NORWAY'S NEW DEFENSE PLAN:ILLUSIONARY INCREASES

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000183 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018 TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV PINS PREL NO SUBJECT: NORWAY'S NEW DEFENSE PLAN:ILLUSIONARY INCREASES REF: 2007 OSLO 1161 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary: Norway,s recently announced new long-term defense plan was touted as strengthening the armed forces but in reality politically motivated and costly elements leave little room for any real strengthening of Norway,s Armed Forces. The plan will continue to stress High North and territorial (and maritime) defenses leaving Norway,s ability to participate in international operations limited to current commitments or less. The study does not comment upon or impact the ongoing fighter aircraft competition and only briefly mentions Nordic Defense Cooperation. End Summary. New Four Year Plan Announced -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 28, Defense Minister Strom Erichsen presented the GON,s long-term defense plan. The release of the plan is the final step in a year-long process involving two Defense Studies and much internal and public debate about the shape of Norway,s Defense (see reftel for details). The new four year plan includes a 160 million dollar increase in the Ministry of Defense,s budget, an increase in overall personnel of one thousand, the closure of the current national HQ at Jatta, near Stavanger (with MOD claiming no impact on NATO,s Joint Warfare Center),and consolidation of the national headquarters in Bodo, closure of several bases throughout Norway and the transfer of responsibility of the defense of Norway to the Home Guard. The GON plan rejected several Ministry of Defense and CHOD suggestions, including compulsory military service for women, termination of the motor torpedo boat (MTB) program, creation of an additional professional battalion, closure of additional bases and reductions in the Home Guard. The plan includes statements of general support for strengthening the UN, maintaining NATO as the cornerstone of Norway,s security, greater involvement in European defense and security programs, and closer Nordic Defense Cooperation, but it is difficult to see how these goals will be achieved with the Armed Forces structure that the plan details. The Illusion of Progress -------------- ¶3. (C) General Diesen, the Norwegian CHOD, supported by the experts who conducted the two Defense Policy Studies, has long argued that with its current budget and force structure Norway cannot continue its level of international operations and is incapable of defending Norwegian territory. The commander of Norway,s Army, General Mood went even farther publicly claiming that the Norwegian "micro army" is only capable of defending an Oslo suburb. The need for additional budgetary support was recognized by the GON (against the wishes of the Socialist Left Party, one of the coalition members) but the impact of the budgetary increase will be minimal given the reluctance of the GON to take politically painful decisions. The costs of maintaining the six MTBs, maintaining the bases the CHOD wished closed and maintaining the Home Guard at it present size will eat up all if not more than the authorized budget increase. Small Improvements -------------- ¶4. (C) In her presentation of the plan, the Defense Minister stated that it would bring about an ultra-modern Navy and a stronger Air Force. In reality the new frigates and the new transport aircraft which make up these upgrades are based on previous governmental decisions and no new investments in the Navy or Air Force are discussed. The crucial question of which fighter aircraft the GON will select (JSF or Saab Gripen) was left unanswered by the plan. The Army will increase by approximately 300 jobs but it is not clear if the new positions will be soldiers. The decision not to create another professional battalion leaves the Norwegian Army in the same position as today, severely limited and primarily reliant on conscripts who volunteer for one-time deployments in international operations. Politically Consistent Downplaying of Defense Needs -------------- ¶5. (C) All these decisions are consistent with the preferred GON approach to defense issues which places a stress on territorial defense, particularly in the High North, maintains local bases and the Home Guard which secure local jobs and whose troops cannot be sent off to international adventures, and keeps a costly MTB program which had strong support in the districts. The GON,s rhetorical support for UN international operations and for Nordic Defense Cooperation are mentioned in the plan but no concrete details show how they will pursue these goals. Can,t Say They Weren,t Warned -------------- ¶6. (C) By approving this plan the GON has ignored Ambassador Whitney,s, General Diesen,s, and others repeated calls for Norway to show leadership and dedicate enough of its bountiful resources to fund a capable defense. The Socialist Left,s anti-military opinions as well as the Norwegian public,s general absence of threat perception have influenced the GON to provide only the most minimal support to Norway,s armed forces. As General Diesen has repeatedly warned, this will have an impact on Norway,s ability to respond to any crises in its territory and will severely curtail Norway,s ability to project all but the most minimal forces internationally. WHITNEY