NORWAY'S INTEREST IN IRAQ PRIMARILY BASED ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000326 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2018 TAGS: ABLD EAID ECON EPET PGOV PREL IZ NO SUBJECT: NORWAY'S INTEREST IN IRAQ PRIMARILY BASED ON IMMIGRATION ISSUES REF: OSLO 20 Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Kristen Bauer for reasons 1.4 b and d 1.(C) Summary: Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister participated in the Stockholm Iraq Compact meeting and pledged to help Iraqi with reconciliation, democracy building, humanitarian needs and energy cooperation but did not offer details. According to MFA contacts Norwegian participation in the Stockholm meeting was primarily aimed at achieving the same "deal" with Iraq on repatriation that Sweden received. This effort did not succeed as the Iraqis refused to even talk until the Norwegians fixed the issue of finding a site for the new Iraqi Embassy in Oslo. Energy cooperation and humanitarian assistance remain the primary areas of interaction between Iraq and Norway although further development of these ties seems uncertain at this time. End Summary. -------------- Norway's Views on the ICI -------------- ¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere originally planed to attend the Stockholm conference, but was unable to do so because of an unplanned stop in Dublin to celebrate the agreement on a new treaty to ban most cluster munitions. Deputy FM Raymond Johansen replaced him and pledged Norway's willingness to support a "broad and legitimate political reconciliation process" and called for Iraq to create democratic institutions which safeguard the rights of women, minorities and other vulnerable groups. He highlighted Norway's chairing of a humanitarian donor group in Amman and called for closer cooperation between the UN, Iraq and the international community. Johansen also promised to support Iraq in rebuilding its economy, particularly in capacity building in the petroleum sector. Note: These pledges did not cover any new ground. ¶3. (C) After a conversation with the MFA's Iraq desk, the true grounds for Norway's interest in Iraq became apparent. The MFA official first expressed Norway's support for the ICI goals and their belief that the ICI meeting's normality was a good sign. She did not, however, have any indication that Norway was planning any additional assistance to Iraq. She then mentioned that Norway's primary motivation for attending the ICI conference was to obtain the same deal on repatriation with Iraq that Sweden had reached. When Johansen held a bilateral meeting with the Iraqis, he specifically asked for this type of deal. He was told that no deal was possible until the GON solved the impasse with the Oslo City Council that is preventing the Iraqis from establishing an embassy in Oslo. The GON agreed that Johansen would accompany the Iraqi Ambassador (resident in Stockholm) to the City Council to push for resolution of this issue. Note: The MFA official mentioned that the Iraqis seemed to regret the repatriation deal with Sweden with some Iraqi officials openly complaining that now everyone wants the same deal. The same Iraqis said that Sweden hosting the ICI meeting was part of the repatriation deal. End Note. -------------- Iraqis in Norway -------------- ¶4. (C) Iraqis comprise the third largest immigrant group in Norway (approximately 22,000) and the number of Iraqis coming to Norway is growing. The number of Iraqi asylum cases has doubled from 2007 and the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration has dramatically increased staffing assigned to processing Iraqi asylum and refugee cases. Many Iraqi asylum seekers are Kurdish and/or come from Northern Iraq, leading UDI officials to speculate that it is not any specific events that are the cause of the increase, but simply word of mouth from the many Kurdish Iraqis in Norway. Norway is eager to tighten rules to discourage such immigration and is also very interested in developing mechanisms to ease the departure of unwanted individuals, such as Mullah Krekar. (Septel will cover Norway's Iraq population in detail.) -------------- Energy Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (SBU) StatoilHydro, Norway's main energy company, recently expressed interest in investing in Iraq but is holding off until the dispute between the Kurds and the central government over revenue sharing and authority to grant contracts is resolved. DNO, a smaller Norwegian energy company, is actively producing oil in northern Iraq but some in the company have questioned the viability of a long-term presence. The Norwegian Ministry of Energy has an ongoing program of assistance in terms of training and capacity OSLO 00000326 002 OF 002 building with the Iraqi Oil Ministry and is active in encouraging Iraq to participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). So, while there is interest and potential, at present there is little likelihood that Norway's energy sector will drive any significant increase in Norwegian involvement in Iraq. -------------- Humanitarian Activities -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Norwegian assistance to Iraq is primarily funneled through Norwegian and international NGOs and the UN. Other assistance is given to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and IRFFI. The GON has contributed $23.38 million to IRFFI since 2003 (half to the UNDP and half to the World Bank) and $3.23 million to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. The Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Norwegian People's Aid, which are heavily funded by the GON, all are involved in differing projects concerning Iraq. Norwegian Church Aid has worked in Iraq since 1997 in the Baghdad and Basra regions. Their work is primarily in water and hygiene projects, psychiatric help to children and youth, and in strengthening civil society. The other groups are not in Iraq but help with Iraqi refugees in Lebanon and Syria, particularly with education. A Norwegian NGO, FAFA, conducted a survey of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and an estimate on what this influx was costing the Jordanian government, which is the first large-scale study of this issue. There has been no indications that 2008 aid will be increased or changed in focus. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Comment: It appears that Norway's interest in Iraq is primarily driven by domestic concerns over rising asylum seekers and immigration policies. The reluctance of the Iraqis to discuss a repatriation deal may spur the GON to pressure the Oslo City Council over the embassy building. If the GON does this it will set a precedent that could prove useful to our efforts to encourage similar pressure on the City Council for our NEC permits. If the GON is unable to resolve the Iraqi Embassy issue, a deal may not be possible and the Iraqis may give up their attempt to establish an embassy in Oslo. This would be a very negative indication of the GON's real willingness to support Iraq. WHITNEY