CANADA TO FLAG ITS CONCERNS ON IRAN AT IAEA BOG

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 000334 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013 TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR CA SUBJECT: CANADA TO FLAG ITS CONCERNS ON IRAN AT IAEA BOG MEETING REF: A. STATE 19694 ¶B. OTTAWA 0326 Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) According to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Senior Advisor for Non-proliferation Che van Haastrecht, Canada agreed with ref a points on Iran and the IAEA, and is particularly concerned about alleged Iranian studies that could point to weaponization. He added that Iranian progress on enrichment and centrifuges is also of great concern to Canada, as well as Iran's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol, as Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier had noted in a March 3 statement on UNSCR 1803 (ref b). ¶2. (C) Van Haastrecht confirmed that Canada believes that the IAEA still has a key role to play to "clear the air" on Iranian nuclear activities. Its delegation will make this point in its submission to the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) on March 5 and also make clear its disappointment at Russia's and China's decisions to block consensus for a strong UNSCR on Iran. Van Haastrecht shared a copy of Canada's draft statement to the BOG (para 4) for delivery on March 5, and invited comment. ¶3. (SBU) Embassy recommends that U.S. delegation in Vienna deliver any USG feedback directly to the Canadian delegation in Vienna. ¶4. (C) Canada's Draft Statement to the BOG Quote: IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS CANADA MARCH 2008 Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Chairman, My delegation would like express its deep appreciation to the Director General for the report contained in GOV/2008/4. While non-conclusive, the Agency's efforts pursuant to the work plan with Iran have made notable progress and demonstrate that a robust verification system can produce results. We would also like to thank the Deputy Director General for Safeguards for the technical briefing last week. The presentation, while noting some progress in obtaining clarifications from Iran, also make clear a number of matters of serious concern which we would like to see addressed. In this regard, the progress achieved by the IAEA to date highlights the legitimacy of the Agency's efforts including in areas related to weapons. The Director General identified possible linkages between Iran's nuclear and military programs, including administrative connections between projects related to uranium conversion, high explosives testing and the design for a missile re-entry vehicle, which could, in his words, "have a military nuclear dimension". This deeply concerns us. What is more, the report of the Director General makes clear that some of these possible linkages may still have some bearing on issues that are now identified as "no longer outstanding", including the role and activities of the Physics Research Centre prior to the razing of that facility. A complete resolution of all the Agency's questions regarding these possible linkages is required if the Agency is to verify that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively is to verify that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in nature. As indicated in the Director General's report, and further clarified in the Deputy Director General's technical briefing, the Agency's information regarding these linkages is derived from multiple sources and is consistent with findings in the Agency's own investigations. We therefore call on Iran to take note of the scope, nature and gravity of the information presented and to respond in a meaningful way. The Director General's latest report confirms once again that a confidence deficit has resulted from many years of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. The report also notes that Iran must establish confidence and affirms in this regard the need for assurances not only of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but equally important, of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. A full understanding of linkages between Iran's military and nuclear programs is a first step in this process. Iran must also fully implement its NPT safeguards agreement, including its modified code 3.1 obligations as they were agreed between Iran and the Agency and put an end to its "ad hoc" cooperation by fully implementing the additional protocol and all other transparency and access measures requested by the Director General. My government endorses fully the resolutions passed by this Board and by the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue, including Security Council resolution 1803 which was adopted on Monday. Iran must heed the requests of this Board and requirements of Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 by suspending enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and its work on its heavy water research reactor at Arak and related projects. In closing, I would like to reiterate my government's deep concern and request the Director General to continue to report on his verification efforts until such a time as Iran has taken all the steps required of it by the Board and Security Council and the Board has deemed that confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program has been established. I would also like to request that the report contained in document GOV/2008/4 be made public. Thank you. End quote. Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada WILKINS