NORWAY, RUSSIA AND GEORGIA; OPPORTUNITY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000513 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 TAGS: ENRG EPET MARR PREL RS NO SUBJECT: NORWAY, RUSSIA AND GEORGIA; OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN TIES TO NORWAY REF: A. A: OSLO 500 ¶B. B: OSLO 482 ¶C. C: OSLO 488 ¶D. D: OSLO 489 ¶E. E: OSLO 497 ¶F. F: 2007 OSLO 1161 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary. The GON is coming to terms with the changing nature of the West's relations with Russia after Georgia. Publicly, the GON has been critical of Russia's (and Georgia's) actions while stressing the need to continue close and productive bilateral relations with Russia. Privately, officials stress the differences between Georgia's and Norway's relations with Russia, but some admit that the return of geopolitics and the use of force will require some adjustments in GON strategic thinking. Norway's two-track approach -- criticizing Russia over Georgia while rejecting sanctions and pushing partnership with Moscow -- presents challenges and opportunities. This moment offers us an opportunity to strengthen Norway's commitment to NATO and to improve our bilateral relationship. End Summary. Norway is not Georgia -------------- ¶2. (C) The starting point for almost all Norwegian viewpoints on Georgia is that Norway's relationship with Russia is categorically different from all other bordering Russia, especially Georgia. Norwegians, including current and former Ministers, Parliament members, the CHOD and other military officials, political advisors and journalists unanimously stress, inter alia, that Norwegians are "too smart" to provoke Russia. This stress on the difference is understandable and accurate in many aspects but may indicate an unwillingness to acknowledge similarities. Georgia and Norway have approximately the same population and both have unresolved border and sovereignty questions with Russia (for Norway this is the maritime border, Svalbard and fishing issues). Norwegian officials and the public do not believe that Russia would ever attack Norway militarily, but some are increasingly aware that Russia is willing to at least consider force as a legitimate tool of international politics. A few recognize that Russia could take a step short of force (e.g. sending an oil rig to Svalbard) to provoke. The threat of force is not imminent, but less "out of the question" than before August 7. FM Stoere noted publicly that Article Five covers Svalbard (Reftel A). (Note: The unique legal status of Svalbard could provide a tempting place for Russia to flex its muscles.) NATO is Important, a Reminder -------------- 3.(C) Russia's actions have re-invigorated the long-stagnant domestic debate over defense and security matters. Proponents of a stronger defense and a closer relationship with the U.S. have been strengthened by the events in Georgia and have been able to challenge the conventional wisdom that dialogue and negotiation will resolve all disputes. Some argue for closer ties to the EU to seek "political security". The use of force is anathema to dialogue-loving Norwegians and not all wish to accept that the potential use of force by Russia is an eventuality that needs to be considered; or, if it is considered, the answer is to seek dialogue to forestall it, not to prepare in case dialogue fails. Despite this reluctance, even the most hardened dialogue proponents have stressed Norway's NATO membership as the ultimate difference in Norway's and Georgia's relationship with Russia. This is a welcome change from recent drift on the relevance of NATO. Many Norwegians never fully accepted NATO's mission of fighting terror or why NATO was in Afghanistan. Support for NATO is consequently difficult to maintain based on out of area operations. With Article Five seeming ever more relevant, however, a shift in attitude on NATO may positively impact future decisions on Norway's defense budget, the purchase of fighter aircraft (JSF),and strengthening Norway's relationship with the United States. Nordic Cooperation Complementing NATO? -------------- 4.(C) Alternatively, the Georgian crisis could deepen Nordic defense cooperation and reduced reliance on trans-Atlantic ties. Norway claims that its support for Nordic Defense is based on logistics and training savings as well as from a desire to encourage Swedish and Finnish membership in (or closeness to) NATO. However, as reported in Reftel F, Norway is searching for security arrangements to compliment its NATO membership. Nordic Defense could be one such area as all Nordic countries are equally concerned with Russia and take events in the North seriously. Supporters of the Swedish JAS Gripen have claimed that it was designed specifically to counter Russian fighters. Differences in defense strategy, as well as Sweden and Finland's neutrality have prevented closer cooperation in the past but Norway will continue to push for common defense strategies. Article Five Key...But Keep Russia a Partner -------------- 5.(C) Other implications from the Georgia crisis will impact Norway's approach to upcoming NATO issues. The Deputy Defense Minister has repeatedly stressed the need to return to core NATO values such as Article five protections. Any Norwegian increase to its commitment in Afghanistan will likely be accompanied by calls for increased attention to NATO territory, most significantly in the Barents. Another reaction will be increased GON reluctance to take any steps which could be characterized as antagonistic towards Russia. Norway has been one of the more skeptical NATO members regarding granting MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia and this skepticism will most probably increase. This reflects the reality that a significant segment of Norwegian officials and the public remain convinced that the West, with the U.S. in the lead, have pushed Russia so far that a response was inevitable. They blame Georgian miscalculations for the Russian response and remain convinced that Norwegians would never make the same mistakes. It also reflects the GON's instinct to pacify Russia rather than challenge. (Comment: It is noteworthy that the GON has not stressed this publicly, rather criticizing Russia and demanding compliance with international law. The temptation to turn to a "carrots only" approach to Russia is strong here, however, we should not take Norway for granted on this. End Comment) No Sanctions, Work with Russia a Priority -------------- ¶6. (C) GON officials have made it clear that Norway will continue its close cooperation with Russia on Barents Sea issues and will oppose any attempts to impose sanctions on Russia. The GON has openly stated that any break in cooperation with Russia in the North would hurt Norway's interests more than Russia's and would throw away years of work in developing cooperative organizations and ties. Cooperation on energy developments in the Barents will also continue, including StatoilHydro's partnership with Gazprom and Total on development of the Shtockman field. Challenges and Opportunities for the U.S. -------------- ¶7. (C) At a time when Norway feels vulnerable, it would be of great benefit to stress in interactions with Norwegian officials (at UNGA and elsewhere) the continued commitment of U.S. to NATO Article 5 protections and the importance of NATO solidarity. Stressing international law and the vulnerability of small states will also be important as well as any increase of USG attention to the Arctic (military, scientific, general). NATO solidarity has increased relevance now, and we should stress that when Russia threatens Poland or the Balts. If Russia succeeds in re-establishing its sphere of influence in Central Europe, stronger designs in the North could follow. It will also be important to re-emphasize the continuing importance of Afghanistan to ensure that Norway does not lose focus. The possibility of a structured dialogue with Norway takes on additional importance and could help return our bilateral relationship to its former strength. The USG could also benefit from accentuating and building on close ties with Norway's intelligence and defense Russia experts. Unlike many countries, Norway maintained a robust analytical and intelligence capability on Russia and the benefits of increased ties with the GON in these areas would reassure the Norwegians and provide the USG with valuable perspectives on Russia. WHITNEY