUDY III -- GALDAMEZ HUMAN SMUGGLING CASE -------------- -- Q -------------- --- ¶28. (SBU) The third case study focused on a huge success for the IBETs. The case was co-presented on the U.S. side by U.S. Attorney in Vermont Thomas Anderson and ICE Assistant Secretary Julie Myers. The case involved a Montreal-based smuggling organization with links to New York City and Boston. Several hundred illegal aliens from Pakistan, India, and Central and South America were trafficked from Canada to the United States (mainly through New York and Vermont) through a scheme that involved dropping them off between ports of entry and having them walk across the border and be picked up on the other side by members of the trafficking organization. The case was worked by the Stanstead/Derby IBET with participation by the RCMP, CBP, CBSA, ICE, Surete du Quebec, and Terretons police, as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office for Vermont. Galdamez and his OTTAWA 00000635 008 OF 008 co-conspirators have been indicted in Vermont for conspiracy and alien smuggling, and their extraditions from Canada are pending. The net result was the reduction of human-smuggling to a trickle in this area. ¶29. (SBU) Discussion of the case revolved around the emergence of one-stop shopping for traffickers, where criminal gangs are providing housing, movement, and jobs for trafficked persons, and the potential for terrorists to utilize pre-existing trafficking routes to move people and weapons. One participant pointed out the need for a better communications forensics model and another for improved cross-border enforcement models. ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY -------------- ¶30. (SBU) In a final presentation on how to improve enforcement between ports of entry, the presenter said that the goal of cross-border law enforcement ultimately is to move from "coordinated response" to "integrated response," as exemplified by the IBET and Shiprider models. With only five IBETs co-located and not all agencies represented and with no overarching strategy, limitations in terms of technology, and use of the Shiprider model only on water, however, gaps remain. The working group suggested discussion of a bi-national border enforcement strategy between the Ports of Entry at CBCF 11 (in the United States; place and time to be determined). It should answer the following questions: -- where are the threats and gaps? -- what intelligence and enforcement model is best? -- how far inland can we move the maritime strategy? -- what technical solutions are there? -- how do we best allocate resources across the border? and, -- what legislative and regulatory amendments are needed? ¶31. (U) Ministers Day and Nicholson also met separately with Attorney General Mukasey on the margins of the Cross Border Crime Forum (refs B and C). ¶32. (U) DOJ has cleared this cable. Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada RODDY