CANADA TO FLAG ITS CONCERNS ON IRAN AT IAEA BOG

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 000334

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA TO FLAG ITS CONCERNS ON IRAN AT IAEA BOG
MEETING

REF: A. STATE 19694

B. OTTAWA 0326

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) According to Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Senior Advisor for Non-proliferation Che
van Haastrecht, Canada agreed with ref a points on Iran and
the IAEA, and is particularly concerned about alleged Iranian
studies that could point to weaponization. He added that
Iranian progress on enrichment and centrifuges is also of
great concern to Canada, as well as Iran's refusal to
implement the Additional Protocol, as Foreign Minister Maxime
Bernier had noted in a March 3 statement on UNSCR 1803 (ref
b).


2. (C) Van Haastrecht confirmed that Canada believes that
the IAEA still has a key role to play to "clear the air" on
Iranian nuclear activities. Its delegation will make this
point in its submission to the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG)
on March 5 and also make clear its disappointment at Russia's
and China's decisions to block consensus for a strong UNSCR
on Iran. Van Haastrecht shared a copy of Canada's draft
statement to the BOG (para 4) for delivery on March 5, and
invited comment.


3. (SBU) Embassy recommends that U.S. delegation in Vienna
deliver any USG feedback directly to the Canadian delegation
in Vienna.


4. (C) Canada's Draft Statement to the BOG
Quote:

IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS CANADA MARCH 2008

Report by the Director General on the implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the
Islamic Republic of Iran

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation would like express its deep appreciation to the
Director General for the report contained in GOV/2008/4.
While non-conclusive, the Agency's efforts pursuant to the
work plan with Iran have made notable progress and
demonstrate that a robust verification system can produce
results. We would also like to thank the Deputy Director
General for Safeguards for the technical briefing last week.
The presentation, while noting some progress in obtaining
clarifications from Iran, also make clear a number of matters
of serious concern which we would like to see addressed. In
this regard, the progress achieved by the IAEA to date
highlights the legitimacy of the Agency's efforts including
in areas related to weapons.

The Director General identified possible linkages between
Iran's nuclear and military programs, including
administrative connections between projects related to
uranium conversion, high explosives testing and the design
for a missile re-entry vehicle, which could, in his words,
"have a military nuclear dimension". This deeply concerns
us. What is more, the report of the Director General makes
clear that some of these possible linkages may still have
some bearing on issues that are now identified as "no longer
outstanding", including the role and activities of the
Physics Research Centre prior to the razing of that facility.
A complete resolution of all the Agency's questions
regarding these possible linkages is required if the Agency
is to verify that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively
is to verify that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively
peaceful in nature. As indicated in the Director General's
report, and further clarified in the Deputy Director
General's technical briefing, the Agency's information
regarding these linkages is derived from multiple sources and
is consistent with findings in the Agency's own
investigations. We therefore call on Iran to take note of
the scope, nature and gravity of the information presented
and to respond in a meaningful way.

The Director General's latest report confirms once again that
a confidence deficit has resulted from many years of
undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. The report also notes
that Iran must establish confidence and affirms in this
regard the need for assurances not only of the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material, but equally important, of the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. A
full understanding of linkages between Iran's military and
nuclear programs is a first step in this process. Iran must
also fully implement its NPT safeguards agreement, including
its modified code 3.1 obligations as they were agreed between
Iran and the Agency and put an end to its "ad hoc"
cooperation by fully implementing the additional protocol and
all other transparency and access measures requested by the
Director General.

My government endorses fully the resolutions passed by this
Board and by the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear
issue, including Security Council resolution 1803 which was
adopted on Monday. Iran must heed the requests of this Board
and requirements of Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737,
1747 and 1803 by suspending enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities and its work on its heavy water
research reactor at Arak and related projects.

In closing, I would like to reiterate my government's deep
concern and request the Director General to continue to
report on his verification efforts until such a time as Iran
has taken all the steps required of it by the Board and
Security Council and the Board has deemed that confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program has
been established. I would also like to request that the
report contained in document GOV/2008/4 be made public.

Thank you.
End quote.

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