Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08OSLO436
2008-08-05 14:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA, WASTE, AND SECURITY DURING

Tags:  KNNP NRC ENRG DOE TRGY SENV OVIP MX PARM RU 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0436/01 2181414
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051414Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 2445
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 7991
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4007
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0845
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3291
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6945
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000436 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS


FOR DHS WASHDC, NRC WASHDC, DOE/NNSA FOR N. NELSON-JEAN,
STATE FOR INS/NESS FOR FENSTERMACHER & PLAPP, STATE FOR
WHA/CAN FOR GREG SPROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: KNNP NRC ENRG DOE TRGY SENV OVIP MX PARM RU
NO
SUBJECT: CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA, WASTE, AND SECURITY DURING
NRC CHAIRMAN KLEIN'S VISIT TO NORWAY

Classified By: Political Counselor Kristen Bauer for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000436 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR DHS WASHDC, NRC WASHDC, DOE/NNSA FOR N. NELSON-JEAN, STATE FOR INS/NESS FOR FENSTERMACHER & PLAPP, STATE FOR WHA/CAN FOR GREG SPROW E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018 TAGS: KNNP NRC ENRG DOE TRGY SENV OVIP MX PARM RU NO SUBJECT: CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA, WASTE, AND SECURITY DURING NRC CHAIRMAN KLEIN'S VISIT TO NORWAY Classified By: Political Counselor Kristen Bauer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On his recent visit to Norway, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman Dale Klein was approached by Russian nuclear regulators extremely concerned about their vanishing authority. Norwegian officials also appear to be frustrated about Russia,s limited cooperation in cleanup efforts and worried about Russia,s nuclear naval and ice-breaker fleets. A visit to the Halden Research Reactor highlighted security concerns at the site. End Summary. -------------- Purpose of visit; Officials met -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman Dale Klein visited Norway from June 10-13, 2008, for the purpose of providing a briefing at the Halden 50th Anniversary Seminar, and for a site visit to the Halden Research Reactor Project. He met with several significant government, industry, and education officials, including: Oyvind Slake, Secretary of State for Industry and Trade; Luis Echavarri, OECD Director General; Bernard Fourest, Electricite de France Chairman; Judith Melin, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate Director General; Ole Harbitz, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority Director General; Kjell Bendiksen, Institute for Energy Technology President, and; Sergey Adamchik, Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service Deputy Chairman. He also met with the operating managers of the Halden Project, including Wolfgang Wiesenack, Halden Project Manager, and; Fridtjov Owre, Halden Deputy Project Manager. During the Halden site visit he toured the Halden Man Machine Laboratory, the Virtual Reality Center, the Halden Workshop and the reactor control room. -------------- Russian Regulators Lose Authority -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Prior to commencement of the Halden seminar, the Chairman met with two officials of the Russian nuclear regulating authority Rostechnadzor: the Deputy Chairman, Sergey Adamchik, and Irina Sokolova, Deputy Head of International Relations. Mr. Adamchik expressed significant concern that, in reorganizing the feder
al executive, his agency had its regulatory authority removed, and that this authority effectively no longer exists. As such, effective legal control over Russian nuclear activities now lies in the hands of political authorities. The Russian delegation provided a written copy of a discussion of the issue and requested that the U.S. government send a letter to the Russian leadership supporting a restoration of Rostechnadzor,s regulatory authority. -------------- --- Concerns about Russia dominate meeting with NPRA -------------- --- ¶4. (C) The Chairman met with the Norwegian National Radiation Protection Agency (NRPA) and was briefed on their emergency preparedness programs and concerns regarding nuclear waste in the Russian Kola Peninsula region. Much of Norway,s concern regarding emergency preparedness is due to &out of country8 concerns, specifically Russia,s naval and ice-breaker fleets. The NRPA said that, post-Chernobyl, they have installed a 29 station radioactivity monitoring network around the country. NRPA does not have significant mobile monitoring capability, such as by aircraft. ¶5. (C) During discussions about nuclear waste in the Kola Peninsula region, the NRPA identified significant nuclear legacy management issues associated with Russian waste disposal. Examples included an old vessel tied up at a pier with approximately 600 spent fuel assemblies onboard. The NRPA staff expressed frustration in that they have been trying to work to enhance a safety culture mindset with its Russian regulatory counterpart, but have been driven instead by Russia to focus only on specific problems. Additionally, the NRPA has been challenged to keep an atmosphere of cooperation going in an environment of reduced financial support to Russia from Norway. ¶6. (SBU) The NRPA requested U.S. participation in its cooperation programs with its Russian counterparts. -------------- Presentations made at the Halden Seminar -------------- ¶7. (SBU) On Wednesday, June 11th the Chairman attended the Halden 50th anniversary seminar and made a presentation entitled &Development trends of nuclear energy utilization and safety regulation in the United States.8 The seminar was well attended, with over 130 guests from 15 countries. Notable points from the presentations include: --Oyvind Slake, State Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Norway, explained that, in the 1970,s Norway had some interest in nuclear power, but, following extensive oil discoveries, the Norwegian parliament set a policy against nuclear power in 1980. Norway does believe, however, that the peaceful use of nuclear power does not contradict non-proliferation concerns. --Mr. Slake also said that Norway began cooperation initiatives with the Russian nuclear regulator in the Kola Peninsula region in the early 1990,s. --Luis Echavarri, Director General, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, discussing uranium supply security, outlined that uranium commodity is a readily available resource with known reserves of 150-200 years. --Mr. Echavarri also said that the key policy challenges to nuclear power include: implementation of high level waste repositories; involvement of stakeholders in decision making, and; coherent regulatory framework and energy policy. He also provided that key infrastructure and financing challenges include: education and training, building industrial capability, and financing reactors and fuel cycle facilities. --Pal Perstrud, Director, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, stated that the atmosphere is currently 40% above pre-industrial carbon levels and that energy consumption is predicted to increase 80% by 2030. This requires significant investment in nclear and renewable energy sources to just limit urther increases of carbon concentrations. --udith Melin, Director General, Swedish Nuclear Powr Inspectorate, expressed concern about the manynew countries embarking upon nuclear programs wih no experience, and the need to enhance internatonal cooperation. She stated that there are many groups available to proide assistance and international support, and tha small countries are resource challenged in balacing international and domestic duties and commitments. --Ole Harbitz, Director General, The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NPRA),explained that more than 70% of research and test reactors (RTR) are greater than 40 years old and suggested that many were past the end of life both financially and environmentally. He also expressed that there is insufficient international cooperation on RTR safety and security, such as exists for power reactors, and that the IAEA should support harmonization of RTR safety standards. Presentations were also given by Bernard Fourest, Electricite de France, Chairman of the Halden Reactor Project Board of Management; and Massimo Salvatores, Generation IV International Forum Policy Director. -------------- Visit to Halden Research Reactor -------------- ¶8. (C) On Thursday, June 12th, the Chairman visited the Halden Reactor Project with the following observations: --Plant conditions at Halden were not up to U.S. standards. The staff interacts very informally and does not exhibit a strong leadership structure. --Security at the site is limited. The only noted guard force was at the entrance checkpoint to the facility. Additionally, in response to our noting that the guard force was not armed, Halden management responded that &this was Norway,8 implying there were no credible threats in Norway. We were informed that the facility had run site penetration exercises by a very credible opponent, and that the invasion force was promptly stopped upon entering the site. --Halden management believes that the NRC provided great support to Halden and desires to continue its cooperation with NRC. --The Halden machine shop was noteworthy, with exceptional precision manufacturing capability and highly skilled technicians. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Comment: Although Chairman Klein,s visit to Norway was highly successful, it brought to light several developments, chief among them the loss of authority by the independent civilian nuclear regulator in Russia. Although the NRC believes that the USG should continue support of Norwegian regulators efforts to engage Russia in emergency preparedness and waste processing in the Kola Peninsula, Norwegian authorities are clearly frustrated with Russia,s lack of cooperation. Although the USG should continue to make clear to Norway at high levels that we are willing to support nuclear power development initiatives in Norway itself, post believes that for the foreseeable future, Norwegian politicians will not find this politically palatable. The lack of security at the Halden Reactor demonstrates a typical Norwegian &it can,t happen here8 mindset which has been seen recently in other areas, such as the Bhatti terrorism trial. Nonetheless, it remains a cause for concern. End Comment. ¶10. Chairman Klein has cleared this cable. WHITNEY

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