NORWEGIAN ENERGY: A MERRY-GO-ROUND OR FISHY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000623 SIPDIS EUR/NB (MMCDOWELL),DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (LMARKOWITZ), DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (EROSSI, TSARKUS, JGIOVE),INR/I, EEB/ESC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PGOV SENV NO SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN ENERGY: A MERRY-GO-ROUND OR FISHY BUSINESS? REF: A. OSLO 126 ¶B. OSLO 128 ¶C. OSLO 129 Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Embassy officers approached parliamentarians to discuss concerns voiced by American producers and suppliers operating on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Given the forthcoming 20th licensing round, American energy majors are increasing calls for greater field operatorship opportunities, while stressing the need for opening up exploration areas. StatoilHydro's NCS operatorship dominance also raises concerns from U.S. companies. U.S. companies also emphasized: -- The ability of U.S. companies to effectively tackle the technological challenges posed by NCS deep-sea exploration; -- Concern that Norwegians are becoming increasingly disinterested in tapping the country's energy resources; and -- The vital role that energy companies play in the Norwegian economy. It is troubling that some segments of Norwegian public opinion strongly oppose any future NCS exploration. The Ambassador raised U.S. company concerns to Energy Minister Riis-Johansen on November 20. End Summary. Background: Unlock the Blocks! -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Norway is the third and fifth largest global exporter of gas and oil, respectively. In 2007, total Norwegian oil production was 2.6 million barrels per day (mbd),with total exports of 2.3 mbd. Recent government estimates indicate a current annual gas production of 96.4 billion standard cubic meters (bcm),of which 93.3 bcm were exported. Gas production is estimated to increase to 120-140 bcm by 2020. Norwegian gas extraction has increased sizably from 2007, in part due to increased deliveries from the Ormen Lange and Statfjord fields. Nevertheless, industry and governmental officials are concerned about future dwindling gas supply. ¶3. (U) NCS development involves a licensing system. The GON owns all subsea petroleum deposits on the NCS, and periodically opens certain blocks for exploration, production drilling and production. Production licenses are normally awarded through licensing rounds, with the GON announcing a certain number of blocks for which a production license application may be made. The GON decides, through the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and ultimately the Petroleum Ministry, on available blocks for each round. Undeveloped NCS frontier areas, which offer the most attractive potential commercial opportunities, are announced every 2-3 years. Frontier acreage is characterized by little geological knowledge of the area, significant technological challenges and a lack of infrastructure. ¶4. (U) The 20th licensing round has attracted 46 applicants--a record, and up significantly from the 19th round application size, where 24 companies submitted applications. The 20th round also involved the largest number of blocks--79 open for consideration. The previous round encompassed 33 blocks. ¶5. (U) Mature areas, mostly in the long-developed North Sea, considered less financially attractive given the small possibility of a "big find," have a separate licensing round regime, the award of production licenses in predefined areas (APA). APA awards occur annually. ¶6. (U) The Petroleum Ministry ultimately awards operatorships, and usually creates a group of companies for each license. The Ministry may also make adjustments to a group which forwarded a joint application. The license provides an exclusive right for exploration, drilling and petroleum production. The initial exploration period may last up to 10 years. ¶7. (C) Officially, licenses are awarded on the basis of impartial, objective, non-discriminatory and published criteria. While American companies reiterate their willingness to do business in Norway, one executive of a major producer previously noted that Norway practices "discretionary transparency," where the government awards licenses on those it simply "likes best." Petroleum Ministry officials have been candid as to the wholly subjective nature of the process, allowing successful applications to those it believes play by its rules (Reftel C). Shelving the Shelf? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Norway's energy sector is transitioning from oil to gas, with NCS oil production falling fast. No major oil fields have been discovered in 10 years, and recently revised estimates indicate that oil production will soon begin its long-expected decline quicker, and more sharply, than previously predicted (Reftel A). ¶9. (SBU) By all accounts, massive energy resources exist in the Nordland VI, VII and Troms II fields, located in the Barents Sea off the Lofoten Islands. The current Norwegian government, facing elections in 2009, has declared those fields off-limits, due to various environmental and fishing concerns. (Reftel B). ¶10. (C) The GON's integrated Management Plan, a paper providing the framework for petroleum activities in the Barents Sea and off of the Lofoten Islands, continues to face a delayed release. Industry insiders speculate that the delay is attributable to the lack of cohesion among the GON's coalition partners, who cannot agree upon a singular framework. U.S. Suppliers, Producers Energized: In or Out? -------------- -- ¶11. (U) The major U.S. producers are well-represented in NCS exploration. The significant U.S. investors offshore are ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, Marathon and Hess. Major U.S. petroleum service providers include Halliburton, Baker Hughes, National Oilwell Varco, Weatherford and BJ. In 2006, foreign and Norwegian petroleum firms invested approximately NOK 93 billion (USD 15 billion) in the offshore petroleum sector. During the last several months, industry has relayed concerns over access which are discussed below. StatoilHydro: Big Company on Campus -------------- ¶12. (U) In October 2007, Statoil and Norsk Hydro merged to create a massive Fortune 50 company, which holds approximately 80% of NCS operatorships. The company is the ninth largest energy supplier in the world (Reftel B),and has significant U.S. operations, including the Gulf of Mexico, the Chukchi Sea off of Alaska, and the Marcellus Shale assets in Appalachia. The company is majority owned by the GON, which will increase its ultimate ownership stake in the company to 67.5 percent. Problems Afield -------------- ¶13. (C) Embassy officers met with parliamentarians on the Storting (Parliament) Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment and/or their energy advisors, which involved members of the Conservative, Progress, Labor and Liberal parties. A spectrum of political viewpoints and ideologies were represented. The current GON ruling coalition is center-left under PM Jens Stoltenberg, consisting of the Labor, Socialist Left and Center parties. ¶14. (C) The following U.S. company concerns were conveyed by Embassy Officers during the meetings: -- While the increased number of 20th round bidders confirms continued interest in NCS development, the large number of applicants does not show large-scale interest by the major producers. The larger applicant pool consists mainly of small to mid-sized companies, many of which have been hard hit by the global credit crises. Larger energy producers possess the needed technical expertise (particularly demanded by the Barents Sea's challenging geologic and deep-water weather conditions),necessary investment capital and experience to tackle many of the demands required for operators. -- U.S. companies have been in Norway since the late 1960s, with ConocoPhillips behind the massive Ekofisk project, which initiated the Norwegian "oil adventure." These companies know how to navigate the thorny Norwegian regulatory regime, and have proven their long-term commitment to Norway and sensible, environmentally-sound NCS development. -- Many U.S. companies are expressing interest in "marginal" blocks, where profits will be small at best. The GON should view this as a commitment to NCS development, and consider such commitment when the same companies are applying for other more commercially lucrative blocks. -- StatoilHydro's market dominance remains a concern. Awarding the company a sizable increase in operatorships in the next round, or handing it the most economically interesting opportunities, sends foreign companies a message challenging Norway's claim to a perfectly transparent and fair system. Further, the company's existing NCS operatorships are causing problems for American licensee partners. Apparently spread too thin globally, StatoilHydro is not focusing on may of these operatorships--leaving their American partners frustrated that projects are not paid adequate attention, and moving too slow. In the short term, this means decreased GON energy revenues. -- The GON should not increase the number of licensees in each package of awarded blocks. The more actors makes it unwieldy for operators to effectively and economically operate or manage a field. -- Opening new acreage is necessary. Norway has not had a major find since the Ormen Lange field in 1997. Major producers are unlikely to continue business in Norway if there are no-long significant term business opportunities. Companies compete internally for valuable exploration resources: if the areas off Lofoten are never opened, U.S. companies may lose interest in further Norwegian investments. Developing a field takes at least 10-12 years. Decisions today about future development will have long-term implications. British Petroleum's decision to not participate in the 20th round is a strong sign that Norway's commercial attractiveness for the majors steadily decreases. -- The energy industry is important to Norway, and public outcries to halt NCS development will have serious domestic consequences. The petroleum sector accounts for approximately 24 percent of the country's GDP, and provides about one-third of Norway's revenues. An estimated 70,000 to 80,000 jobs are directly tied to the energy industry, while another 300,000 positions are indirectly linked--huge numbers for a country with a total population of approximately 4.6 million. Given global financial uncertainty, there seems little new industry which could immediately fill the job creation void should NCS development cease. Further, sending signals to Norwegian's youth that the energy industry is a dying career will discourage students in related disciplines: Norway's pride in deep-water engineering/technology excellence could thus be seriously undermined. -- Norway maintains a sterling safety and environmental record. (Note: Stringent GON safety requirements are often begrudgingly accepted by U.S. companies, who voice frustration that the GON mandates tougher requirements than its U.K. neighbor, including rig retrofitting, lower maximum labor hours and larger sleeping spaces). Operating near an environmentally-sensitive area would allow the GON to trumpet its tough operating requirements. -- The GON, including the Environment Minister and high-level Petroleum Ministry and Directorate officials, have raised increasing concerns that seismic tests (used in exploration) scare away fish. Industry understands that the GON may be setting the groundwork for denying Lofoten access by building an argument that fishing stock will be frightened away by basic exploration techniques. The Parliamentarians, Advisors react -------------- ¶15. (C) Meetings with the parliamentarians and/or their energy advisors revealed a commonality: all were concerned with StatoilHydro's market dominance. Each stressed that competition encouraged innovation. The Liberal party, adamantly opposed to opening up acreage off o Lofoten due to environmental concerns, pointed ut alternate possibilities in the Barents. (Note: Econ Officer was informed by one major U.S. prodcer that initial tests in the Barents have proven very disappointing). ¶16. (C) The Progress andConservative party representatives backed most, f not all, of the raised concerns, recognizing the long-time necessary for NCS development. The Conservative party, in particular, noted that the closing NCS opportunities would seriously undermine Norway's position as an expert in deep-sea extraction technologies. That party's Energy Advisor also stressed that the issue of "scared fish" is linked to the NPD's failure to enter into a meaningful dialogue with fishermen. All were admittedly candid that even their own parties suffered dissension. The Conservative Party's lead Parliamentarian on energy is facing concern from his Northern Norwegian constituents as to how opening acreage would hurt their fishing industry. Still Open, or Closed, for Business? -------------- ¶17. (C) Comment. U.S. energy producers and suppliers doing business in Norway often lambaste Norway for its tough regulations, high tax rates and sizable operation costs. Nevertheless, the same companies simultaneously praise the country for its stable government, clear playing rules, positive investment climate and overall transparency. The phrase "this isn't Venezuela" has been frequently voiced by industry. Yet, all is not ideal. Resources are falling, despite recent gas finds. Acreage of great potential, such as the areas off of the Lofoten Islands, may never be opened due to intense domestic fears of environmental degradation and decreased fishing stocks. The market dominance of StatoilHydro shall be put to the test during the 20th licensing round, answering foreign energy producer and supplier concerns. Public indifference as to overall exploration may ultimately close the tap on Norwegian energy. It is doubtful that U.S. companies will sit still as the Norwegian energy tolerance, and market opportunities, run dry. End Comment. WHITNEY