NEW POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP BY THE CONSERVATIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001495 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV CA SUBJECT: NEW POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP BY THE CONSERVATIVES REF: A. OTTAWA 1470 ¶B. OTTAWA 1455 Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Unexpectedly early in the 40th Parliament, the Conservatives have called the bluff of the opposition parties by announcing an END to the federal funding for political parties, which basically keeps the opposition parties functioning. (The Conservatives' own successful fundraising has limited their own dependence on these funds.) The opposition will face a vote as early as December 1 in which they can either support the government's motion (unlikely) or introduce and pass their own motion opposing the government's motion, thereby triggering yet another federal election (which no one wants now). An attempt by the three opposition parties to form a coalition government is possible, but likely unworkable. While it remains possible the Conservatives will back down, they probably instead see this as the opportune time to deliver a deadly body blow to all three opposition parties, who are in a poorer position financially and politically to face another election. Such a radical change in the political landscape would nonetheless do little or nothing to increase the Conservatives' own popularity with the voters, while probably entirely alienating their remaining support in vote-rich Quebec. More likely, the current government and Parliament will remain intact for now, but the "kinder and gentler" Parliamentary dynamic that voters had hoped for in the current economic climate will instead take a more bitter and divisive form. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Conservative Party under Prime Minister Stephen Harper took an unexpected step toward political brinkmanship in the November 27 Economic and Fiscal Statement by Finance Minister Jim Flaherty (septel) by announcing an END to the public financing for federal political parties based on popular votes received in the last federal election (C$1.95 per vote). Flaherty described the move as a cost-cutting measure -- although it would save only about C$28 million out of the federal budget -- and as a leadership example that political parties, too, must tighten their belts in these tough economic times. ¶3. (C) The semi-surprise announcement (Harper's team had briefed selected press the previous day) has distinctly raised the stakes in the political GAME of chicken between the minority Conservative government and the still-bleeding Liberal Party, in particular. The Conservatives had given no heads up in the 2008 Throne Speech (ref a) or in their 2008 campaign platform that such a change to political party funding was even under contemplation. It may have come up during the recent Conservative Party policy convention in Winnipeg (ref b); Conservative Party contacts have resolutely declined Embassy's requests for copies of the convention's final resolutions, but insiders had not indicated that this funding issue was even on the radar scope. ¶4. (C) All three opposition leaders in the House of Commons have cried foul and have vowed to vote against the economic statement due to this funding issue (as well as other concerns about the lack of an actual stimulus package, deep doubts about the government's claim of a probable small surplus in the current fiscal year, and a new and seemingly unnecessary ban on strikes by public servants until 2010). The ruling Conservatives had already designated Monday, December 1 as an Opposition Day (two are required by Parliamentary rules in the sitting that ends on December 12), leaving the Liberals free to introduce their own motion Qleaving the Liberals free to introduce their own motion opposing the statement or demanding an amendment excising this provision. Because the economic statement is a ways and means motion, it will by definition be a confidence vote. If the opposition parties are present in sufficient numbers to pass this motion, the government would logically fall. ¶5. (C) The true strategy of the Conservatives is still not entirely clear. They must be banking on the assumptions that Canadians do not want another federal election so soon after the October 14 election, that the Liberals definitely would not wish for lame-duck leader Stephane Dion to lead the party through yet another election, and that the Liberals in particular will be forced to vote in such insufficient numbers in support of the opposition motion that it would fail. The ideal outcome, from the Conservative outlook, may be that the Liberals END up not only looking impotent and ineffective, but also face the prospect of financial ruin. While the Conservatives depend on federal funding for only about 37 pct of their budget, it provides the Liberals with about 63 pct of their budget, along with 57 pct for the New Democratic Party, 65 pct for the Green Party, and a whopping 86 pct for the Bloc Quebecois. ¶6. (C) There are already credible media reports of OTTAWA 00001495 002 OF 002 behind-the-scene talks between at least the Liberals and the NDP about possibly forming a coalition government should the government fall during the week of December 1. While coalition governments are not unprecedented in Canadian political history, they have only happened before in wartime. The Liberals and NDP remain uncomfortable and unlikely bedpartners -- and together would have only 114 seats versus the Conservatives' current 143 seats. Only a tripartite coalition including the Bloc would have sufficient votes to secure a majority, but the prospects of the three disparate parties agreeing on enough substance to form a government, to introduce, and to pass legislation -- including in early 2009, a new budget dealing with the current economic crisis -- are worse than dim. And probably none of the parties would want to see Dion -- however newly galvanized he appeared in the wake of Flaherty's presentation -- as the next Prime Minister. Dion could not impossibly resign immediately and turn the reins over to an interim Liberal leader, who could then theoretically head a coalition government. However, this scenario is also unlikely to sit well with the party faithful of any of the three opposition parties. ¶7. (C) The bottom line is that the Conservatives may -- incredibly -- successfully squeak through this vote and END up scoring a major body blow against all of their rivals, who have few other immediate prospects for alternative funding and who all have debts from the previous election, as well as from the Liberals' leadership race. If so, the Conservatives will have done their own image very little good by this abrupt change in the political landscape. Criticisms that the Conservative proposal is "mean-spirited" are already widespread, and there is considerable grumbling that the government is overly focused on a petty partisan victory instead of dealing with the larger and more pressing economic problems facing Canada and the world. Should the government fall and there be a new election early in 2009, the Conservatives would have the theoretical possibility of winning a majority, but it is hard to see any way that they could pick up sizable pockets of votes any where as a result of this maneuvering, while almost certainly alienating their remaining Quebec supporters. More likely, the current government and Parliament will remain intact for now, but the "kinder and gentler" Parliamentary dynamic that voters had hoped for will instead take a more bitter and divisive form. Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada WILKINS