NOT YOUR FATHER'S NORWAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000057 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR NO SUBJECT: NOT YOUR FATHER'S NORWAY REF: A. OSLO 1161 ¶B. OSLO 922 Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney for reasons 1.4b and d 1.(C) Summary: The current center-left Government of Norway is systematically attempting to alter Norway,s foreign policy consensus, making it more distant from the U.S. Influential members of the government, including the Foreign Minister, Development Minister, and Finance Minister have capitalized on broad Norwegian trends to garner support for this new approach. If unchecked, this could threaten even our closest ties with Norway (intelligence and military cooperation). General displeasure with U.S. policy has dampened reaction from those opposed to "going too far" in this realignment, but Norwegians are beginning to ask if fundamentally weakening key relationships with the U.S. and NATO is positive. While the U.S. should not overreact, we should persistently and firmly respond to unhelpful Norwegian approaches. This may restrain the GON and will strengthen those Norwegians alarmed by the implications of this foreign policy shift. End Summary. A Break From Traditional Norwegian Foreign Policy -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Norway's foreign policy traditionally stressed transatlantic ties (including close relations to the U.S. and maintaining a seat in the "inner circle" of NATO),an emphasis on the UN and other international organizations, a generous development program and close, but not too close, cooperation with the EU and other Nordic nations. This policy consensus remained, under both Labor and Conservative governments, until the election of the current GON in October of 2005. Sharp Shifts in Policy -------------- ¶3. (C) The new GON (a coalition of the Labor, Center and Socialist Left Parties elected in the fall of 2005) quickly set out to distinguish itself from past foreign policy, immediately withdrawing Norway's small presence in Iraq and shifting Norwegians in Afghanistan out of OEF. Shortly afterwards, the Finance Minister's proposed (and later dropped) boycott of Israel signaled a major ideological shift. After over two years in power, a number of decisions indicate that the shift is real, strategic, and not limited to specific issues such as Iraq. Indications include: unilaterally normalizing relations with Hamas during the short-lived Palestinian unity government; intense debates over the principle of sending troops to Afghanistan; increased relations with (and development aid to) leftist Central and South American countries including Cuba; disinvestment of companies by Norway's Pension Fund as a political tool; continued high-level meetings with Iranian officials, including the FM, in opposition to our requests; a vocal push for civilian over military international involvement; an almost ideological emphasis on dialogue and on peace and reconciliation facilitation; repeated inappropriate and public criticism of President Bush (ref B); refusals to meet high-level USG visitors on controversial topics (missile defense and cluster munitions); and a pattern of regularly defining and defending GON policies by criticizing ours. What is Driving the Independent Agenda -------------- ¶4. (C) This shift in foreign policy has several causes, including the influence of the Socialist Left party on the coalition (an anti-NATO, anti-US, anti-EU party) and the need to adjust to Norway's extreme wealth and corresponding global sovereign interests. Norway's wealth provides the means to conduct an active foreign policy and also triggers a desire in many Norwegians to use this wealth responsibly, to solve problems. In pursuit of this impulse the GON has often shown a frustration with existing processes and is tempted to take independent, &coalition of the willing,8 type actions. In addition Norway is beginning to realize the influence that the $380 billion Pension Sovereign Wealth Fund and energy resources can give its foreign policy. ¶5. (C) Another significant influence is the personal impact of Norway's Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Stoere. Stoere is a charismatic, highly self-confident, ambitious, and forceful personality who believesstrongly in the ideals of dialogue, the use of cvilian rather than military power, and in Norways unique ability to influence world events. Some observers have charaterized his style as &old8 Frnch diplomacy, perhaps reflecting his education t the Institut d,Etudes Politiques de Paris. Stere remains the most popular politician in Norwa and has been mentioned as a potential future candidate for Prime Minister. ¶6. (C) Stoere has set out to change Norwegian foreign policy, prohibiting MFA employees from referring to Norway as a "little country," a phrase which long symbolized Norway's self image as a harmless peripheral nation. Instead, Stoere has spoken of Norway as a "surplus nation" with an obligation to assist and engage. In pursuit of this priority, Stoere shows a clear willingness to depart from international consensus, most prominently demonstrated by his decision to speak with and give money to the Hamas members of the Palestinian Unity Government. The February 2007 launch of the Oslo Process to ban cluster munitions is another example of how Stoere's personal convictions drive Norwegian foreign policy. Stoere's activism is popular with the public which is eager to expand Norway's pristine international image. Russia: Carrots Only Please -------------- ¶7. (C) The GON's Russia policy is characterized by a consistent stress on the positive and a reluctance to criticize even the most blatant of Russia actions. This stems from Norway's focus on the High North, its desire to increase economic ties with Russia, continued unsettled relations with Russia over Svalbard and over the maritime boundary in the Barents, and its reluctance to be seen as joining U.S. criticisms of Russia. Russian threats to allies over missile defense, aggressive behavior against Estonia and Georgia, and unhelpfulness on Kosovo all received no public comments from the GON. Instead, while on a visit to Russia, the PM echoed inaccurate Russian claims on missile defense. The GON gives Russia the benefit of the doubt, to a much wider and deeper degree than it does to the U.S. MFA Political Director Kai Eide commented at a recent e-Pine meeting that Russia's sins are the West's fault for isolating Russia. The MOD takes a different tack, finding increased Russian military actions concerning, but the GON as a whole refuses to remove its rose colored glasses. Increased economic ties will only reinforce the GON's kid glove approach to Russia's missteps. The GON was quick to point to Gazprom's inclusion of StatoilHydro in the Stockman gas field as confirmation of its Russia strategy. North, South, East or West: Which Suits Norway Best -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The GON regularly proposes various strategic priorities. The GON's High North strategy (focus on the Barents and Arctic regions emphasizing close relations with Russia),closer ties to the EU, and increased cooperation with Sweden and Finland are all touted as high priorities. The security link with the U.S. through NATO is mentioned, but is clearly far less compelling. The GON's vacillations on support for ISAF are a good example of this development. ¶9. (C) The central (if unspoken) question now appears to be what will replace the NATO and transatlantic link as the primary orientation for Norway. At a recent conference Stoere made a revealing comment, referring to the transatlantic alliance as a "strategic hedge" which allows Norway to pursue other options. This is a far cry from the traditional Norwegian view that NATO and the U.S. are the "anchors" of Norwegian foreign and security policy. ¶10. (C) In October 2007, Stoere launched the two-year "Refleks" project to identify key Norwegian interests, explore the challenges of globalization, and suggest priorities for Norwegian foreign policy. This is an attempt to rally domestic support for a deep and abiding foreign policy change. It will explore Norway's relationship with Russia, the EU, the U.S., China, Africa etc., and likely recommend priorities quite different from previous governments. The current government's clear goal is to cement these new priorities so that any new government in 2009 will be hard placed to change them. The Dilemma of Europe (and the Nordics) -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Relations to the EU remain both appealing and difficult for the GON. Norwegians enjoy nearly all the privileges of EU citizens and Norway is a substantial annual contributor to the EU budget. The GON generally agrees with EU foreign policy. Despite official claims that remaining outside the EU allows Norway freedom of action, many Labor Party leaders would like to be in the EU. However, Norwegian society and the current GON coalition are split on the EU issue (the Socialist Left and the Center Party strongly oppose EU membership). Referendum defeats over EU membership and strong opposition in opinion polls prevent any formal increase in Norway's ties to the EU. ¶12. (C) Informal agreements such as participation in the EU Nordic battle group and with EU Security and Defense Policy bodies, and closer ties to EU members Sweden and Finland are alternatives. Nordic cooperation appeals to the GON but lacks sufficient weight and substance to replace the traditional bedrocks of Norwegian foreign policy. The Nordic arena also would not provide Norwegian foreign policy priorities with the international impact that Stoere and others seek. Cooperation with Sweden and Finland on Defense issues is substantial and growing (for details see reftel A). Is the UN the Answer? -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The current GON has continued the traditional focus on the UN, with PM Stoltenberg actively involved in UN reform efforts and the GON insisting on a UN mandate before any commitment of troops to international operations. However, the limitations of the UN to resolve issues such as Kosovo, Iran's nuclear development, terrorism and climate change have led some Norwegians to question the weight that the UN holds in Norwegian foreign policy. While the UN will remain a central part of any new Norwegian foreign policy consensus, the GON is seeking complementary foreign policy means as well. Beginnings of a Debate -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Spurring some debate, the President of Parliament, Thorbjorn Jagland argued in a recent newspaper article that despite a grand self image Norway (outside the EU) lacks the international weight to effectively influence policy on essential issues such as climate change, terrorism, and democracy promotion. Jagland's comments created a flurry of counter-arguments defending the effectiveness of Norway's peace promotion efforts and Norway's global influence. We expect the debate to grow as the traditional consensus fractures and consequences of the shift become more apparent to the public. Implications for the USG and Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) The success or failure of the GON's attempt to change Norway's foreign policy consensus will have a significant impact on our bilateral relations. In the short-term, it is clear that the current GON will continue to pursue its activist and independent line until the next election in ¶2009. In interactions with the GON, senior USG officials should not assume generally common interests and policies. This is not the Norway many remember, and relations with the GON include more disagreements than in the past. ¶16. (C) However, despite general skepticism of U.S. policies, the relationship with the U.S. still is important to the Norwegian people and elements of the GON. Domestically, no government can afford to be seen as the one which "lost the U.S." It is therefore important to make very clear, in public and in private, our objections to GON policies. Failure to do so will encourage more drift and give GON politicians room to claim U.S. approval of their actions. ¶17. (C) Longer-term, the lack of opposition leaders with foreign policy experience complicates the crafting of a viable alternative foreign policy and of an articulate defense of the traditionally strong links with the U.S. If not challenged, many of the changes the current GON is pursuing could become the basis for a new consensus in Norwegian foreign policy, complicating our bilateral relationship. Respectful but clear senior level USG responses when Norway acts against U.S. interests (missile defense, Russia, Iran, etc.) can stem, or even help Norwegians turn this trend. GON actions on Kosovo, commitments and comments on missile defense and Afghanistan at the Bucharest NATO summit, and the decision on whether to buy the Joint Strike Fighter will all be pivotal indications of just how far the GON is willing to pursue its inclinations. WHITNEY