NORWAY'S 2008 AFGHANISTAN CONTRIBUTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000123

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: EAID MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S 2008 AFGHANISTAN CONTRIBUTIONS

REF: STATE 19516

Classified By: Ambassador Benson Whitney
for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Norway's Minister of Defense told Ambassador Whitney
on February 28th that Norway had little more to give on
Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains Norway's largest military
commitment and with the 50 percent increase in aid for 2008
Afghanistan will become its leading aid recipient. No new
military or development commitments from Norway should be
expected this year. The vocal anti-war minority in Norway
includes one member of the government coalition, has long
dominated public discussion over Norway's Afghanistan
commitments. The GON has only recently begun to clearly
explain and defend the Afghanistan mission in public. This
over-due public posture indicates a welcome long-term
commitment, but with clear limits. End Summary

Norway out of Afghanistan Now!
--------------

2. (SBU) The Socialist Left Party (SV) has long opposed
Norwegian involvement in Afghanistan and has worked (with
significant successes) to minimize Norway's military
contributions to ISAF. A January SV conference on
Afghanistan heightened media attention on SV's opinions on
Afghanistan and led to SV members calling for Norway to
withdraw its troops and have the UN take over control from
NATO. SV members, supported by other anti-war groups,
claimed that problems with the Taliban are created by ISAF's
offensive military strategies and, along with other leftist
groups, organized marches to "Get Norway out of Afghanistan."
Just as media attention was dying down, the January 14
attack on the Serena hotel in Kabul, with FM Stoere huddled
in the basement, added a dramatic and tragic element to the
public debate and kept the GON's Afghanistan policy on the
front pages.

Labor Party Finally Speaks Out
--------------

3. (C) The GON has long used the vocal SV opposition to
Afghanistan as an excuse for not increasing its contributions
to ISAF. As recently as January 29 Norway's Development
Minister (and SV member) Erik Solheim said (to U/S Burns)
that Norwegian presence in Afghanistan was a "big, highly
disputed political issue" and that the government would fall
if Norwegian forces took large casualties. It is true that
Afghanistan has been a big political issue in Norwegian
politics, but this is largely self-inflicted, occurring
primarily because of SV,s threats to leave the GON's
coalition and the Labor Party's unwillingness to confront SV
or to defend the Afghan mission to the Norwegian public.


4. (SBU) Stoere's February 5 speech before Parliament
therefore was one of the strongest signals any senior
official has given that the GON understands and is willing to
defend the necessity of the military aspects of Norway's
Afghanistan contributions. Stoere stated that "we can not
accept that Afghanistan again becomes a base for
international terror." While stressing that only a
comprehensive approach balancing military and development
will succeed, Stoere stated that security is decisive. He
went on to say that reducing the military presence would
damage and weaken many of the positive signs seen in
Afghanistan and that it is only NATO, through ISAF, which can
provide the military force necessary. He also observed that
through NATO allies and partners, one fifth of the world is
participating in the effort. All of these points were aimed
specifically (if belatedly) at objections that SV has raised
to Norway's Afghanistan and ISAF participation.


5. (SBU) Despite strong opposition to Afghanistan from the
left, public support for broad Norwegian involvement in
Afghanistan has stayed steady at 50-60%. The degree of this
support should not be overstated as it is shallow, based
primarily on the impression that Norway's involvement is
focused on peacekeeping and in humanitarian aid. This
support would likely not continue if Norwegian forces
suffered significant casualties. Until recently GON leaders
have been reluctant to publicly explain why Norway is in
Afghanistan or what the military role in Afghanistan is,
leaving the debate to opponents. Other leaders, such as the
President of Parliament, have spoken out about the need for
additional military commitments to Afghanistan.

Details on Military Contributions
--------------


6. (SBU) In late November 2007 the GON was forced (by Dutch
requests for help, pressure from SACEUR and others) to hold a
divisive coalition debate over what military forces to commit
to ISAF for 2008. An agreement was reached over additional
troop deployments and the Parliamentary mandate for ISAF
deployments was extended until the late fall of 2009 (after
national elections scheduled for September). Norway's
contributions include approximately 650 troops in
Afghanistan, split between the PRT in Meymaneh, the QRF in
Masar-e-Sharif and the National Contingent in Kabul. In the
coming weeks 150 SOF will deploy to Kabul for 18 months.
Norway will also increase the number of OMLT personnel from
10 to approximately 50 beginning in October. Although the
QRF will stand down this summer, the PRT in Meymaneh will be
reinforced by an infantry company and 3 rotary winged
aircraft, leaving total troops deployed at around 500.


7. (C) So far, Norway has refused specific requests (from the
Dutch last fall and from SecDef Gates before Vilnius) to send
additional troops, particularly to the south of Afghanistan.
The PM, FM and Defense Minister have all publicly said that
Norway is doing its part, and does not have the capacity to
contribute more, and that no additional troops will be sent
in 2008. Our analysis shows that the Norwegian Army is
particularly stretched and at most would be able to provide
only a few additional OMLT teams. The Telemark battalion,
requested by reftel is not available for deployment now.
Elements of the Telemark are already in Afghanistan, filling
in at the PRT due to a change in the training rotation of the
regular battalions which are sent to Afghanistan. As a
result, the Telemark will not be available for deployment as
a unit until 2010, and deployment to Afghanistan then would
remain problematic.

Response to our Demarche
--------------

8. (C) Thus, when the Ambassador met on February 28 with the
Minister of Defense, Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen, to present
reftel points, most of the discussion revolved around the
feasibility of any increase in troops. Strom-Erichsen shared
the Ambassador's concern about the need for all allies to
take our responsibilities for Afghanistan seriously and
contribute. Norway, she claimed, has done so providing a PRT
where it was asked to do so and Special Operations troops in
Kabul. Norway's previously announced increase of OMLT
personnel from 10 to 50 is a sign of their commitment to the
mission. She noted that Norwegian troops are training the
ANA company in their PRT region and Norwegian police are
working in their PRT and Kabul. Further, some Norwegian SOF
are embedded in Afghan Ministry of Interior units. Finally,
she mentioned the contribution of Norwegian helicopters which
is expected to be a significant force multiplier.


9. (C) Strom-Erichsen appreciated the recent US contribution
of marines and the critical support the U.S. provides in
Afghanistan. She also appreciated the particular need for
maneuver battalions. She repeated that parts of the Telemark
Battalion are already in Afghanistan and thus the battalion
as a whole cannot be sent. That battalion could only
theoretically be considered for full deployment in the summer
of 2010. She concluded saying that the only realistic exit
strategy for Afghanistan would come through the training of
the Afghan army. She promised that her staff would look
again to see if a few extra people could be spared to
contribute towards an OMLT, but was not optimistic. The
Ambassador concluded the meeting by discussing the long-term
need for Norway to be able to contribute more troops and
military capacity and thus Norway must commit more funds to
its military. Strom-Erichsen's staff responded that the
government is looking to increase the size of the Norwegian
army to better respond to this type of need.

Details on Development Contributions
--------------

10. (U) In contrast to the status quo in Norway's military
contributions, the GON has announced a large increase in
development and humanitarian aid, bringing 2008 assistance to
$140 million. This represents a substantial increase over
2007 levels and will be focused on school construction, rural
development and humanitarian aid. The GON has committed to
build 82 new schools in Faryab by the end of 2008, is
contributing to many rural development and poverty reduction
programs such as water, sanitation, micro-finance, roads,
rule of law promotion, capacity building through the Civil
Service Institute, anti-corruption efforts as well as
developing a management framework for the oil and gas sector.
In the humanitarian field the GON supports the UNHCR and the
Red Cross and in strengthening UNAMA's coordination role.


11. (C) Strengthening the UN coordinator's role is also a
priority for the GON. The MFA's political director Kai Eide
has been mentioned for this UN coordinator position. Eide is
knowledgeable about Afghanistan and has worked within the GON
to push it to do more for Afghanistan.

Comment
--------------

12. (C) For 2008 it is very unlikely that the GON would
agree to additional military deployments to Afghanistan. Not
only is this a politically difficult issue but the Norwegian
Army is severely stretched. In addition, the GON would much
rather increase civilian aid, and to its credit has been
doing so. Very recent GON willingness to publicly explain
and defend the Afghanistan mission and reiteration of its
long-term commitment are welcome.

WHITNEY