Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OSLO50
2008-01-25 05:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

SMOKE AND MIRRORS OVER NORWAY'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY

Tags:  MOPS PGOV PREL NO 
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DE RUEHNY #0050 0250533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250533Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6556
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0183
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3252
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0280
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000050 

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SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/NB AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL NO
SUBJECT: SMOKE AND MIRRORS OVER NORWAY'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY

REF: OSLO 1161

Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney for reasons 1.4 b and d
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000050

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/NB AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL NO
SUBJECT: SMOKE AND MIRRORS OVER NORWAY'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY

REF: OSLO 1161

Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney for reasons 1.4 b and d

1.(C) Summary: An internal debate over Afghanistan policy in
the Socialist Left Party (the most radical of Norway's three
party coalition) resulted in statements from the Norwegian
Ministry of Defense which on the surface seem to indicate an
inclination to push for changes in NATO's Afghanistan policy
during the NATO Defense Minister's Meeting in Vilnius. As
detailed in reftel, Norway's defense policy is shifting and
its behavior in NATO on various issues such as missile
defense, responses to Russian missteps and cluster munitions
have been less than helpful. However, in this case we
believe that MOD statements are part of a Labor Party effort
to co-opt existing NATO plans and priorities regarding
Afghanistan in order to present the Socialist Left Party (SV)
with the image of a victory while maintaining current
Norwegian commitments to ISAF. End Summary

2.(C) SV has long opposed Norwegian involvement in
Afghanistan and is in principle opposed to Norway's NATO
membership. Forced to accept Norway's involvement in
Afghanistan (and NATO membership) by other coalition members,
SV has waged a successful effort within the government (with
left leaning allies in the Labor Party) to:
--Put limitations on the use of Norwegian troops in ISAF,
including an unwritten caveat which prevents the use or
stationing of Norwegian troops in the south,
--Push for the UN to take over control of all aspects of
Afghanistan operations,
--Encourage an independent line from NATO consensus, and
--Regularly criticize US military tactics in Afghanistan.


3. (C) Despite this success, many members of SV are
dissatisfied and are pushing for an even more aggressive
stance by SV leadership within the GON. An internal SV party
meeting January 26 and 27 produced a unified set of demands
that SV believes the GON should push NATO to adopt.
Statements from the Deputy Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide
made after the SV meeting outlined the main elements that he
says Norway will push NATO to adopt. These include:
--The UN must be given clear responsibility for coordinating
all efforts in Afghanistan,
--The UN's field efforts must be coordinated with the
regional protection groups,
--Military planning must factor in civil strategies,
--Regional protection groups must be given more support,
--Concrete steps must be taken to bolster regional
authorities.


4. (C) SV leaders enthusiastically welcomed Eide,s statement
and said that these ideas will end "NATO's aggressive warfare
strategy." When asked about this quote the Defense Minister
did not refute the allegations of aggressive warfare but
simply stated that she and other European Defense Ministers
agreed that NATO's strategy must be revised to create better
coordination of civilian developments and military operations
and that the UN should take on a central role. Asked what
she would say if the US asked for additional troop
commitments, she stated "Norway is already making a
substantial contribution. We do not have the capacity to
contribute more in Afghanistan this year."


5. (C) Reliable MOD contacts claim that Eide and the
Minister,s quotes do not indicate a GON desire to alter NATO
strategy and that there is in fact no separate Norwegian
strategy proposal. This statement rings true and we suspect
that the public comments are an effort to cloak expected NATO
priorities for Afghanistan as victories for the GON, thus
satisfying SV and relieving some of the pressure to withdraw
troops. While the GON does go to great lengths to pacify SV,
the MOD is equally committed to maintaining its current
commitments in Afghanistan. The open question is whether the
ultimate Vilnius outcome will satisfy SV.
WHITNEY

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